Palais v. Dep't of Administrative Services, No. CV 960566803, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1588 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 10, 1997). The State can intercept a Federal and/or State tax refund to apply to past due child support when the obligor is in compliance with court ordered support and arrearage payments. The State is statutorily authorized to make such intercept.

Long v. Indiana, No. 79A02-9811-CR-861, 1999 Ind. App. LEXIS 1475 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 1999). The father's conviction for intentional failure to pay more than $10,000 in child support was upheld, as the State properly credited the amounts withheld from the father's income tax refunds on the date when the State received the money, rather than on the date when the IRS intercepted the funds.

Davis v. Dep't of Human Resources, 349 N.C. 208, 505 S.E.2d 77 (1998). The Child Support Enforcement Division was not entitled to intercept the father's State and Federal income tax refunds, when the father was fully complying with his current support obligations and up to date with court ordered payments towards accrued arrears.

Fazio v. Medina County Child Support Enforcement Agency, No. C.A. No. 2719-M, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4180 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 9, 1998). The county was not precluded from submitting the father's case to the IRS for collection of arrears, when the father owed more than $500 in past due support, although he complied with a 1991 order that required him to make monthly payments toward the amount in arrears.

Davis v. Davis, No. C-970363, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2221 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). A domestic relations court lacks jurisdiction to entertain an obligor's motion to prevent a child support agency from intercepting his Federal income tax refund for payment of child support arrears, when administrative rules require objections be raised, in the first instance, in an internal review by the enforcement agency.

Short v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 335, 1996 U.S. Claims LEXIS 209 (Ct. Cl. 1996). The court denied the plaintiff's request for an order releasing all setoffs for unpaid child support asserted by the government against the Short judgment account. The Plaintiffs argued that the government had no right to claim these setoffs because there is no mutuality of obligation between the Short plaintiffs/debtors and the government's efforts to collect unpaid child support from the individual Short plaintiffs. The court rejected the argument and dismissed the action, finding that although 28 U.S.C. §§ 1503 and 2508 give the Court of Claims authority to render judgment upon setoffs, generally, these provisions do not override 26 U.S.C. § 1605(b), which bars all Federal courts from entertaining an action brought to restrain or review the assessment and collection of past due child support by the Secretary of the treasury.

Hunter v. Internal Revenue Service, No. 95-24693-D, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 620 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Apr. 1, 1997). The IRS sent the debtor's 1994 tax refund to the Alaska Child Support Agency more than two months before the debtor filed his petition for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy court had a standing order, which provided that the automatic stay was lifted, for purposes of IRS tax intercept 45 days after filing, unless the debtor or another party in interest filed an objection and requested a hearing within the 45 day period. Nearly a year after the petition date, the IRS forwarded the debtor's 1995 tax refund to Alaska, based on the standing order.

The debtor initiated this action seeking to recover the 1994 and 1995 tax refunds and to enjoin the IRS from sending future tax returns, on the grounds that he needed the funds in order to effectuate his reorganization. The complaint was denied and the IRS motion to dismiss was granted because the debtor did not file his objection and request for a hearing within the prescribed period.

Ray v. O'Malley, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1952 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 1999). The Court dismissed the plaintiff's amended complaint, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, several sections of the Internal Revenue Code, and the 4^th, 5^th and fourteenth amendments, as well as various State law claims, because the pro se plaintiff failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted.

The Plaintiff's case is a sympathetic one. In 1994 the Illinois Department of Public Aid notified Mr. Ray that he was in arrears on a1971 child support order. He ignored the notice. Although he had lived at the same address since 1972, he had not previously been notified of child support arrearage claims. In 1996 the IRS notified Ray that his overpaid Federal income taxes had been applied to the alleged debt. Mr. Ray then sought relief in the Circuit Court for Cook County. The Circuit Court entered an order prohibiting the Department of Public Works from taking further action to collect the alleged debt. Ray was ordered to submit verification of payment, but because of the age of the alleged child support judgment (case number indicates 1971) no documents regarding the judgment were available. The Case had come up several times in the Circuit Court, and confusion continued.

While the State court action was pending, the father filed this action in the Federal court. The court dismissed the action, rather than granting the father leave to further amend his complaint, because the Younger doctrine requires the Federal court to abstain from deciding the matter while related proceedings are pending in State court.

Weber v. Weber, No. 98-3009, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS, 16 ColoColo. Bankr Ct. Rep. 89 (10^th Cir. Apr. 7, 1999). The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's finding that the Bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to hear Weber's challenge to a priority claim by the IRS for past due child support. See also, Weber v. Weber, 209 B.R. 745 (D. Kans. 1997) (finding that the Bankruptcy Court was not the proper forum for the debtor to challenge assessments made pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6305(a); challenge must be pursued in State court); Weber v. Weber, 215 B.R. 887, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21324 (D. Kan. Dec. 3, 1997). The automatic stay would preclude collection activities, while the father pursued his remedies in the appropriate State court. 26 U.S.C. § 6305(b) provides that no United States court has jurisdiction of any action brought to restrain or review the assessment and collection of child support arrears certified by the States.

Swartz v. Internal Revenue Service, No. 98-1058, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 26015, 82 A.F.T.R.2d 6797 (1^st Cir. Sept. 22, 1998). The court affirmed the dismissal of the father's claim that the IRS erred in transferring his tax refund to California authorities for allegedly past-due child support payments. The court based dismissal on statutory provisions, which bar Federal courts from adjudicating such claims. The duty of the IRS is simply ministerial: it makes no determinations of liability and ability to pay.

Nebraska v. Bentson, 146 F.3d 676 (9^th Cir. 1998). This is a removal case, stemming from an enforcement action, initiated by the Nebraska child support agency. In 1986, Nebraska initiated an enforcement action against the father in California. The Superior Court of Contra Costa County entered an order directing the father to pay $9,290 in past due child support, and denied some additional child support arrearages. The father paid the full amount and a satisfaction of the California judgment was entered in 1992.

The State then petitioned the Secretary of HHS to certify the additional arrearages, previously denied by the California court, for IRS collection. The petition was granted and the IRS notified the father that it had initiated collection activities against him. The father responded by obtaining a California Court order permanently enjoining the State from collecting further payments. After the State refused to comply, the Superior Court scheduled a civil contempt proceeding against the State and included the IRS as the State's collection agent. The IRS removed the action to the Federal district court, which dismissed the IRS from the action, and remanded the case to State court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. The father appealed the dismissal of the IRS.

The Court of Appeals affirmed both the dismissal and remand, finding that Federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over these types of claims and that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the claims against the IRS because the Federal government had not waived its immunity to such suits. The District Court's opinion was reported as Nebraska v. Bentson, No. C-96-4337 SC, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18893, 79, A.F.T.R.2d 815 (D. N. Cal. 1996).

In re Alvstad, 223 B.R. 733, 745 (N.D. Bankr. 1998). The debtor's Chapter 12 Plan of Reorganization could not be approved unless the debtor provided for payment of the county child support claim.

In re Parker, No. 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 1484 (B.R. N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 1999). The debtor could discharge his debt for past due child support under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, pursuant to 11 U.S.C.S. § 507, because the mother had assigned her support rights to the State in exchange for welfare benefits.

Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp. v. Tamimi (In re Tamimi), 4^th Cir.,176 F.3^rd 274), 1346. No. 98-1423, 5/21/99. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act defeats a woman's garnishment action against her ex-husband's employer for child support arrearages. The court agreed with the employer, an airline owned by Saudi Arabia, that the waiver and commercial activity exceptions to the act (which sets forth exclusive standards to be used to resolve sovereign immunity issues raised by a foreign country in State and Federal courts) are inapplicable. Fourth Circuit says the Federal statute bars garnishment of wages of a delinquent obligor who works for a company wholly owned by a foreign nation.

U. S. v. Mattice, 2d Cir.,186 F.3d 219),1460 No. 98-1578, 7/29/99. (Affirming 24 FLR 1579). In order to convict a delinquent obligor under the Federal Child Support Recovery Act, the government need only show that he knew his conduct violated the underlying support order, not the CSRA itself. The court also ruled that an obligor's inability to pay the full amount of past due support does not prejudice his conviction under the act.

The court did agree that if a defendant is unable to pay even some of the past due support, his failure to pay cannot be willful within the meaning of the CSRA. Saying that a defendant's inability to pay any amount of past due support therefore provides a defense to liability under the act, the court found that the record contained ample evidence to support a finding that Mattice was able to pay part of the arrearages. It thus affirmed his conviction.

Second Circuit also says that obligor does not have to be financially able to pay entire amount of arrearages in order for willfulness to be shown.

United States v. Harrison, (9^th Cir.), 1493. No. 98-4208, 8/17/99. A trial court did not err when in finding an obligor guilty of violating the Federal Child Support Recovery Act it refused to consider evidence that he had applied for modification of the underlying Nebraska support order after receiving a disabling, job-related injury. The court found that at the time the Colorado obligor was tried under the CSRA, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 228 (FLR Ref. File 125:045), for willful failure to pay support, he had requested the State court to modify his support obligation in light of his injuries but the request had not yet been ruled on (he did not work after being injured but did receive workers' compensation payments, which he eventually opted to take as a lump-sum payment of Social Security disability benefits). Asserting that it made no difference from what source the obligor received his income, the court pointed out that he could have used a portion of his lump-sum workers' compensation and Social Security benefits to pay support but didn't. Therefore, the court ruled, whatever the disposition of his yet-to-be ruled upon modification request, it is not relevant to the existence of his past ability to pay support and his willful failure to do so.

United States v. Russell, (D.S.D., 31 F.Supp.2^nd 1171),1132; (8^th Cir.), 1436. No. 99-1451, 7/19/99. An indictment returned against a man for violating the Federal Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act by willfully failing to pay more than $10,000 in child support arrearages should not have been dismissed pursuant to the Federal Constitution's ex post facto clause. Reversing the ruling below (31 F.Supp. 2d 1171, 25 FLR 1132 (1998), the court explained that the DPPA was enacted in 1998 to amend the provisions of the Child Support Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 228 (1994) (FLR Ref. File 125:045), that criminalized the failure to pay arrearages in excess of $5,000. It said that the district court's dismissal of the indictment because the man had not accrued more than $10,000 in past due support obligations after the enactment of the DPPA (reasoning that the government violated the ex post facto clause by relying on pre-enactment arrearages), was in error. Thus, it said, the statute is not retrospective and does not run afoul of the ex post facto prohibition.

United States v. Craig, ( 9^th Cir.),1445. No. 98-10162, 6/29/99. A restitution order imposed under the Federal Child Support Recovery Act may cover the entire amount of unpaid support owed by a delinquent obligor, and not just the arrearages that accrued during the period specified in the indictment. The court also said that restitution may be ordered in the full amount owed without a prior inquiry into the obligor's ability to pay.

United States v. Ballek,(9^th Cir., 170 F.3d 8771), 1241. No. 97-30326, 3/11/99. The constitutional prohibition against slavery was not violated when a delinquent obligor was held guilty of willfully failing to pay support in violation of the Child Support Recovery Act based on his failure to seek a job so as to be able to meet his support obligation. The court said that while an obligor should never be confronted with a situation where he is ordered to make support payments he cannot afford, absentee parents cannot be allowed to evade their support obligation by refusing to accept gainful employment. Stressing that not all forced employment is barred by the 13^th Amendment, and that where the obligation is one that has been traditionally enforced by imprisonment, the constitutional prohibition does not apply, the court asserted that child support awards fall within that narrow class of obligations that may be enforced by means of imprisonment without violating the bar against slavery. To hold otherwise, it added, would undermine well-established State court practices for policing compliance with support obligations and would put children on the same footing as unsecured creditors.