Courts agree that a child support agency must give the noncustodial parent notice of the alleged arrearage and an opportunity to contest the amount of arrears. Service by mail, to the obligor's last known address, meets Constitutional due process requirements. See, e.g. Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Ragland, 330 Ark. 280, 954 S.W.2d 218 (1997) (finding that personal service of process is not needed, for enforcement by the issuing court); State ex rel Houk v. Grewing, 586 N.W.2d 224 (Iowa, 1998) (finding that Iowa's "Notice of Support Debt" and service in compliance with the Iowa Code of Civil Procedure satisfy due process requirements); Department of Revenue v. Beans, 965 P.2d 725 (Alaska, 1998) (finding that Alaska's drivers license revocation statute does not unconstitutionally deprive an obligor of due process, nor does it violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution).

Washington v. Thompson, 339 Ark. 417, 6 S.W.3d 82 (1999). This case involved the child support agency's registration of a Washington State judgment for enforcement in Arkansas. Although the father's defenses should have been barred because he failed to request a hearing to contest the validity of the order within the statutory time period, he was entitled to a hearing because the notification packet that he received did not adequately explain the father's rights and duties under the statute.

Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Ragland, 330 Ark. 280, 954 S.W.2d 218 (1997). Personal service of process is not needed in an enforcement action brought in the issuing court. The court has continuing personal jurisdiction over the obligor, and service by mail, to the obligor's last known address, is sufficient.

State ex rel. Houk v. Grewing, 586 N.W.2d 224 (Iowa 1998). Iowa's "Notice of Support Debt" and service in compliance with the Iowa Code of Civil Procedure satisfy due process requirements.

Hurd v. Dep't of Human Services, 580 N.W.2d 383 (Iowa 1998). The father was not entitled to a formal agency hearing before information about his child support debt was released to consumer agencies. Established internal procedures, which entitled him to a conference, adequately protected his due process rights.

Tindall v. Wayne County Friend of Court, No. 98 CV-73896-DT, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15928 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 1999). The Friend of Court's practice of issuing pre-signed show cause orders and bench warrants, without actual review by a judge and failure to follow procedures set forth in Michigan Court Rules, violated the defendant's due process rights.

United States v. Grigsby, No. 99-071L (D.R.I. Feb. 24, 2000). Child Support Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 228(b), which gives the defendant the burden of refuting the presumption that if the government produced a support order then the parent was able to pay, violates the defendant's Constitutional due process rights.

Layne v. State Child Support Enforcement Division, 505 S.E.2d 412 (W. Va. 1998). The Bureau for Child Support Enforcement must provide an obligor with notice and an opportunity to be heard, before implementing wage-withholding. Mandatory statutory procedures must be followed prior to instituting automatic income withholding.

Ashford v. State, No. 72, 2000 Md. LEXIS 185 (Md. Apr. 19, 2000). The father was entitled to a jury trial in Circuit Court for the charge of constructive criminal contempt.

Idaho v. Garcia, (Idaho Ct. App., 975 P.2d 793),1180 No. 24384, February 2, 1999. A man incarcerated in a Texas prison was denied due process when no provision was made for his participation in an Idaho child support hearing, the Idaho Court of Appeals held February 2. Acknowledging that an inmate does not have an absolute right to be personally present at trial in civil litigation, the court pointed out that in In re Baby Doe, 936 P.2d 690 (1997), it set out some of the factors to be considered in determining when an inmate should be allowed to appear personally in a civil proceeding. Finding that here the inmate's request to appear telephonically was never addressed by the judge, the court asserted that a judge may not bypass the Doe balancing process by summarily rejecting or disregarding a prisoner's request to appear at trial.

Bostic v. Dep't of Revenue, 968 P.2d 564 (Alaska 1998). The father was entitled to notice and a hearing, when the child support agency modified his child support obligation, as part of their administrative review process. Agency must base its decision on evidence presented at the hearing.

Gregory v. Rice, 727 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1999). The case involves handling of contempt proceedings in matters presented to the court by Department of Revenue personnel and heard by child support hearing officers. It specifies required contents of hearing officer's report – level of court review. Court is not to be a rubber stamp.

Kelly v. State Dep't of Human Resources ex rel Kelley, 269 Ga. 384, 498 S.E.2d 741 (1998). There is no statutory or common law right to a jury trial in an action to modify child support. Recommendations of child support hearing officer were properly adopted by court after a judicial hearing. Nevertheless, if either parent desires, he/she is not precluded from seeking a jury trial for a modification proceeding, regardless of whether an agency review has been initiated.

Mason v. Dep't of Health and Human Services, No. 98-263, 1998 Mt. LEXIS 310 (1998). Father's due process rights were not affected by alleged procedural defects. Alleged oral agreement did not modify the father's child support obligation, under a Hawaii order.

Bostic v. Dep't of Revenue, 968 P.2d 564 (Alaska 1998). The father was entitled to notice and a hearing, when the child support agency modified his child support obligation, as part of their administrative review process. Agency must base its decision on evidence presented at the hearing.

C.R.B. v. State, 974 P.2d 931 (Wyo. 1999). Service of process, by placing the summons and complaint in the putative father's mailbox, was sufficient given that he had refused to accept service and was told that the documents were being placed in the mailbox.

Berry v. Cabinet for Families & Children ex rel. Howard (Higdon), Ky., 998 S.W.2d 464), 1529. No. 98-SC-682-DG, 8/26/99. A custodial mother, through a motion by the State Cabinet for Families and Children, is entitled to prospective relief from a prior order terminating her child's father's support obligation, which was entered at a time when she believed her future husband would adopt her child, the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled August 26. Saying that this case presents a novel issue, the court remarked that the prior agreed order terminating the father's obligation clearly indicates that the only reason for doing so was that the mother planned to marry a man who had indicated he would adopt her child. It instructed the trial court to vacate the prior agreed order and to establish child support to be paid by the father prospectively from the date of the motion for relief. One justice dissented, arguing that because the sole basis for relief here--the fact that the adoption did not occur--was completely within the control of the mother and her husband, this is not the extraordinary situation CR 60-02 was intended to remedy.

Williams v. Davenport, 713 N.W.2d 1224 (Ill. Ct. App. 1999). The IV-D agency represented the mother and child in a paternity action. Upon motion by the defendant, the court appointed a guardian ad litem for the minor child. After DNA tests showed that the defendant was not the child's father, the court ordered the Department and the defendant jointly and severally liable for the attorney fees and costs of the guardian ad litem. The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court did not have authority to order the Department to pay legal fees, as the Court of Claims retains exclusive jurisdiction in determining whether the State is liable for the expenses of litigation.

State Child Support Enforcement Division v. Pealatere, No. S-7507, No. 5238, 2000 Alas. LEXIS 11 (Feb. 11, 2000). The child support agency sought reimbursement of public assistance provided to the non-custodial parent. The appellate court correctly determined that the trial court properly offset the mother's interest in the marital property against her future child support obligation, because the parties to the divorce had agreed to such an offset and the court had approved the agreement as in the child's best interest. Thus, the child support agency's independent right to recoup the cost of public assistance payments yielded to equitable considerations. Because the mother relinquished her interest in a portion of the marital property, she was entitled to an offset against the amount sought by the Child Support Enforcement Division. Alaska law provides that a parent's liability for assistance may not exceed the amount of support provided in the support order.

In re Comer, 14 Cal.4^th 504, 927 P.2d 265 (Cal. 1996). A custodial parent's concealment of a child that terminates when the child is still a minor does not constitute a defense to an action brought on behalf of the child against the non-custodial parent for child support arrears. Furthermore, the State is not estopped from seeking to recover arrears, where the custodial parent has assigned child support rights to the State in exchange for public assistance payments.

In re Marriage of Dennis, 59 Cal. App.4^th 998 (1997). Los Angeles County was not barred from collecting child support arrears as reimbursement for the public assistance that the child received. Where there is an order that child support is to be paid to the court trustee and the custodial parent's concealment of the child does not prevent the noncustodial parent from making payments, the custodial parent is not estopped from seeking arrearages.

Willing v. Division of Child Support Enforcement, Mo. Ct. App. 99878 S.W.2d 568), 1565. WD 56313, 8/31/99. A divorced mother waived her right to past-due support for her child from her ex-husband for the nine-year period during which he had been led to believe that her current husband had adopted the child, thus terminating his parental rights, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, ruled August 31 (in an opinion modifying, on its own motion, its prior opinion in this case, released June 22). The court rejected the argument that the obligor's defense of waiver by acquiescence could not succeed because there was no change in his situation. . . . By failing to pursue enforcement of support payments over so long a period, the mother lulled the obligor into a false sense of security and deprived him of his visitation rights, the court stated, concluding that the obligee had acquiesced in the obligor's failure to remit the past-due support payments as they become due.

Truman v. Truman, Neb., 591 N.W.2d 81),,1288. No. S-98-347, 4/2/99. A woman is estopped from collecting accrued child support from her ex-husband based on their prior agreement that he need no longer pay support after she relinquished custody of one of their two children to him, the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled April 2. Although it recognized that the general rule in Nebraska is to allow retroactive modification of child support only back to the filing date of the modification application, the court said that it has previously held that the doctrine of equitable estoppel may operate to excuse the payment of accrued support under the appropriate circumstances. Saying that there is no evidence that the parties' agreement was detrimental to their now-adult children's welfare, the court agreed with the trial court that under the present circumstances, it would be inequitable to require the obligor to pay support accruing after 1979.