Kansas v. United States, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 12021 (No. 98-3341, U.S. Ct. App. 10^th Cir. June 1, 2000) affirming 24 F.Supp.2d 1192 (D. Kan. 1998).

Kansas brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief in response to PRWORA's (Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996) child support enforcement provisions. The District Court granted the U.S. motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court ruling finding that these provisions do not exceed Congress' authority under the Spending Clause (Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution) or the Tenth Amendment.

Kansas argues that the IV-D requirements were "too onerous and expensive, necessitate too much manpower, and encroach upon its ability to determine its own laws. Because of the money at stake, Kansas contends it is being coerced into implementing the program requirements." The Court of Appeals analyzes the case in terms of South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). Dole delineates the requirements for Congress to exercise its power under the Spending Clause. Noting that the non-payment of child support, particularly in interstate cases, is a "widespread problem which has significant, deleterious effects on children, particularly those in low-income families," the court dismisses out-of-hand the argument that Congressional action in enacting PRWORA was not in pursuit of "the general welfare." The second requirement of Dole is similarly dispensed with. PRWORA is unambiguous that the IV-D provisions are attached to receipt of TANF and IV-D funds.

Third, the IV-D program is clearly related to the TANF program. Thus, there exists a close "correlation between the funding condition and the Federal interest." The fourth requirement of Dole is that there be no independent constitutional bar. Congress cannot use its powers to require States to engage in unconstitutional activity. Here, Kansas' argument that the State New Hire Directory and automatic enforcement requirements violate the privacy and due process rights of its citizens is similarly dismissed. The Court of Appeals notes the express requirements Congress imposes on participating States to safeguard confidential information.

Finally, Kansas asserts that the financial carrot offered by PRWORA is simply so large in this case ($130 million in combined TANF and IV-D funds) that the inducement becomes coercion. Noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has never employed the theory of coercion to invalidate a funding condition, the Court of Appeals declines to "expand the concept of 'coercion' as it applies to relations between the State and Federal governments, and find a large Federal grant accompanied by a set of conditional requirements to be coercive because of the powerful incentive it creates for the States to accept it."

"Put more simply, Kansas' options have been increased, not constrained, by the offer of more Federal dollars. The requirements contained in IV-D represent a reasoned attempt by Congress to ensure that its grant money is used to further the State and Federal interest in assisting needy families, in part through improved child support enforcement. This is a valid exercise of Congress' spending power, and the requirements do not render PRWORA unconstitutional."