Skip ACF banner and navigation
Department of Health and Human Services logo
Questions?
Privacy
Site Index
Contact Us
 Home| Services|Working with ACF|Policy/Planning|About ACF|ACF News Search
Administration for Children and Families US Department of Health and Human Services
[an error occurred while processing this directive]

back to contents / next chapter

CHAPTER 2

PRIVATIZATION, COMPETITION, AND PARTNERSHIP

If you have only a hammer, all problems look like nails.

- Law of the Hammer

Although this book is about the privatization of child support enforcement, it does not advocate privatization-the use of private resources to perform government functions-as the only solution to the challenges faced by Title IV-D agencies. Privatization is but one of many tools available to elected officials and public managers. In selecting this or any other tool, they should be mindful of the Law of the Hammer. Privatization is the right tool for addressing some problems, but used indiscriminately it can destroy more than it fixes.

This chapter defines the term "privatization" more fully and provides some perspective on this approach so the reader can see where it fits in the armamentarium of public management. It also introduces the concept of "competitive government," which is the idea that when public services are put out to bid private companies need not be the only ones bidding. Finally, it addresses the issue of "public-private partnership" and suggests some rules for creating strong partnerships between the Title IV-D agency and its private contractors.

WHAT IS PRIVATIZATION?

The classic definition of privatization is "the assumption by the private sector of a function or service formerly provided by government" (Ingoldsby, 1995). This definition needs to be expanded, however, to account for the type of "creeping privatization" that occurs when public administrators find themselves managing contracts for services their agencies never used to provide. Genetic screening serves as an example. When this technology became available and child support agencies were required to use it in establishing paternities, they did not rush out to build their own genetic testing labs. They instead turned to private sector laboratories that were already performing this type of work for hospitals and other clients. Today, states routinely devote a portion of their Title IV-D budgets to contracts for this service. The term privatization, therefore, must also include the assumption by the private sector of functions or services that government has never before performed, but for which it is newly responsible.

Contracting Out Is the Most Feasible Privatization Option for Child Support Enforcement

Privatization includes a wide range of activities. William Eggers of the Reason Foundation (1993a) lists ten different types of privatization, which are shown in Exhibit 2-1. Examining Eggers' list of privatization options reveals that most are not available to state and local governments seeking to privatize child support enforcement services. States are required by federal law to have a state plan for child support that provides for the establishment of a single and separate organization within the state to administer the plan. Thus, load shedding-getting out of the child support business altogether-is not an option. State and local officials are still responsible for the provision of child support services in a privatized system, even if government does not actually deliver the services.

The proper conditions also do not exist for using strategies such as asset sales, subsidies, infrastructure development, and deregulation. Self-help is not an option because of the scope and complexity of child support services. Volunteers are used already to supplement public employees on some tasks such as file maintenance; however, a child support system could not rely exclusively on volunteers. Vouchers might be considered as a means for obtaining legal representation for low-income families seeking support from non-custodial parents, but vouchers would not be an appropriate means for providing other services such as parent location, collections, and disbursement of payments. These are the types of services that lend themselves to contracting out because private agencies already exist that perform similar services for other clients.

In summary, the primary privatization option available to state and local child support officials is contracting out services to private firms. The guide concentrates on this aspect of privatization.


Exhibit 2-1

TEN TYPES OF PRIVATIZATION

1. Contracting. Government contracts with a private organization, for-profit or nonprofit, to provide a service or part of a service.

2. Franchise. A private firm is given the exclusive right to provide a service within a certain geographical area. This is contracting with a twist. For example, governments often give franchises to cable television companies and bus companies, or to fast food chains to operate restaurants on turnpikes.

3. Vouchers. Government pays for the service; however, individuals are given redeemable certificates to purchase the service on the open market. The certificates, or vouchers, subsidize the consumer of the service, but services are provided by the private sector. Food stamps, housing vouchers, and vouchers for child day care are some examples of widely used voucher programs. Voucher programs put the "power of the purse" in the hands of consumers, allowing them to decide who will get their business.

4. Subsidy. The producer of a service is subsidized by the government contributing financially or in-kind to a private organization to reduce the costs to consumers. Hospitals, medical schools, and developers of low-income housing are subsidized because they produce goods and services considered beneficial to the public interest.

5. Service or "Load" Shedding. Government stops providing the service, relinquishing any responsibility for its provision, and lets the private sector assume the function.

6. Asset Sale or Lease. Government sells or leases assets such as airports, gas utilities, or real estate to private firms, thus turning physical capital into financial capital.

7. Volunteers. Volunteers provide all or part of a government service.

8. Self-help. Community groups and neighborhood organizations take over a service or government asset such as a local park or community pool. The new providers of the service also directly benefit from the service.

9. Infrastructure Development. The private sector builds, finances, and operates public infrastructure such as roads and airports, recovering costs through user charges.

10. Deregulation. Government regulations are eliminated from a government monopolized service to allow private providers to compete. Deregulation of express mail statutes governing the Postal Service, for example, allowed Federal Express, United Parcel Service, and their competitors to begin delivering packages overnight.



Why Privatize Child Support Enforcement Services?

Caseload Pressures

Of the many reasons why child support enforcement is in the vanguard of human services to be privatized, the foremost is the pressure created by rapidly increasing caseloads. Unlike cash assistance, food stamps, Medicaid, and other benefits programs for which the popular goal is to reduce caseloads, elected officials and the public actively encourage the growth of child support caseloads. The rationale is that, if these cases are enforced properly, the money collected on behalf of children will lessen the demand for public assistance. In fact, between 1990 and 1994 the total IV-D child support caseload increased 45 percent from 12.8 million cases nationally to 18.6 million cases (OCSE, 1996).

This accelerated growth has run headlong, however, into the popular sentiment for reducing the size of government. Because many state and local governments have reduced or capped the size of their work forces, child support agencies often cannot keep up with the demands for service. Recent estimates of child support caseloads nationwide range from 300 cases to as many as 2,500 cases per worker (GAO, 1996). Privatization provides a safety valve, allowing child support offices to reduce caseload pressures without increasing the number of public employees. In Virginia, for example, when caseload growth created the need for two more local offices, the state hired a private contractor to staff them.

New Service Niches

The myriad child support initiatives that have been launched in the past few years, coupled with technological advances in genetic screening and computer automation, have radically altered the child support enforcement process and created new service niches for private companies.

The customer service function serves as a good example. Customer service no longer involves just answering inquiries from custodial and non-custodial parents about the status of their cases or verifying for them that support payments have been made and disbursed. Now Title IV-D agencies must answer questions daily from employers regarding wage withholding and new hire reporting requirements, from hospitals regarding paternity acknowledgment procedures, and from parents behind in their payments who demand to know why their lottery winnings were intercepted by the state and what they can do about it. These are all new "customers" of the system with unique information and service needs. Each time a new initiative creates another customer group, Title IV-D directors must decide how their demands for information will be handled. Should calls be fielded by public employees, by an automated voice response system, or by a privately operated hotline service?

Potential for Profit

Another reason for privatizing child support enforcement is that there is money to be made-both by the states and by private contractors. Unlike welfare block grants, which are capped under the welfare reform legislation, the amount of federal funds states receive under Title IV-D is uncapped and depends on the amount of child support they collect from parents. There are even incentive payments available for states that exceed performance targets. The more child support a state collects, the more federal money it can draw down. Many agency directors see child support as a moneymaker for the state and depend on revenues from incentive payments to fund other programs such as welfare-to-work initiatives.

In recent years, a growing number of states have found that they could increase their "profits" by contracting with private collection agencies on a contingency fee basis to handle hard-to-collect child support accounts. A study by the U.S. General Accounting Office of collections contracts in nine states reported that in 1994 and 1995 contractors collected nearly $60 million in child support and were paid about $6 million (GAO, 1996). The GAO study found that after subtracting contract costs all states had a net gain in child support revenues, even in the two instances in which administrative costs were subtracted as well.

Meets Prerequisites for Successful Contracting

A final reason why child support enforcement is more heavily privatized than other social services is that it meets the two prerequisites for successful contracting of services cited by E. S. Savas in his seminal book Privatization: The Key to Better Government (1987). These prerequisites are (1) specificity and (2) suppliers.

Specificity refers to the extent to which performance standards and service outcomes can be clearly stipulated. As Savas states, "If detailed contract specifications cannot be written, the contractor cannot be expected to conform, and the agency cannot monitor the contractor's performance." Lack of specificity is not a barrier to contracting for child support services. For the major program elements, there are many specific outcomes that can be incorporated into a contract. These include the number and percentage of paternities established, the number of non-custodial parents located, the percentage of cases with support orders, the percentage of non-custodial parents making support payments, and the amount of money collected in support of children. Clear performance standards can also be established for activities such as payment processing, customer service, genetic screening, and the service of summonses and warrants.

An adequate number of suppliers is the second necessary condition for successful contracting. If only one private firm is available to bid on a contract, the element of competition, which serves to keep costs in check and service quality high, is lost. Contracting in this situation merely replaces a public monopoly with a private monopoly. In making the privatization decision, the rule of thumb is that the greater the number of qualified firms, the more likely that contracting will produce superior results at a reduced price.

Again, child support enforcement meets this prerequisite for privatization better than most other social services. Because the program is so complex-encompassing such diverse activities as location and collection, legal representation, genetic screening, payment processing, customer service hotlines, and computer matching of massive data bases-it is relatively easy to find suppliers who perform one or more of these functions for other large public or private enterprises. In the past few years, as the 1995 GAO study found, there are even a handful of private companies nationally that have experience operating local child support offices.

Public Officials Must Carefully Weigh the Arguments For and Against Privatization

Any debate on opening a public service to competition from the private sector produces its share of supporters and opponents. Proponents generally argue that injecting competition will improve efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Eggers (1993b) asserts that privatization, appropriately structured and sufficiently monitored, can produce the positive results described in Exhibit 2-2. Opponents argue that just the opposite will occur. Exhibit 2-3 lists arguments against privatization that are frequently raised by public employees and their unions (AFSCME, 1983; n.d.).


Exhibit 2-2

ARGUMENTS FOR PRIVATIZATION

Saves taxpayers' money. Over 100 studies have documented cost savings averaging between 20 to 40 percent from contracting out services to the private sector (Hilke, 1993). Privatization also creates new tax revenues from private contractors who pay taxes and license fees, whereas government units do not.

Increases flexibility. Public officials have greater flexibility to meet the public's needs. They can replace a firm that fails to meet contract standards, cut back on services when demand declines, and add to service during peak periods. Being able to shop around for the most efficient and effective service providers allows public managers to use any available option to meet an agency's objectives, including in-house (public) service delivery.

Improves service quality. Competition induces both public and private service providers to deliver better service in order to keep customers satisfied and retain contracts. Service quality is not assured, however, unless contracts include performance standards that create incentives for high-quality service.

Increases efficiency and innovation. Private management can use its more flexible personnel practices and job categories, streamlined operating procedures, and simplified procurement processes to work more efficiently and lower operating costs. To stay ahead of competitors and keep its contracts, a private firm also must innovate constantly.

Allows policymakers to steer, rather than row. Competition allows government leaders to spend more time on policy decisions (steering) than on overseeing service delivery (rowing). It effectively separates management from operations and reduces the time that leaders spend micromanaging programs.

Increases accountability for quality performance. Contractors know they can be let go if quality sags; it is harder to hold civil servants directly accountable for performance (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).


Exhibit 2-3

ARGUMENTS AGAINST PRIVATIZATION

Costs taxpayers more. When making cost comparisons, governments often omit the costs for contract preparation, administration, service monitoring, and renegotiation. Often the cost of using in-house facilities or equipment is omitted as well. Also, the taxpayer must foot the bill for unemployment payments made to laid-off government workers. When all these factors are taken into account, contracting out may actually cost more than in-house provision of services.

Decreases flexibility. Public managers directing a public workforce have a large degree of flexibility in responding to unforeseen circumstances; on the other hand, the contractor has the right to refuse to do even the smallest task that isn't in the contract.

Decreases service quality. The profit motive provides incentives to cut corners on service quality-to hire inexperienced, transient personnel at low wages, skimp on contract requirements, or provide inadequate supervision.

Promotes corruption. Using contractors to perform public services can produce widespread corruption including bribery, kickbacks, collusive bidding, conflicts of interest, and charges for work never performed.

Creates dependence on private sector providers. As more services become privatized, the government loses the capacity (facilities, equipment, skilled workers) to provide public services on its own. The public becomes dependent on private providers for essential services. Monopolies and price fixing among private providers can result in higher costs and reduced quality of service.

Reduces accountability of public officials to citizens. Public officials often use contracting to wash their hands of administrative hassles and to avoid responsibility and blame for service failures. As more public services are shifted to the public sector, we move from an open, accountable society to a closed, secretive society easily subject to manipulation.



In general, arguments for and against privatization should be taken with a grain of salt. Opponents use the most egregious examples they can find of fraud, corruption, service failure, and public employee layoffs to bolster their arguments (Poole, 1983). Often these cases are decades old, and the problems cited could have been avoided if modern contracting techniques that emphasize outcome monitoring had been used, or if plans for reducing the impact of privatization on public employees had been in place.

Proponents use case examples of success from leading cities or cite national survey results to support their contentions that privatization saves money, produces better service, and has a minimal impact on the livelihood of public employees (O'Leary & Eggers, 1993; Eggers, 1994). Unfortunately, some of these surveys merely ask government officials to state their opinions on whether privatization has improved service and reduced costs. Actual performance and savings usually are not verified through independent evaluations or audits. The most frequently cited studies of the impact of privatization on public employees are ones conducted in the 1980s, which may not be completely applicable to today's labor market (see for example, U.S. Department of Labor, 1989).

Currently, there is no body of literature on the impact of privatization on child support enforcement. Until there is, the arguments for and against privatization presented above can be used to prompt thoughtful discussions about whether to privatize child support functions.

WHAT IS COMPETITIVE GOVERNMENT?

Some experts on public management promote the view that the debate should not be about privatization per se, but about how to make government more competitive. A competitive government is one that fosters competition among service providers-including public sector agencies-for the right to deliver services. The rationale for competitive government is that when providers must compete with others in an open marketplace they will keep their costs down, respond quickly to changing demands, and strive hard to satisfy their customers.

Advocates of direct competition between the public and private sectors assert that it is really the monopoly on service delivery that causes inefficiency and the shortchanging of the public. The issue, they claim, is not "public vs. private" but "monopoly vs. competition." Without competition, any service provider-public or private-has little incentive to keep service quality high and costs down.

David Seader, a senior manager for Price Waterhouse, observes, "[We] have a paradigm shift from privatization to competitive government" (Seader, 1995). He likens the direct competition approach to the process by which private industry decides to "make or buy" a needed product or service. Through careful analysis of costs and results, a management decision is made about whether it is better for the company to make a product in-house or to outsource production to a qualified, capable outside organization.

Three Types of Competition

David Osborne and Ted Gaebler in their book Reinventing Government (1992), which has been called the bible of government reinvention, write: "Competition will not solve all our problems. But perhaps more than any other concept in this book, it holds the key that will unlock the bureaucratic gridlock that hamstrings so many public agencies." Drawing mainly on the experience of municipal governments, they classify competition into three categories:

  1. Private vs. Private Competition. This is essentially contracting out service provision to private entities through a competitive bidding process. Cities typically contract out more than a quarter of their municipal services, and often spend as much as 20 percent of the cost of the service on contract management.
  2. Public vs. Private Competition. The city of Phoenix pioneered this approach in 1978 when it allowed its public works department to bid against private collectors to win back solid waste disposal contracts that had been privatized. Under this method, a "level playing field" is created by requiring both public and private agencies to include all direct, indirect, and overhead costs in their bids; having an independent (non-political) body evaluate bids and award contracts; and making the consequences of failure real to public employees: their units or jobs go away if the contract is lost.
  3. Public vs. Public Competition. There are several variations of this technique. A city may regularly compare the cost, efficiency, and effectiveness of its services to those offered in other cities. A particular unit, such as an accounting group or print shop in a state agency, may compete to provide its services to other agencies. Units within an agency performing the same function, such as road repair crews, may compete for group bonuses or for the right to take over the work of poorly performing units in neighboring districts. This type of competition does not promote competition among individuals or between policy agencies-otherwise known as a turf war. It does promote competition among units that fulfill the same function.

Public-Private Competition May Improve Child Support Enforcement

State and local child support enforcement directors who are considering privatizing services will want to consider more than just contracting with private firms. The privatization movement, which threatens both the livelihood and sense of self-worth of public managers and employees, has led to significant resistance, resentment, and backlash. Public employees and their unions want an opportunity to prove that they are the best providers of service. They believe that they can outproduce private organizations if they are given greater flexibility and control over operations and are allowed to benefit from increases in their productivity.

In many areas of government, public employees in head-to-head competition with private contractors have proven that they can deliver services better, faster, and cheaper. Independent governmental and academic studies on the effects of competition on service delivery at the municipal level have recorded cost savings in the range of 20 to 40 percent (Hilke, 1993). The cities of Phoenix and Indianapolis have demonstrated cost savings of 25 percent or more when city units beat out private firms in the bidding process (Eggers, 1994).

Moreover, the threat of competition can create a ripple effect throughout government. To avert privatization of a number of municipal functions, in-house units in Philadelphia discovered ways to cut 20 to 30 percent from their previous costs. The city's mayor, Ed Rendell, concludes, "Ironically, privatization is the most effective way we know to restore [public sector] productivity and the taxpayers' faith in government" (Eggers, 1994).

A number of states-including Tennessee, Virginia, Nebraska, Mississippi, and Colorado-have already established the groundwork for public-private competition in child support by completely privatizing services in selected jurisdictions. Most of these privatized sites have been in operation for several years, and data will soon be available on their long-term performance. Preliminary reports indicate that, at least during the first year or two of operation, privatized sites usually outperform publicly operated sites on important measures such as parent location, paternity and support order establishment, and child support collections. However, on-site interviews conducted for this book indicate that some of the early advantage enjoyed by private providers may be slipping as public agencies complete the process of automating their case record systems and implement other statewide initiatives that make public units more effective than they were previously. More will be said about these results in later chapters.

It is important to note, however, that these are not examples of true public-private competition in the sense that Osborne and Gaebler propose. In a truly competitive system, public employees in the government-operated sites would be allowed to re-engineer their services and take any other steps necessary to compete successfully against private companies. For the most part, service delivery in the non-privatized sites remained unchanged.

The state of Maryland recently initiated a course of public-private competition when it privatized nearly all child support functions in Baltimore City and rural Queen Anne's County. Costs and impacts in the privatized sites will be compared via an independent evaluation to results from a demonstration county in which public employees were allowed to redesign their operations for better service. Unfortunately, the results of this direct competition will not be known for several years.

Discussing privatization without also considering the competitive government approach would be to ignore a large and important part of the change that is occurring in government today. Therefore, while the following chapters focus on the steps to successful privatization of child support enforcement, they will also remind the reader throughout that many of these steps apply equally well to improving the performance of publicly operated programs.

WHAT IS A PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP?

Before turning to the steps for successful privatization, the concept of "public-private partnership" must be addressed. While this term is widely used, its meaning is not always clear. For some it is a synonym for privatization. They reason: if government joins with the private sector to provide a service, then a partnership exists. For others it is a mutually beneficial working relationship that can only exist among equals (Hale and Williams, 1989). In human services, the term has been used loosely for nearly two decades to describe almost any joint venture between a government agency and a non-government entity, including for-profit businesses, nonprofit organizations, religious institutions, and citizen groups.

Despite a lack of agreement on its definition-or perhaps because of this-many people are beginning to use the term public-private partnership instead of privatization. Politicians often use the term to avoid sounding like antigovernment ideologues when they propose privatizing some service or other. Businesses use it to convey the sense that they do not want to take over government's legitimate functions, but merely want to help it do a better job. Agency heads use it to indicate that, while they are turning over some duties to the private sector, they have not abdicated their public oversight responsibilities. Even the Privatization Council, a national organization founded in the 1980s to promote the transfer of government functions to the private sector, has changed its name to the National Council for Public-Private Partnerships.

This guide advocates the development of solid partnerships between the public and private sectors when child support functions are contracted out. As will be seen, however, true public-private partnership in child support is more an ideal than a reality at present.

Public-Private Partnership in Child Support Enforcement

Part of the research for this guide involved conducting site visits, interviews, and focus groups with Title IV-D administrators, agency directors, and contractors who were engaged in privatizing child support enforcement services. The hope was to identify exemplary partnerships between the public and private sectors. What we found instead-at least in the areas of full-service privatization, locations, collections, and payment processing-was that most of the "partnerships" were uneasy relationships in which the parties displayed some level of mutual distrust.

In focus group discussions, speakers from both sectors frequently slipped into a "them" versus "us" mode of speaking when describing their working relationships. The public sector representatives at times expressed the views that private contractors were more interested in profits than in serving the consumer, had therefore focused their energies on the easiest or most profitable cases, and generally had oversold their services in order to win contracts. Private contractors, in turn, complained that they were not given promised support and direction by the Title IV-D agency, were often compelled to follow outmoded policies and procedures that hampered effectiveness, and had been misled by the state during the contract bidding process-either in regard to the amount of work to be done under the contract or as to the potential for profit. The public administrators feared becoming dependent on contractors' proprietary systems and having service costs soar uncontrollably in future contracts. Contractors feared the state would commandeer their systems and innovative practices for use in other child support offices, thus depriving them of potential markets.

Some contractors, particularly those involved in collecting overdue support payments, claimed that the current competitive procurement process, which tends to award contracts of 1-3 years to the lowest bidder, hampers the development of true public-private partnerships. They felt that there was little opportunity to develop trust and loyalty under this system. They wanted longer initial contracts and more credit for a job well done when contracts are rebid so they could go from being "hired hands" to actual partners. Their competitors, of course, saw these proposed changes as an attempt to freeze them out of the market.

Despite these complaints and differences of opinion, program outcomes have generally improved-at least in the short haul-in the areas of child support that have been privatized. This offers hope that real and productive public-private partnerships can be achieved.

Guidelines for Creating Public-Private Partnerships

The following are some guidelines for creating strong public-private partnerships for child support enforcement. Taken together, these suggested rules express a philosophy on partnering that underpins the rest of the material presented in this guide.

1. The partnership must be goal directed and outcome focused.

The ultimate goal of any public-private partnership in child support enforcement is to improve the lives of children by seeing that they receive adequate financial and medical support from their parents. The goal is the same whether the contract is for direct service delivery or for a supportive service such as payment processing. Specific goals (and associated outcomes) should be developed for each contracted service, but the link between these goals and the overall goal should always be made clear to the contractor. Once specific goals and desired outcomes are established, the Title IV-D agency and the contractor should work collaboratively-each fulfilling its responsibilities as set forth in the contract-to ensure that the goals are met.

2. The Title IV-D agency must assume the role of senior partner.

By law, the Title IV-D agency is responsible for the provision of child support services in its jurisdiction. No matter how many service and enforcement functions are privatized, the agency is ultimately accountable for the results. This means that there cannot be an equal partnership between the public and private sectors. The public agency should function much as a senior partner in a law firm: overseeing and supporting the work of the contractor (the junior partner); setting standards and goals; providing incentives for superior performance; encouraging the contractor to innovate; and conferring with the contractor on major program decisions-but always reserving the right to make the final decision itself.

3. Each partner must contribute something different to the relationship.

In a strong public-private partnership, each side brings different strengths to the relationship that in combination make the system work better. The Title IV-D agency automatically brings needed stability to the child support program, as well as the authority and legitimacy of its office, which is conferred by association on the contractor. But this is not sufficient. The public agency must also provide a strategic vision for the joint effort, leadership, and good contract management skills.

The private contractor, in turn, brings the technology, innovative management solutions, and ability to respond quickly to changing circumstances that characterize the private sector. In addition, the contractor must also bring a commitment to customer service and a dedication to quality.

4. Each side must gain certain rewards from the partnership.

For the public agency, the main rewards from partnering with the private sector are improved program performance, cost efficiencies, and public recognition for a job well done. The private contractor should expect to make a reasonable profit and to have the opportunity to expand its business.

5. All partners must share credit and blame for program outcomes.

Too often in privatization the public and private sectors point accusingly at one another when programs fail. They sometimes are reluctant to share the credit for success. In a true partnership, both sectors view positive or negative results as a reflection of their joint efforts and share the responsibility accordingly.

6. The Title IV-D agency must create a level playing field when competition is used to select service providers.

The public agency should seek the best possible partner, and all qualified providers should have a fair shot at being that partner. This means that the agency should create a contract bidding process in which private companies can compete fairly against one another-and against public units if they are also allowed to bid. Incumbent providers (public or private) should not be kept on simply because it is comfortable working with them. On the other hand, if an incumbent is already providing superior service, this fact should not be ignored in the proposal evaluation.

7. The partners must work constantly to maintain and improve their relationship.

Constant communication and frequent feedback are the keys to a smooth working relationship. Partners should meet regularly to review their progress and engage in joint problem solving when difficulties arise. If the partners disagree strongly on policy issues, division of responsibility, provider payment structures, and so forth, they may need to engage in a conflict resolution process mediated by a neutral third party.

8. Both parties must recognize that the relationship is temporary.

A public-private partnership is not expected to last "until death do us part." As circumstances change, so do the needs of the public agency. For example, a private company that is excellent at processing and distributing support checks to custodial parents may no longer be the best partner if the Title IV-D agency decides to distribute funds electronically and another firm can do this better or cheaper. The decision to continue or terminate the partnership is determined by the bottom line for both parties. For the private sector the bottom line is about profits and losses; for the public agency it is about getting the best service for the customer at the best price.

While these guidelines are designed to promote better public-private partnerships, they also can be applied to partnerships between the Title IV-D agency and other public agencies. State and local child support offices enter into contracts or cooperative agreements with many other public agencies to help them deliver child support services. These can include contracts with the sheriff's office to serve summonses, with the district attorney to provide legal representation for custodial parents, and with the state treasurer to distribute support payments. Cooperative agreements, such as those governing the matching of records between the child support agency and the motor vehicles department or state employment service, are yet another form of partnership. Even the relationship between the state-level Title IV-D agency and the local child support office can be seen as a partnership.

By working within the structure of these guidelines, the child support agency should be able to develop productive partnerships with private companies and public agencies that are characterized by trust, openness, fairness, and mutual respect.

back to contents / next chapter