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IV. CONCLUSIONS
A. TANF Programs Continue to Evolve
One of the most striking observations during the site visits was the degree to which programs continue to change. It has been 10 years since PRWORA changed the nature of the welfare program. Although many of the large-scale policy changes were adopted in the years immediately following welfare reforms, states and local areas continue to adapt their programs. The research team observed changes in organizational structures (e.g., separating the eligibility and employment functions at the state and local levels), pre-eligibility requirements (e.g., upfront job search, meetings with child support staff), program activities (e.g., new employment programs), and case flow (e.g., new intake procedures).
B. There is Limited Flexibility in the TANF Program at the Local Level
One of the purposes of this study was to examine how local offices have implemented innovative practices over the last five years to improve performance in the TANF program. Considering observations at the five study sites, there were few examples of major innovations implemented by local officials during that period of time. Often staff at the sites indicated that they had limited flexibility to make changes to program policies. To the extent that local offices have flexibility, it tends to involve procedural issues, such as intake processes and staff assignments.
Although one of the hallmarks of the TANF program was the devolution of responsibility for policy decisions from the federal government to the states, the states, at least those in this study, do not pass a great deal of responsibility to the local level. This is true regardless of whether the program is state administered (Arizona, Georgia, and Missouri) or county administered (New Jersey and Wisconsin). In fact, in the later two states, where one might have expected greater local flexibility, state staff were very much involved in determining how the program operates at the local level, and on-site state staff closely monitored local actions. Ironically, the site that appeared to have the most local flexibility was one of the state-administered programs (Macon).
C. TANF Programs Varied Considerably by Site
Comparing the attributes of the TANF programs at these five sites, one might conclude, “If you’ve seen one TANF program, you’ve seen one TANF program.” No two programs are alike. There are substantial differences in philosophy, the mix of organizations that are responsible at the state and local level, program policies, up-front eligibility requirements, and the coherence of the program at the local site. It is impossible to generalize about “the TANF program” from visits to five sites.
The sites in Georgia, Wisconsin and Arizona had recently taken steps that, by design or not, limited new entrants into the program by emphasizing up-front job search at the behest of state officials or, in Arizona, requiring diversion interviews and child support enforcement meetings. The other sites allowed relatively easier entry into the TANF program, with an initial focus on timeliness and accuracy in eligibility determinations.
Sites differed in terms of the privatization of services. At the Milwaukee site, a private contractor is responsible for case management and employment services. In Kansas City, responsibility for case management was recently shifted from state staff to a private, non-profit organization. Arizona is in the midst of privatizing case management. In Macon, state staff are responsible for both eligibility and case management; in Newark, county staff handle these functions.
There are significant differences in up-front eligibility requirements. Three of the states require cooperation with child support enforcement as a pre-condition of TANF eligibility—Arizona, New Jersey, and Wisconsin.16 Two have grant diversion policies—Arizona and New Jersey. The length of time that clients are eligible for cash assistance is similar on paper—60 months in four of the five sites (Georgia’s limit is 48 months). However, in practice, New Jersey created a program that extends eligibility for many clients beyond the five year limit.
D. Divided Responsibility for Eligibility and Employment Functions May Affect TANF’s Coherence and Performance at the Local Level
A factor that is difficult to quantify, but which stood out as a significant difference between the sites, is the apparent coherence of the programs at the local sites. Coherence is suggested when management and staff responsible for various functions, such as eligibility and case management, share a common vision of the purpose of the program and speak with one voice.
Another factor is the administrative connectedness of TANF functions and staffs—there is little opportunity for clients to fall between the cracks, so to speak. For example, clients are introduced to processes related to employment immediately upon beginning the process of applying for TANF, as opposed to receiving a letter weeks or months after filing for benefits. A third factor is the sense that staff, those directly involved with TANF functions and staff in associated programs, are energized and view the program positively.
One reason for the difference in the coherence of these local programs may be the bureaucratic structures in which they operate, with eligibility and case management functions either separated structurally and administratively, or closely connected. This study included examples of bifurcation at the state and local levels, as well as examples of unified management of these functions at both levels of government. In three states, Arizona, Georgia and Wisconsin, a single state department had responsibility for both functions. In Georgia and Wisconsin, one individual has management responsibility for both functions locally, aiding program coherence. Arizona is unique. Although both functions reside in the same state department, two agencies within the department operate eligibility and employment services. This bifurcation is reflected at the local level, where eligibility and employment services are housed in separate offices with few exceptions, including the site studied. The functions will likely become more separate with statewide privatization of case management functions.
In Missouri, the state labor department is responsible for TANF employment-related functions, including case management, while the human services agency is responsible for TANF eligibility, a recent structural change. In New Jersey, the state labor department is now responsible for employment-related functions, while the human services agency is responsible for TANF eligibility, much like Missouri. However, a major difference between the local sites in these states is that in Newark, county staff under a single administrator are responsible for both functions. In Kansas City, state staff handle eligibility, while a private agency handles case management.
It is more than coincidental that the two of the local offices that operate in states with a unified management structure at the state level (Macon and Milwaukee) have the most integrated client processes at the local level, and appeared to be the most coherent from the client perspective. The fact that eligibility and case management were co-located within the same office, a factor that is more likely to occur when both functions are within a single bureaucratic structure, certainly contributes to the sense of coherence. Various staffs can communicate more efficiently and are more likely to understand the challenges that each face. The number of offices that clients are required to visit and the number of different bureaucracies with which they must interact is minimized.
It would be difficult to separate the effects of various factors that contribute to an office’s performance, such as bureaucratic structures, program policies, physical location of functional components, management skill, and staff motivation, to name a few. And the small sample of local sites represented in this study should not be the basis to reach broad conclusions about the TANF program. Nevertheless, it would be inappropriate to ignore the fact that the offices in Macon and in Milwaukee had the best performance among the study sites in terms of client participation. (In Macon, client participation in employment-related activities routinely exceeded 90 percent in the months preceding the site visit.)
E. TANF Reauthorization is Likely to Generate Additional Changes in Local TANF Offices
At the time of the site visits, all of the states were satisfying existing participation rate requirements, although three of them (Missouri, New Jersey, and Arizona) would not meet the requirements without caseload reduction credits. Participation requirements are more stringent under the 2006 Deficit Reduction Act (DRA). For example, the DRA recalibrates and updates the baseline for caseload reduction credits, and it reduces states’ flexibility in using certain activities to satisfy the participation requirements. Many states are thus expected to have difficulties meeting the new participation requirements. Because this study began before the DRA was passed, and the site visits occurred as state staff were only beginning to wrestle with the effect of the changes on their TANF programs, the study findings do not reflect planned adaptations.
The findings, however, do suggest that certain program elements are associated with high participation rates and, thus, may increase the likelihood that states will comply with the new regulations. This includes programs that are work-oriented in philosophy and practice. In these programs, state and local staff alike send a consistent message to applicants and clients—that employment is good (e.g., “everyone is better off working”) and is the expected outcome. In other sites, the message was not consistent or gave considerable weight to other goals, such as income support for persons with multiple barriers to employment.
The work-based philosophy was operationalized in part by up-front work and child support enforcement requirements that preceded eligibility determination. These up-front requirements appeared to lead many people to drop out of the intake process, before they actually received cash assistance, either because they found jobs or alternative sources of support, or because they were unwilling or unable to comply with the requirements. Whatever the reason, these initial expectations appeared to strengthen the work orientation of the programs in several ways: clients almost immediately knew that they had to participate in work-related and other activities; unresponsive clients were winnowed out; and the greatly reduced caseload made it easier for workers to provide more focused and intensive case management and services to the families that eventually qualified for assistance.
Once a client receives assistance, participation in work activities, which support the ultimate goal of unsubsidized employment, is reinforced through sanctions. In some of the sites, the sanction process is quick and straightforward—families whose head does not participate in the expected number of hours are simply paid less. In other sites, the sanction process is often long and complicated. As a consequence, the up-front requirements—which hold benefits back until compliance is obtained—have become even more important in enforcing work and responsibility goals.
A comparison of local management also suggests that performance may be facilitated when the staff performing employment and eligibility functions either work within the same agency and for the same proximate superiors, or are located together and communicate often, even while they work for different contractors or state agencies. When eligibility and employment functions are handled by largely separate and independent agencies, clients may more easily get on assistance without first understanding all the obligations attached to cash receipt under TANF. In such circumstances, signaling and enforcement of work requirements rely more heavily on sanctions—which, as noted above, often involve long and complicated processes and are not always effective. Close coordination between employment and eligibility functions at the local level also seems to make it easier for staff to monitor clients’ activities, and it helps ensure that program goals, policies, and assumptions are widely shared among staff and come across consistently in their interactions with clients.
While it is unwise to draw too many conclusions from a very small sample, it appears the centrality of work to TANF's goals and operations from initial contact, through the eligibility process, and during the period of benefit receipt will be key to state efforts to satisfy the new work participation requirements. It will be instructive to follow these sites as they adapt their programs in response to the new requirements. Future research that assesses the integration of TANF eligibility and work functions across a broader sample of states and localities would also be informative.
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