|
CHAPTER 7 AT A GLANCE Introduction Historically, child support enforcement was a private matter, financed by parents and governed by State law. State and local governments became involved only if a child needed public assistance. For almost the past fifty years, however, there has been increasing Federal involvement in both the structure and the funding of child support activities.1 An examination of the historic funding of the child support enforcement program established in Part D of Title IV of the Social Security Act (IV-D) reveals that Congress has continually adapted program funding to encourage activities which it believes are important to program improvement. The IV-D program benefits from a generous Federal funding formula. In fiscal
year 1997, the Federal government paid over $2.3 billion to States for the
operation of child support enforcement programs. State and local governments
appropriated an additional $1.1 billion.2 The Federal contribution is
essential to the success of the child support program. Federal funds defray a
majority of the costs of State child support agencies, and are instrumental in
determining the agencies' functions and directing the priorities of the program.
With this context in mind, the Working Group analyzed the funding stream for activities related to medical child support enforcement and the impact the funding mechanisms have on policy choices. The recommendations that follow support the programmatic reforms addressed elsewhere in this Report or that may arise with further study. Current IV-D Funding Structure Funding for the child support enforcement program is provided in three general ways. 1- Federal Administrative Funding The largest share of program funding comes from Federal administrative funds. The Federal government provides 66 percent of the operating funds for State child support programs.12 Federal funding at this rate is "open ended" in that it pays its percentage of expenditures by matching the amount spent by State and local governments, with no upper limit or ceiling. Federal law and regulations dictate the specific expenditures for which this 66 percent FFP is available, and the Federal government reviews expenditures to determine whether they were reasonable.13 2- State and Local Administrative Funding In order to receive any Federal funding, State and/or local governments must provide 34 percent of the funds needed to operate their child support enforcement programs. Most States pay for a majority of child support expenditures from the State's general revenue. Some states pay administrative costs from the portion of TANF child support collections retained by the State. In some States, county governments pay a portion of or the entire State share. States also have the option to charge fees and recover costs for services from the custodial and/or noncustodial parent.14 3- Incentive Payments Federal incentive payments are designed to encourage States to operate efficient, cost-effective child support programs A new incentive-funding scheme for child support enforcement will be phased in, beginning in fiscal year 2000.15 New performance measures, developed by OCSE, in consultation with State IV-D Directors, in response to law enacted by Congress in 1996, developed base incentives on the program's success in achieving a number of goals, in addition to its ability to provide services in a cost-effective manner.16 Incentive payments are tied to the rates of paternity establishment, order establishment, collection of current child support payments, and collection of arrears, as well as the amount of support collected for each dollar spent.17 The Federal government provided incentive payments totaling over $411 million to State child support enforcement programs in fiscal 1997. Incentive payments will be capped at $422 million in fiscal year 2000, and gradually increase to $483 million in fiscal year 2008.18 States must reinvest the full amount of Federal incentive payments in their child support programs.19 Incentive payments, whose performance measures mirror program goals, should encourage states to improve their child support programs and comply with Congressional goals. Policy Issues Related to IV-D Funding As noted above, the Federal government provides 66 percent of the funding for most IV-D program activities, including those related to medical support. In the past, when Congress wanted to encourage activity in a given area, it offered FFP at a higher level. For example, Congress provided enhanced FFP to encourage paternity establishment and automation. The Working Group believes that Congress should provide enhanced FFP at the 90 percent rate for medical child support activities to encourage states to more aggressively pursue medical support enforcement. At the current time, States are faced with new initiatives and competing priorities to medical child support enforcement activities at the State level. While recognizing the importance of medical support, IV-D agencies are fully occupied. Agencies report being occupied with implementing new mandates and the critical role child support collections play in welfare reform. In a world of limited TANF benefits, full and timely collection of child support is a lynchpin, critical to the economic self-sufficiency of millions of single parent families. Both CSPIA and the Working Group's recommendations require State child support agencies to assume new responsibilities. The Working Group's recommendations and existing Federal legislation require major systems changes for IV-D agencies, which are still struggling with PRWORA's automation requirements. Some examples of the additional demands for automation and for casework services that medical child support enforcement-under current law and as proposed in this Report-places on IV-D agencies include:
The Working Group concluded that child support enforcement agencies cannot be expected to fulfill these critical mandates unless they are able to hire and train adequate staff and fund the enhancement of systems. Congressional authorization of additional funding for medical support is essential to improved IV-D performance in this area. The funds that State and Federal governments devote to medical child support will be key to improving medical support enforcement, and implementing reforms. Enhanced FFP and a new incentive measure for the IV-D program will provide important sources of funding to help State child support agencies ensure that every child who is eligible for child support services has comprehensive health care coverage. Enhanced Federal Financial Participation (FFP) Congress has successfully used enhanced funding to "jump start" State implementation of new child support activities. For example, in the Family Support Act of 1988 Congress provided 90 percent enhanced FFP to defray laboratory costs incurred in establishing paternity.20 This enhanced FFP contributed to dramatic increases in the number of IV-D cases where paternity was established.21 Enhanced Federal funding for establishing and improving State automated child support systems similarly made it possible for States to comply with requirements in the Family Support Act and PRWORA that they create highly automated child support enforcement systems.22 These systems are designed to make it faster and easier to establish and enforce child support orders and to distribute the payments received. When completed by all jurisdictions, they are expected to make the child support program more efficient and cost-effective. As with these priority areas, enhanced FFP would highlight the importance of medical support and give the states the resources they need to implement CSPIA'S medical support requirements and the Working Group's recommendations. However, the Working Group recognizes that the Federal government cannot be asked to provide an open-ended commitment to funding medical support activities. States will need to assume greater responsibility for funding medical support. Thus, the Working Group recommends that Congress offer an enhanced 90 percent FFP rate for medical support activities but only for a limited 5-year period. By offering this "carrot" and prioritizing IV-D medical support
activities, Congress would use the power of the purse to ensure prompt and
effective implementation of Title IV-D's medical support provisions and the
Working Group's recommendations. This funding could be capped in order to limit
the total amount of Federal funding earmarked for enhanced medical support and
to help Congress predict the cost of implementing these provisions.
In 1998, Congress established a new incentive payment scheme, mandated by CSPIA, which rewards performance in five areas.23 At the same time, it capped the total amount of Federal incentive payments that would be made available to the States. The new system is currently being phased in, and will be fully implemented in FY 2002.24 CSPIA also authorized creation of a sixth incentive measure, medical support enforcement.25 This legislation required that the medical support performance measure be incorporated, in a revenue neutral manner, into the performance measures already established by Pub. L. 105-200. Once a medical support performance measure is adopted, medical support will be added to the list of activities for which states can receive incentive payments. However, States will still be competing for the same pot of money, which will be divided based on six factors rather than five. CSPIA authorized the Secretary of HHS to develop a medical support incentive measure in consultation with State IV-D agency directors and representatives of children eligible to receive child support. The Medical Support Incentive Work Group began meeting in 1998. The statute requires that the incentive measure be based on the States' effectiveness in establishing and enforcing medical child support obligations. The Medical Incentive Support Work Group's final report to Congress is due on June 1, 2001.26 Developing a medical support performance measure has proven a difficult task. The Medical Support Incentive Work Group's June 23, 1999 preliminary report to Congress states that the primary obstacle is the lack of reliable data upon which a measure can be based.27 At last review by OCSE's audit division, only seven states could provide medical support data-and that data was considered to have limited reliability. This problem will be addressed through the new State IV-D reporting requirements,28 but it will be at least a year before this process provides enough reliable and accurate data to design a truly useful performance indicator. The Medical Support Incentive Work Group also expressed concern about the
benefits of implementing a performance measure before states actually have
adequate tools to improve their performance in this area. The NMSN, which will
be key to improving medical support enforcement, will not actually be finalized
and in broad use until FY 2002. For all of these reasons, the Medical Support
Incentive Work Group recommended postponing implementation of the performance
measure.
In the interim, the Medical Support Incentive Work Group will be reviewing State-reported data regarding the number of cases in which: (1) medical support (cash and/or family health coverage) is ordered; (2) health care coverage is ordered; or (3) health care coverage is provided as ordered. In addition, the Medical Support Incentive Work Group contemplates a system which rewards continuous improvement, as well as current performance. Given the historic inattention to medical support issues, it is important to measure improvement, so that States with poor records can hope to earn incentives by significant annual improvement. The Working Group concurs with the Medical Support Incentive Work Group's judgment that a performance measure should be developed but that data is not yet available to do so. The Working Group also agrees that the Medical Support Incentive Work Group should develop measures that reward the full range of medical support activities, including securing and enforcing health care coverage in IV-D cases, contributions toward premiums, and other health care reimbursement. Consistent with the Decision Matrix adopted by the Working Group, the Medical Support Incentive Work Group should devise a measure that rewards States for enrolling children in the most appropriate coverage, whether that is private or public. The incentive payment scheme should reward States which screen cases and follow through, so that children who cannot obtain private coverage are enrolled in public coverage, such as Medicaid or SCHIP. The Working Group supports the idea of a standard that sets minimum acceptable performance levels and rewards significant improvement over that level. Finally, the Working Group also agrees with the Medical Support Incentive Work Group's finding that the states need to have access to the tools needed to improve their performance, before Congress establishes a performance measure. A number of the recommendations made in this Report require changes in
Federal law and regulations, which will occur over a period of time.
Furthermore, the results of demonstration projects suggested in Chapter 8 are
designed to provide additional insight into ways to further improve medical
support enforcement. These results are several years away. For these reasons,
the Working Group recommends that the medical support incentive payment system
be developed and implemented in conjunction with other funding recommendations.
With the need for the development of outcome measurements-not only for the existing requirements but also for any that are implemented due to the Working Group's recommendations-delay was unavoidable. But the consensus was that a full 5-year delay for development and implementation of this incentive measure was untenable. The consensus reached balances the practical considerations described above with the need to send the message that medical support activities must happen sooner-not later. The Working Group does not favor indefinite postponement of State accountability for improved medical support enforcement. Indeed, some members of the Working Group felt that postponement of the medical support performance incentive measure might give states an undeserved reprieve, since medical support requirements are not new to the IV-D agencies.29 A number of Working Group members found the lack of data disturbing in light of existing statutory requirements. They feared that postponing implementation of a medical support incentive system would reward states that have long ignored medical support. Others observed that postponing implementation of the medical support incentive measure could send the wrong signal to State child support agencies. The Working Group's decision to develop and implement this incentive measure in conjunction with other efforts should not be interpreted as a decision to downgrade the importance of medical support in the child support enforcement program. The Working Group wants to stress that the period of enhanced FFP should be used as a time of preparation for and focus on making medical support a core child support activity. Otherwise, children could needlessly be denied health care coverage, at great cost to private insurers, public health care programs, and most importantly the children themselves. Ultimately, the Working Group concluded that enhanced FFP for a limited time period would focus states' attention on medical support, and generate increased State activity in the medical support area. This funding would expire after five years. Thus, it seemed appropriate to propose a plan in which the medical support incentive payment would be phased in and become fully operational as enhanced Federal funding ends. To achieve this, the medical support incentive measure must be developed as quickly as possible. The Working Group recommends that the Medical Support Incentive Work Group continue its work and develop its recommendations, so that the medical support performance indicator will be published in final form within three years of the date enhanced FFP becomes available. At that point, OCSE should begin gathering the data needed to assess State performance, so that the medical support performance indicator will be fully implemented into the incentive payment system when the enhanced Federal funding expires at the end of the five-year period. Under this approach, CSPIA's requirements will be fully implemented, and
recommendations of the Working Group should be in place before the incentive
payment becomes fully operational. In the meantime, enhanced FFP will make it
possible for states to fund more concerted efforts in the medical support area.
When enhanced funding ends, the incentive payments system will reward states for
continued, focused, medical support activity, and they will have the tools
necessary to ensure that medical support is consistently ordered and enforced.
Most Working Group members agree that medical support efforts of the IV-D agencies have resulted in savings to the Medicaid program. Identifying the savings to the Medicaid program (and the cost avoidance to SCHIPs) when the IV-D agency obtains coverage on behalf of Medicaid and SCHIP recipients is an important and complex matter that the Working Group strongly believe merits further study. So that IV-D agencies benefit from their efforts to obtain third-party private health insurance, State Medicaid agencies could share these cost savings with the IV-D agencies. New York State, for example, estimates that for every Medicaid child who has private health care coverage available, there is a potential Medicaid savings of $666 per year.30 Since receipt of such savings could be a strong incentive to the IV-D agency to enroll children in private health insurance, the medical support incentive measure could be used to better identify these savings, with the IV-D, Medicaid, and SCHIP agencies collaborating in establishing the appropriate reporting requirements. The Working Group identified several complications in the measurement and
distribution of such savings. First, much of the Medicaid savings realized
through medical child support collection will be through cost avoidance instead
of cost recovery. Expenses that are cost avoided do not show up in accounts
receivable as a specific amount. Not only is it very difficult to determine
accurately the exact amount of Medicaid spending that has been cost avoided, but
there is no "pot of money" in which cost-avoided funds reside.
Second, because IV-D agencies receive a higher rate of FFP than Medicaid
agencies, a policy of direct cross funding from the Medicaid agency to the IV-D
agency could result in an overall loss of State funds (as more of the savings
would need to be returned to the Federal government).
Endnotes [1] See Krueger, Ruth Gillie. “Analyzing American Social Policy: A Study of the Development of the Child Support Provisions of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 (PRWORA).” Dissertation presented to the University of Southern California School of Public Administration (December 1998); Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, “The Child Support Enforcement Program: Policy and Practice.” U.S. Government Printing Office (December 5, 1989). [2] U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration of Children and Families, Office of Child Support Enforcement, Twenty-second Annual Report to Congress, Table 1. Financial for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years. [3] Section 402a of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §402(a)(ii). [4] Pub. L. 90-248. [5] However, for the first five years of the program, FFP for non-AFDC cases was somewhat problematic. In 1980, financing for non-AFDC cases was made permanent. [6] Pub. L. 93-647, 42 U.S.C. §651
et seq. [7] This figure was reduced to 12 percent effective October 1, 1983. Pub. L. 96-178, Pub. L. 96-265, Pub. L. 96-272. [8] Pub. L. 98-378. [9] Pub. L. 100-465. [10] 42 USC §658a. This new system is being phased in and will be fully operative in FY 2002. [11] Pub. L. 105-200, § 401 112 Stat. 659 (1998). [12] 42 U.S.C. §655(a) (1999); 45 C.F.R. 304.20 (1999). [13] 42 U.S.C. §655(a) (1999); 45 C.F.R. 304.20 (1999). [14] Fees received and costs recovered for non-TANF cases totaled $40,797,848, in fiscal year 1997, (Twenty-second Annual Report to Congress, Table 22). [15] 42 U.S.C. §658a (1999). [16] 42 U.S.C. §658A (1999). This approach was endorsed by the U.S. Commission on Interstate Child Support Enforcement in its Report to Congress, “Supporting Our Children, a Blueprint for Reform” (1992), 288. [17] 42 U.S.C. §658a(b)(4). The incentive measures are as follows: a) Paternity Establishment: The ratio of children in the State or IV8209D caseload who were born out of wedlock and have paternity established compared to the total number of children in the State or IV8209D caseload who were born out of wedlock in the prior year. b) Order Establishment: The percentage of IV8209D cases with support orders. c) Collection Rate: The IV8209D collection rate for current support due. d) Collection of Arrearage: The percent of IV8209D arrearage cases paying. e) Expenditures:Collections Ratio: The total dollars collected per dollar of expenditures. [18] 42 U.S.C. §658a (1999). [19] 42 U.S.C. §658a(f)(1999). [20] 42 U.S.C. §655(a)(1)(C) (1999). [21] Office of Child Support Enforcement, Twenty-second Annual Report to Congress and Twenty-first Annual Report to Congress. [22] 42 U.S.C. §654(16), 42 U.S.C. §655(a)(1)(1999). [23] 42 U.S.C. §658a (1999). [24] Id. [25] Pub. L. 105-200 §201(d)(6)(E), 112 Stat. 657 (1998), codified at 42 U.S.C. §658a, note 2 (1999). [26] Id. [27] HHS, Report to Congress on the Development of a Medical Support Incentive for the Child Support Enforcement Program (June 23, 1999), 1. [28] HHS, Report to Congress on the Development of a Medical Support Incentive for the Child Support Enforcement Program (1999), 2. [29] Since the 1980s child support agencies have been required to enforce medical support. See Pub. L. 98-378, the Child Support Amendments of 1984. [30] New York State Department of Health, Office of Medicaid Management.
Download FREE Adobe Acrobat® Reader™ to view PDF files located on this site.
OCSE Home
|
Press Room
|
Events Calendar
|
Publications
|
|