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Appendix A
EFFECTS OF WELFARE REFORM FOR SUBGROUPS
A key question for many policymakers is whether different subgroups respond to welfare reform differently. Since groups facing different barriers or advantages may respond differently to different reforms, it is possible that some groups could be left behind, even as others fare well under the new regime. Understanding such responses would enable legislators and administrators to refine their programs, targeting groups most in need of assistance and improving their programs’ overall performance. In this appendix, we discuss what is known about the effects of the various welfare reforms and outcomes considered in Chapters 4 to 10 on different segments of the welfare population.
In the case of the random assignment studies, it is possible to consider impacts for subgroups of the populations served by a particular demonstration.108 Table A.1 shows the subgroups analyzed across the random assignment studies, with codes to indicate which outcomes are analyzed for each subgroup. For example, Vermont’s WRP examines impacts on welfare use (W), employment and earnings (E), use of other government programs (G), and income and poverty (I) for subgroups defined by a composite measure of disadvantage and a measure of prior welfare receipt. Depending on the study, the composite measure of disadvantage may be designed to reflect risk of long-term dependency, barriers to employment, or other combined measures of disadvantage. Other subgroups are defined by single dimensions that capture prior welfare use or labor market history, human capital accumulation, demographic characteristics, health and family structure, or child characteristics. All characteristics are measured as of the time of randomization.
Table A.1–Subgroups Analyzed by Random Assignment Studies Included in Synthesis (Click on this link to view table)
It is evident from Table A.1 that some subgroups receive more analysis than others, and that most subgroup analyses are confined to the basic outcomes of welfare use, employment and earnings, and income and poverty. Subgroup differences for family structure and other measures of well-being are examined by only one study each. A number of studies do not analyze subgroups for any of the outcomes shown in Table A.1.
Given the differences in which subgroups are examined for a given outcome, it will often not be possible to cross-validate findings across multiple studies as to whether the impacts of a given policy or bundle of policies vary by subgroup. Even when two studies within our classification scheme consider differences for the same outcome and subgroup category, differences across studies in the way the subgroups are defined often make results less comparable. Some subgroups that might be of interest, for example immigrants are not covered at all by the studies in Table A.1.
Two other issues complicate our ability to examine differences by subgroups. The first involves sample sizes. In many random assignment studies, the overall sample size is chosen to ensure that the overall program impacts will be statistically significant if their magnitudes are economically meaningful. However, detecting differences in effects between subgroups requires samples sizes several times larger than those required to detect an overall effect. Thus, there may be important variation in effects across subgroups, but they will not be detected unless the sample is much larger than that needed to generate significant results in the full sample. Many studies are based on samples that are too small to reliably detect even important differences between groups.
The second issue involves hypothesis testing. All the studies report whether the subgroup-specific estimates are significantly different from zero. Of equal importance is whether they are significantly different from each other. However, tests for the heterogeneity of impacts across groups are reported in only a few studies, leaving the reader to draw conclusions about group-specific differences from less objective criteria.
The remainder of the appendix discusses the results for program impacts by subgroups for the outcomes examined in Chapters 4 to 10, following the same order as the chapters. In the case of the Chapter 7 analysis of fertility and marriage, only one study includes any subgroup analyses, so those results are reported as part of the main discussion in Chapter 7. For the outcomes covered in this appendix, we note that the subgroup analyses may be based on a shorter follow-up period than the main results presented in the body of the report. For example, throughout the appendix, our analysis of subgroup impacts for Jobs First is based on outcomes measured in the 18-month follow-up survey (Bloom et al., 2000) or administrative data through years two or three (Hendra, Michalopolous, and Bloom, 2001). Subgroup results based on the three-year follow-up survey and administrative data through year four provide a more limited set of analyses (specifically by level of disadvantage, welfare recipiency status, and race/ethnicity) than those reported here (Bloom et al., 2002). Likewise, the subgroup analyses for the NEWWS programs are based on a pooled analysis using data through the third follow-up year (see the discussion of Michalopoulos and Schwartz, 2000, below). Subgroup results are not available in the five-year follow-up study of the NEWWS programs (Hamilton et al., 2001).
A.1. WELFARE USE
Subgroup differences for welfare use are reported for a subset of the random assignment studies reviewed in Chapter 4. The available results for ten of the programs are reported in Table A.2. The table records impacts for up to four different subgroups, with subgroups arrayed, to the extent possible, from most to least disadvantaged. Some studies report only whether subgroup impacts are statistically significant (denoted using asterisks next to the impact estimate); others also report whether differences in impacts across subgroups are statistically significant (denoted in the first column by x’s). We indicate when the statistical significance of subgroup differences is not available. Thus, when that cell in the table is empty, it means that the differences by groups are not statistically significant.
A.1.1. Programs That Focus on Financial Work Incentives
As seen in Panel A of Table A.2, there are two programs in this category, WRP-IO and MFIP-IO, that provide subgroup results for welfare use. Both provide subgroup-specific impact estimates, but the MFIP impacts for subgroups are available only for the recent applicants.109 None of the subgroup-specific impacts from WRP-IO are significant. In MFIP-IO, program impacts are significantly different from zero for both short-term recipients and new applicants. There is no way to determine whether the subgroup-specific estimates are significantly different from each other, however.
A.1.2 Programs That Focus on Financial Work Incentives Tied to Hours of Work
New Hope provides tests for subgroup differences; none of these tests rejects homogeneity across the three groups shown (Panel B). The evaluations of SSP Applicants and SSP Plus provide no subgroup analyses. The main SSP evaluation estimates subgroup impacts on employment (see below), but not on welfare use.
A.1.3. Programs That Focus on Mandatory Work-Related Activities
A different type of evidence on subgroup effects is available for policy reforms involving mandatory work-related activities (Panel C). For this type of reform policy, there are estimates from a large number of studies, all of which define subgroups in a consistent manner. Michalopoulos and Schwartz (2000) reanalyze the microlevel data from 20 studies that involve mandated work-related activities, including the eleven NEWWS programs discussed above as well as MFIP and FTP.110 By systematically reanalyzing the microdata from these studies, they are able to construct more rigorous and powerful tests for subgroup differences than can be obtained by simply comparing group-specific program impacts from separate studies. Unfortunately, Michalopoulos and Schwartz (2000) do not analyze welfare use, but rather focus on welfare payments. As a result, we defer our discussion of their results to Section A.4 below, where we discuss components of income.
Subgroup results for L.A. Jobs-First GAIN, which was not included in the Michalopoulos and Schwartz analysis, are presented in Panel B of Table A.2. Few substantial between-group differences are readily apparent, with the possible exception of the results for Asians in the race-ethnicity breakdown. None of the differences are statistically significant.
A.1.4. Programs That Combine Financial Work Incentives and Mandatory Work-Related Activities
Although a substantial number of studies focus on this particular combination of reforms, as a whole the studies provide little useful evidence about the combination’s effects on different groups (Panel D). The limitations pertaining to WRP-IO and MFIP-IO discussed above pertain to the full WRP and MFIP programs as well. None of the subgroup estimates from WRP are significant. Both subgroup estimates from MFIP are significantly different from zero, but they are similar, and no test for their difference is available.
In FIP, none of the estimates for families without prior-year earnings or with children under three are significant, compared to three of the four estimates for families with prior-year earnings or with no children under three. There are no tests to determine whether the subgroup differences are statistically significant. The evaluation of TSMF provides no subgroup analyses for welfare use.
A.1.5. Programs That Focus on TANF-Like Bundles of Reforms
Among studies that combine time limits with other policy reforms, ABC, FTP, and Jobs First provide subgroup impacts on welfare use (Panel F). However, the subgroups are defined differently across the studies, as seen in Table A.2, although all the subgroup classifications are intended to reflect measures of disadvantage. As noted above, all are arrayed from most to least disadvantaged across the table. In the case of FTP, the length of the time limit provides a measure of disadvantage because participants with low levels of education, short employment histories, and lengthy welfare histories were given a 36-month time limit, whereas other participants were given a 24-month time limit. Using participants’ applicant/recipient status at random assignment as a measure of disadvantage, as with Jobs First, is based on the observation that most new entrants will stay on welfare for a relatively short period, whereas most ongoing recipients are in the midst of what will become a lengthy spell on aid (Bane and Ellwood, 1994).
Across these groups, there is no clear tendency for program impacts to vary by the level of disadvantage. The effects of ABC were insignificant at both levels of schooling. They were largest for those with intermediate levels of prior aid use and were smallest for those with the most recent employment history. FTP’s effects were similar for all groups. Jobs First increased aid use by a greater amount among disadvantaged groups during the pre—time limit period. By some measures, the program decreased aid use among more disadvantaged groups during the post—time limit period; by other measures, the pattern is less clear. The change in impacts between the pre— and post—time limit period is fairly similar across the groups. Based on this relatively small number of studies and differing definitions of disadvantage, we cannot conclude whether the effects of policy reforms involving time limits have greater or lesser effects on relatively disadvantaged groups.
A.2. EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS
Although only a subset of the random assignment studies provides subgroup analyses for employment and earnings, the subset is larger in this case than it was in the case of welfare use. Thus, we can consider subgroup differences for a broader range of policy reforms than we could above. Table A.3 presents subgroup-specific program impacts for employment and Table A.4 presents corresponding estimates for earnings.111 As a whole, the available evidence on subgroups does not suggest that any of the reforms consistently work to the greater employment or earnings detriment–or benefit–of relatively disadvantaged groups.
| Group 1 | Group 2 | Group 3 | Group 4 | ||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Name | Cases served | Signif. of group diff. | Measure | Control mean | Impact | % | Control mean | Impact | % | Control mean | Impact | % | Control mean | Impact | % |
| A. Programs that focus on financial work incentives | |||||||||||||||
| WRP-IO | Single-parent recipients and applicants | n.a. | By status at RA: | Recipient | Applicant | ||||||||||
| Employed in last 3 mos. of FU | 46.0 | 2.5 | 5.4% | 51.4 | 3.3 | 6.4% | |||||||||
| n.a. | By level of disadvantage: | Most disadvantaged (1) | Moderately disadvantaged (1) | Least disadvantaged (1) | |||||||||||
| Employed in last 3 mos. of FU | 33.3 | 9.9 | 29.7% | 44.9 | 0.3 | 0.7% | 59.5 | 5.5 | 9.2% | ||||||
| MFIP-IO | Urban single parents recipients | By years of schooling: | Less than 12 | 12 or more | |||||||||||
| n.a. | Quarterly employment rate, year 3 | 35.7 | -0.9 | -2.5% | 49.6 | 4.8* | 9.7% | ||||||||
| By employment in year before RA: | No work in year before RA | Worked in year before RA | |||||||||||||
| n.a. | Quarterly employment rate, year 3 | 35.4 | 5.1* | 14.4% | 57.8 | 1.0 | 1.7% | ||||||||
| By years on aid prior to RA: | 5 or more years | Less that 5 years | |||||||||||||
| n.a. | Quarterly employment rate, year 3 | 42.9 | 5.1* | 11.9% | 47.7 | 1.6 | 3.4% | ||||||||
| B. Programs that focus on financial work incentives tied to hours of work | |||||||||||||||
| New Hope | Poor families employed FT at RA | By barriers to employment: | Two (3) | One (3) | None (3) | ||||||||||
| Quarters employed, year 1 | 2.1 | 0.6*** | 28.6% | 2.3 | 0.5*** | 21.7% | 2.5 | 0.4** | 16.0% | ||||||
| xx | Quarters employed, year 2 | 2.4 | 0.3 | 12.5% | 2.3 | 0.5*** | 21.7% | 2.8 | -0.2 | -7.1% | |||||
| All poor families | By race/ethnicity: | African-American | Hispanic | White | |||||||||||
| Quarters employed, year 1 | 2.6 | 0.5*** | 19.2% | 2.6 | 0.4*** | 15.4% | 2.6 | 0.3 | 11.5% | ||||||
| Quarters employed, year 2 | 2.6 | 0.3*** | 11.5% | 2.7 | 0.2 | 7.4% | 2.8 | 0.0 | 0.0% | ||||||
| SSP | Single-parent recipients | By age of youngest child: | 0 to 2 | 3 to 11 | 12 to 15 | 16 and over | |||||||||
| Months of FT employment | 4.4 | 3.5*** | 79.5% | 5.4 | 3.2*** | 59.3% | 5.3 | 3.4*** | 64.2% | 6.1 | 2.0* | 32.8% | |||
| By education: | No high school credential | High school credential | |||||||||||||
| Months of FT employment | 3.3 | 3.3*** | 100.0% | 7.2 | 3.1*** | 43.1% | |||||||||
| By employment status at RA: | Out of labor force | Unemployed | Employed PT | Employed FT | |||||||||||
| Months of FT employment | 2.6 | 3.0*** | 115.4% | 5.1 | 4.1*** | 80.4% | 7.7 | 4.6*** | 59.7% | 20.0 | 2.7** | 13.5% | |||
| By months on aid in prior 3 years: | 36 months | 24 to 35 | 10 to 23 | ||||||||||||
| Months of FT employment | 3.9 | 3.3*** | 84.6% | 5.5 | 3.6*** | 65.5% | 6.4 | 3.0*** | 46.9% | ||||||
| C. Programs that focus on mandatory work-related activities | |||||||||||||||
| LA Jobs-First GAIN | Single-parent recipients and applicants | By race/ethnicity: | African-American | Hispanic | Asian | White | |||||||||
| Ever employed in years 1-2 | 62.0 | 6.6*** | 10.6% | 57.5 | 12.0*** | 20.9% | 41.9 | 13.0*** | 31.0% | 54.8 | 8.3*** | 15.1% | |||
| By English proficiency: | Not proficient | Proficient | |||||||||||||
| xx | Ever employed in years 1-2 | 46.7 | 12.4*** | 26.6% | 60.3 | 9.0*** | 14.9% | ||||||||
| By education: | No diploma or GED | Diploma or GED | |||||||||||||
| Ever employed in years 1-2 | 52.3 | 10.1*** | 19.3% | 64.0 | 9.0*** | 14.1% | |||||||||
| By status at RA: | Long-term recipient | Short-term recipient | New applicant | ||||||||||||
| Ever employed in years 1-2 | 55.5 | 10.2*** | 18.4% | 62.5 | 8.5*** | 13.6% | 67.5 | 4.7 | 7.0% | ||||||
| By employment in year prior to RA | Not employed | Employed | |||||||||||||
| Ever employed in years 1-2 | 43.4 | 12.8*** | 29.5% | 82.4 | 4.1*** | 5.0% | |||||||||
| By disadvantage: | Most disadvantaged (2) | ||||||||||||||
| xxx | Ever employed in years 1-2 | 39.3 | 13.2*** | 33.6% | |||||||||||
| D. Programs that focus on financial work incentives and mandatory work-related activities | |||||||||||||||
| WRP | Single-parent recipients and applicants | By status at RA: | Recipient | Applicant | |||||||||||
| n.a. | Employed in last 3 mos. of FU | 46.0 | 10.3*** | 22.4% | 51.4 | 6.6*** | 12.8% | ||||||||
| By level of disadvantage: | Most disadvantaged (1) | Moderately disadvantaged (1) | Least disadvantaged (1) | ||||||||||||
| n.a. | Employed in last 3 mos. of FU | 33.3 | 10.9* | 32.7% | 44.9 | 9.8*** | 21.8% | 59.5 | 7.0** | 11.8% | |||||
| MFIP | Urban single parents recipients | By years of schooling: | Less than 12 | 12 or more | |||||||||||
| n.a. | Quarterly employment rate, year 3 | 35.7 | 9.5*** | 26.6% | 49.6 | 12.2*** | 24.6% | ||||||||
| By employment in year before RA: | No work in year before RA | Worked in year before RA | |||||||||||||
| n.a. | Quarterly employment rate, year 3 | 35.4 | 16.5*** | 46.6% | 57.8 | 4.3 | 7.4% | ||||||||
| By years on aid prior to RA: | 5 or more years | Less that 5 years | |||||||||||||
| n.a. | Quarterly employment rate, year 3 | 42.9 | 11.5*** | 26.8% | 47.7 | 10.8*** | 22.6% | ||||||||
| FIP | Recipients | By earnings in year before RA: | No earnings | Some earnings | |||||||||||
| n.a. | Any employment, year 2 | 59.2 | 2.2 | 3.7% | 81.0 | 1.5 | 1.9% | ||||||||
| By children less than 3: | Any children less than 3 | No children less than 3 | |||||||||||||
| n.a. | Any employment, year 2 | 68.7 | 4.4** | 6.4% | 71.9 | -0.3 | -0.4% | ||||||||
| Applicants | By earnings in year before RA: | No earnings | Some earnings | ||||||||||||
| n.a. | Any employment, year 1 | 48.9 | 6.3* | 12.9% | 85.8 | 2.7 | 3.1% | ||||||||
| By children less than 3: | Any children less than 3 | No children less than 3 | |||||||||||||
| n.a. | Any employment, year 1 | 70.0 | 6.9*** | 9.9% | 77.0 | 0.9 | 1.2% | ||||||||
| E. Programs that focus on other individual reforms | |||||||||||||||
| F. Programs that focus on TANF-like bundle of reforms (time limits with financial incentives, work-related activities, or both) | |||||||||||||||
| ABC | Recipients and applicants | By age of mother: | Under 25 | 25 to 34 | 35 and over | ||||||||||
| n.a. | Percent working at survey interview | 44.6 | 1.3 | 2.8 | 42.2 | 9.9*** | 23.5 | 36.1 | 11.5** | 31.8 | |||||
| By age of youngest child: | Under 3 | 3 to 5 | 6 and older | ||||||||||||
| n.a. | Percent working at survey interview | 43.7 | 2.6 | 6.1 | 48.8 | 4.5 | 9.3 | 34.1 | 16.8*** | 49.3 | |||||
| By when last employed: | 24 or more months before RA | 6 to 23 months before RA | Within 6 months of RA | ||||||||||||
| n.a. | Percent working at survey interview | 34.8 | 6.3 | 18.1 | 39.1 | 3.7 | 9.3 | 49.3 | 9.1** | 18.5 | |||||
| By years of schooling: | Less than 12 | 12 or more | |||||||||||||
| n.a. | Percent working at survey interview | 34.3 | 7.4** | 21.6 | 47.9 | 6.5** | 13.5 | ||||||||
| By years on aid in past 5 years: | 3 to 5 | 1 to 2 | Less than 1 | ||||||||||||
| n.a. | Percent working at survey interview | 37.8 | 6.4 | 17.0 | 42.1 | 11.8*** | 28.0 | 46.5 | 3.0 | 6.5 | |||||
| FTP | Recipients and applicants | By length of time limit: | 36 months (4) | 24 months (4) | |||||||||||
| n.a. | Ever employed in years 1-2 | 70.4 | 5.8** | 8.2 | 72.0 | 4.8** | 6.6 | ||||||||
| By age of youngest child: | Under 3 | 3 or over | |||||||||||||
| n.a. | Ever employed in years 1-2 | 71.2 | 6.6*** | 9.2 | 71.5 | 4.3** | 6.0 | ||||||||
| By level of risk: | Most risk (5) | Medium risk (5) | Least risk (5) | ||||||||||||
| n.a. | Quarterly employment, year 2 | 37.8 | 6.4** | 16.9% | 38.1 | 7.5*** | 19.7% | 58.4 | 5.4* | 9.2% | |||||
| JOBS First | Recipients and applicants | By status at RA: | Recipient | Applicant | |||||||||||
| n.a. | Avg. employment rate, years 1-2 | 41.8 | 10.9*** | 26.0 | 49.9 | 2.8* | 5.6 | ||||||||
| n.a. | Avg. employment rate, year 3 | 50.7 | 8.0*** | 15.8 | 55.3 | 3.7** | 6.7 | ||||||||
| By disadvantage: | Most disadvantaged (6) | Least disadvantaged (6) | |||||||||||||
| n.a. | Avg. employment rate, years 1-2 | 19.3 | 14.1*** | 73.0 | 65.9 | 3.7 | 5.6% | ||||||||
| n.a. | Avg. employment rate, year 3 | 30.2 | 11.6*** | 38.6 | 71.3 | 3.2 | 4.5% | ||||||||
| By age of youngest child: | Less than 6 | 6 to 11 | 12 to 18 | ||||||||||||
| n.a. | Avg. quarterly employment, Q1-6 | 44.1 | 7.2*** | 16.3% | 46.6 | 10.0*** | 21.5% | 38.0 | 7.6** | 20.0% | |||||
| n.a. | Any employment, Q8 | 49.2 | 9.1*** | 18.5% | 51.6 | 7.1*** | 13.8% | 43.0 | 5.5 | 12.8% | |||||
| By aid receipt in year before RA: | Long-term recipient (7) | Short-term recipient (7) | New applicant (7) | ||||||||||||
| n.a. | Avg. quarterly employment, Q1-6 | 37.7 | 12.1*** | 32.1% | 48.7 | 6.1*** | 12.5% | 46.8 | 3.1* | 6.6% | |||||
| n.a. | Any employment, Q8 | 44.4 | 11.3*** | 25.5% | 53.7 | 6.3** | 11.7% | 52.5 | 3.8 | 7.2% | |||||
| By employment in year before RA: | Not employed | Employed | |||||||||||||
| n.a. | Avg. quarterly employment, Q1-6 | 23.3 | 10.5*** | 45.1% | 61.9 | 5.2*** | 8.4% | ||||||||
| n.a. | Any employment, Q8 | 31.1 | 11.4*** | 36.7% | 66.0 | 4.4** | 6.7% | ||||||||
| By earnings in year before RA: | No earnings | $1 to 5000 | Over $5000 | ||||||||||||
| n.a. | Avg. quarterly employment, Q1-6 | 23.3 | 10.5*** | 45.1% | 55.0 | 6.9*** | 12.5% | 72.8 | 3.2 | 4.4% | |||||
| n.a. | Any employment, Q8 | 31.1 | 11.4*** | 36.7% | 61.0 | 5.0** | 8.2% | 73.8 | 3.6 | 4.9% | |||||
|
NOTES: For full program names
and citations, see Table 3.4. Significance tests for treatment-control
differences is indicated by: Abbreviations: Q=quarter; RA = random assignment; n.a. = not available. 1. Persons classified as "most disadvantaged" (1) had been on aid for at least 22 of the 24 months prior to random assignment; (2) had not worked in the prior year; and (3) did not have a high school credential. Persons classified as "least disadvantaged had none of these traits; persons classified as "moderately disadvantaged" had one or two. 2. "Most disadvantaged" consists of long-term recipients who did not have a diploma or GED and did not work for pay in the year prior to random RA. 3. Barriers include not having worked in the past six years; being arrested since age 16; having 2 or more children under six or four or more under 12; having been fired from one's longest-lasting jobs; and not having a high school credential. 4. Participants with low levels of education, short employment histories, and long welfare histories were assigned a 36-month time limit; other participants were assigned a 24-month time limit. 5. "Most at risk" sample members are those whose risk score is in the top quartile of the distribution of a "dependency index." "Least at risk" sample members are those whose risk score is in the bottom quartile of the distribution of the dependency index. "Medium risk" sample members are those whose risk score is in the interquartile range of the distribution of the dependency index. 6. "Most disadvantaged" is defined as having no high school credential, not having worked in the year prior to RA, and having been on aid at least 21 of the 24 months prior to RA. The "least disadvantaged" meet none of these criteria. 7. "Long term" recipients are those who received aid for at least 22 of the 24 months prior to RA. "Short term" recipients are those who received aid for 1 to 22 months during the 24 months prior to RA. "New applicants" are those who received no aid during the 24 months prior to RA. |
A.2.1. Programs That Focus on Financial Work Incentives
The two programs that focus on financial work incentives provide no clear evidence that the effects of this policy vary according to recipients’ level of disadvantage (Panel A). Although the group-specific employment impacts vary for WRP-IO, they are insignificant and display no consistent pattern. MFIP-IO has greater effects for participants with higher levels of schooling, but also for persons with shorter employment histories and longer welfare histories. The estimates in Table A.4 show that these programs had insignificant effects on earnings for all the subgroups, which is consistent with the finding that the programs had no significant effect on third-year earnings overall, as shown in Table 5.1.
A.2.2 Programs That Focus on Financial Work Incentives Tied to Hours of Work
As seen in Panel B, the first-year employment effects of New Hope are essentially uniform across groups, defined by differing numbers of barriers to employment, although there are significant differences in the second-year effects. In both years, employment impacts for whites are insignificant and smaller than the impacts for blacks and Hispanics. The effects of SSP are nearly uniform across the distribution of the age of the youngest child, the mother’s education, employment history, and welfare history. Indeed, formal tests indicate that these effects are homogenous across levels of disadvantage for all the disadvantage measures considered.
Only New Hope provides subgroup estimates for earnings. The earnings effect of the program is strongest for the middle-disadvantage group. By race, the impacts of New Hope are positive for blacks and Hispanics, but negative (though always insignificant) for whites.
A.2.3. Programs That Focus on Mandatory Work-Related Activities
Employment and earnings impacts by subgroup from L.A. Jobs-First GAIN are presented in Panel C of Tables A.3 and A.4. Employment impacts differ significantly only among subgroups defined by English proficiency and by the recipient’s overall level of disadvantage. None of the earnings impacts differ significantly across the different subgroups.
Panel C of Table A.4 also presents subgroup-specific earnings impacts from Michalopoulos and Schwartz (2000). As noted above, these estimates are based on pooled microdata from the NEWWS programs and several other experiments that involved mandatory work-related activities. Several of the subgroup differences are statistically significant. However, in some cases the impacts are larger for relatively disadvantaged groups, such as families with several children, whereas in other cases, the impacts are larger for relatively advantaged groups, such as recent applicants.
A.2.4. Programs That Combine Financial Work Incentives with Mandatory Work-Related Activities
Three programs estimate group-specific employment impacts for programs that combine financial work incentives with mandatory work-related activities: WRP, MFIP, and FIP (Panel D). For the most part, these programs produce employment effects that are similar across the distribution of socioeconomic disadvantage. WRP has similar effects for all three levels of its composite measure of disadvantage, and MFIP has similar effects by education and prior welfare use. It has smaller effects for persons with recent employment histories than for persons without any recent employment. The only significant effects of FIP are for relatively disadvantaged groups, but like most of the other studies, FIP provides no tests for whether the subgroup differences are statistically significant.
WRP’s impact on earnings is significant only for the least disadvantaged group, although the estimates for the most and least disadvantaged groups are similar. The only estimate from MFIP that is significant is the one for persons with no recent work history, which is substantially larger than the corresponding estimate for persons with recent work histories. Estimates are similar by education and welfare histories, albeit insignificant. The overall third-year earnings effect of MFIP, shown in Table 5.1, is of similar magnitude and marginally significant. Smaller samples by subgroup are probably the reason why the subgroup-specific estimates are insignificant. The earnings effects of FIP are generally stronger for the more disadvantaged groups.
A.2.5. Programs That Focus on TANF-Like Bundles of Reforms
ABC, FTP, and Jobs First provide subgroup-specific employment impacts (Panel F of Table A.3). There is little uniformity in their impacts by level of socioeconomic disadvantage. In ABC, impacts are larger for older mothers, mothers with older children, and mothers with more recent work experience, but fairly similar by level of education. They are larger for women with intermediate welfare histories than for women with more or less recent time on aid.
In FTP, the program impacts on employment are similar by the length of the recipient’s time limit, by the age of her youngest child, and by her level of dependency risk. In Jobs First, they are generally greater among the more disadvantaged groups. Earnings impacts in Jobs First likewise are larger among more disadvantaged groups. However, in FTP, they are greatest for those at least risk, based on the composite risk scale, but also greater among those with shorter time limits and with children under age three.
A.3. USE OF OTHER GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS
As seen in Table A.5, the only random assignment studies to provide subgroup-specific impact estimates are WRP, New Hope, FTP, and Jobs First. Only New Hope provides statistical tests for subgroup differences. Moreover, these studies provide subgroup impacts only for food stamps. There is no information in the literature on whether the various reform programs have affected Medicaid coverage or utilization of other nutrition programs in a manner that varies according to socioeconomic disadvantage.
| Group 1 | Group 2 | Group 3 | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Name | Cases served | Signif. of group diff. | Measure | Control mean | Impact | % | Control mean | Impact | % | Control mean | Impact | % |
| A. Programs that focus on financial work incentives | ||||||||||||
| WRP-IO | Single-parent recipients and applicants | By status at RA: | Recipient | Applicant | ||||||||
| n.a. | Received FS in last 3 mos. of FU | 57.8 | -0.1 | -0.2% | 39.9 | 2.6 | 6.5% | |||||
| By level of disadvantage: | Most disadvantaged (1) | Moderately disadvantaged (1) | Least disadvantaged (1) | |||||||||
| n.a. | Received FS in last 3 mos. of FU | 68.4 | 0.1 | 0.1% | 52.8 | -0.6 | -1.1% | 38.7 | 4.1 | 10.6% | ||
| B. Programs that focus on financial work incentives tied to hours of work | ||||||||||||
| New Hope | Poor families employed FT at RA | By barriers to employment: | Two (2) | One (2) | None (2) | |||||||
| Months receiving FS, year 1 | 8.4 | 0.4 | 4.8% | 7.3 | 0.0 | 0.0% | 6.7 | -0.6 | -9.0% | |||
| Months receiving FS, year 2 | 6.2 | 1.1** | 17.7% | 5.1 | 0.4 | 7.8% | 4.2 | 0.1 | 2.4% | |||
| C. Programs that focus on mandatory work-related activities | ||||||||||||
| D. Programs that focus on financial work incentives and mandatory work-related activities | ||||||||||||
| WRP | Single-parent recipients and applicants | By status at RA: | Recipient | Applicant | ||||||||
| n.a. | Received FS in last 3 mos. of FU | 57.8 | -1.9 | -3.3% | 39.9 | -0.9 | -2.3% | |||||
| By level of disadvantage: | Most disadvantaged (1) | Moderately disadvantaged (1) | Least disadvantaged (1) | |||||||||
| n.a. | Received FS in last 3 mos. of FU | 68.4 | 0.5 | 0.7% | 52.8 | -1.3 | -2.5% | 38.7 | -3.1 | -8.0% | ||
| E. Programs that focus on other individual reforms | ||||||||||||
| F. Programs that focus on TANF-like bundle of reforms (time limits with financial incentives, work-related activities, or both) | ||||||||||||
| FTP | Recipients and applicants | By length of time limit: | 36 months (3) | 24 months (3) | ||||||||
| n.a. | Ever received FS in years 1-2 | 92.4 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 88.4 | -0.8 | -0.9 | |||||
| By age of youngest child: | Under 3 | 3 or over | ||||||||||
| n.a. | Ever received FS in years 1-2 | 91.0 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 89.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | |||||
| JOBS First | Recipients and applicants | By status at RA: | Recipient | Applicant | ||||||||
| n.a. | Avg. percent receiving FS, years 1-2 | 79.9 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 56.1 | 5.2*** | 9.3 | |||||
| n.a. | Avg. percent receiving FS, year 3 | 61.8 | -3.7** | -6.0 | 40.1 | -0.4 | -1.0 | |||||
| By disadvantage: | Most disadvantaged (4) | Least disadvantaged (4) | ||||||||||
| n.a. | Avg. percent receiving FS, years 1-2 | 84.5 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 50.4 | 3.9 | 7.7 | |||||
| n.a. | Avg. percent receiving FS, year 3 | 70.0 | -2.1 | -3.0 | 36.1 | -1.6 | -4.4 | |||||
| By age of youngest child: | Less than 6 | 6 to 11 | 12 to 18 | |||||||||
| n.a. | Avg. quarterly FS receipt, Q1-6 | 74.7 | 2.9** | 3.9% | 74.1 | 7.0*** | 9.4% | 75.4 | -2.0 | -2.7% | ||
| n.a. | Any FS receipt, Q8 | 59.6 | -0.4 | -0.7% | 59.3 | 3.4 | 5.7% | 57.3 | -7.6* | -13.3% | ||
| By aid receipt in year before RA: | Long-term recipient (5) | Short-term recipient (5) | New applicant (5) | |||||||||
| n.a. | Avg. quarterly FS receipt, Q1-6 | 87.3 | -0.3 | -0.3% | 70.6 | 7.0*** | 9.9% | 57.9 | 3.6* | 6.2% | ||
| n.a. | Any FS receipt, Q8 | 75.1 | -4.6** | -6.1% | 52.7 | 3.6 | 6.8% | 40.9 | 1.9 | 4.6% | ||
| By employment in year before RA: | Not employed | Employed | ||||||||||
| n.a. | Avg. quarterly FS receipt, Q1-6 | 78.8 | 1.2 | 1.5% | 69.6 | 4.0*** | 5.7% | |||||
| n.a. | Any FS receipt, Q8 | 65.3 | -2.3 | -3.5% | 52.9 | 1.0 | 1.9% | |||||
| By earnings in year before RA: | No earnings | $1 to 5000 | Over $5000 | |||||||||
| n.a. | Avg. quarterly FS receipt, Q1-6 | 78.8 | 1.2 | 1.5% | 76.6 | 1.5 | 2.0% | 58.8 | 7.3*** | 12.4% | ||
| n.a. | Any FS receipt, Q8 | 65.3 | -2.3 | -3.5% | 60.4 | -2.4 | -4.0% | 41.2 | 5.7 | 13.8% | ||
| NOTES: For full program names and citations, see
Table 3.4. Significance tests for treatment-control differences
is indicated by: *=10%, **=5%; ***=1%. Significance of test for
subgroups differences is indicated by: x = 10%; xx= 5%; xxx=1%.
Abbreviations: FS=Food Stamps; FU=follow-up; RA=random assignment;
n.a.=not available. 1. People in the "most disadvantaged" group: (1) were on aid at least 22 of the 24 months prior to RA; (2) had not worked in the past year; (3) had no high school credential. People in the "least disadvantaged" group had none of these characteristics. People in the "moderately disadvantaged" group had some, but not all three. 2. Barriers include not having worked in the past six years; being arrested since age 16; having 2 or more children under six or four or more under 12; having been fired from one's longest-lasting jobs; and not having a high school credential. 3. Participants with low levels of education, short employment histories, and long welfare histories were assigned a 36-month time limit; other participants were assigned a 24-month time limit. 4. "Most disadvantaged" is defined as having no high school credential, not having worked in the year prior to RA, and having been on aid at least 21 of the 24 months prior to RA. Results for less disadvantaged groups are not provided. 5. "Long term" recipients are those who received aid for at least 22 of the 24 months prior to RA. "Short term" recipients are those who received aid for 1 to 22 months during the 24 months prior to RA. "New applicants" are those who received no aid during the 24 months prior to RA. |
Neither WRP-IO nor WRP had significantly different effects on food stamp use by subgroup (Panels A and D). This underscores the impression from Table 6.1 and earlier chapters that this program had little effect on behavior overall.
Only one of the subgroup-specific estimates from New Hope is statistically significant (Panel B). The subgroup impacts do not differ significantly from each other.
Subgroup results for FTP and Jobs First are presented in Panel F of Table A.5. The pre—time limit impacts of FTP on FSP participation are similar to FTP’s impacts on welfare use. The impacts vary little by either the length of the recipient’s time limit or the age of her youngest child. The subgroup-specific FSP impacts of Jobs First are smaller, and mostly less significant, than the corresponding effects on welfare use. During the pre—time limit period, Jobs First increased food stamp use significantly among applicants, families with younger children, shorter-term recipients, and recipients with more favorable work histories. In the post—time limit period, Jobs First reduced food stamp use significantly among recipients (as opposed to applicants) and long-term recipients.
In the case of food stamps, a particularly important subgroup to consider is immigrants, since PRWORA included a provision to remove most legal immigrants from the food stamp rolls. Although that provision of the law was later overturned, it has been suggested that the provision had a chilling effect, causing immigrants to leave the program, returning only in smaller numbers after the law was rescinded. Three sets of analysts consider the decline in food stamp use between 1994 and 1997, noting that the decline among immigrants was greater than the decline among natives. Borjas (2001b) observes that the decline in immigrant food stamp use relative to natives is almost entirely attributable to the substantial relative decline that took place in California. He conjectures that it may have as much to do with anti-immigrant sentiment there as with the terms of PRWORA. Lofstrom and Bean (2001), in contrast, factor in the role of the economy and conclude that the labor market conditions facing immigrants were responsible for their greater decline in aid use. Haider et al. (2001) reach similar conclusions.
A.4. INCOME, INCOME SOURCES, AND POVERTY
A number of the experimental studies that provide results for income and poverty also examine impacts for subgroups.112 Tables A.6, A.7, and A.8 record results for the studies with subgroup impacts for income, welfare payments, and food stamp payments, respectively. We review the findings by the reform policy or policies evaluated in the experiment for the three outcomes covered by the tables.
Table A.6–Estimated Impact of Welfare Reform on Income for Subgroups: Random Assignment Studies (Click on this link to view table)
| Group 1 | Group 2 | Group 3 | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Name | Cases served | Signif. of group diff. | Measure | Control mean | Impact | % | Control mean | Impact | % | Control mean | Impact | % |
| A. Programs that focus on financial work incentives | ||||||||||||
| WRP-IO | Single-parent recipients and applicants | By level of disadvantage: | Most disadvantaged (1) | Moderately disadvantaged (1) | Least disadvantaged (1) | |||||||
| n.a. | Quarterly FS payment for last 3 mos. of 42-mo FU | $391 | $26 | 6.6% | $285 | -$7 | -2.5% | $183 | $41* | 22.4% | ||
| By status at RA: | Recipient | Applicant | ||||||||||
| n.a. | Quarterly FS payment for last 3 mos. of 42-mo FU | $317 | $2 | 0.6% | $198 | $19 | 9.6% | |||||
| B. Programs that focus on financial work incentives tied to hours of work | ||||||||||||
| New Hope | Poor families not employed FT at RA | By potential employment barriers (6) | Two or more | One | None | |||||||
| Avg. annual R FS payments in year 1 of 2-yr FU | $2,274 | $249 | 10.9% | $1,806 | -$84 | -4.7% | $1,363 | -$79 | -5.8% | |||
| xx | Avg. annual R FS payments in year 2 of 2-yr FU | $1,568 | $589*** | 37.6% | $1,259 | -$13 | -1.0% | $817 | $123 | 15.1% | ||
| C. Programs that focus on mandatory work-related activities | ||||||||||||
| D. Programs that focus on financial work incentives and mandatory work-related activities | ||||||||||||
| WRP | Single-parent recipients and applicants | By level of disadvantage: | Most disadvantaged (1) | Moderately disadvantaged (1) | Least disadvantaged (1) | |||||||
| n.a. | Quarterly FS payment for last 3 mos. of 42-mo FU | $391 | $4 | 1.0% | $285 | -$9 | -3.2% | $183 | $5 | 2.7% | ||
| By status at RA: | Recipient | Applicant | ||||||||||
| n.a. | Quarterly FS payment for last 3 mos. of 42-mo FU | $317 | -$13 | -4.1% | $198 | $10 | 5.1% | |||||
| E. Programs that focus on other individual reforms | ||||||||||||
| F. Programs that focus on TANF-like bundle of reforms (time limits with financial incentives, work-related activities, or both) | ||||||||||||
| FTP | Recipients and applicants | By length of time limit: | 36 months (2) | 24 months (2) | ||||||||
| Avg. total R FS payments in year 1 and 2 of 4-yr FU | $4,744 | -$188 | -4.0% | $3,685 | -$464*** | -12.6% | ||||||
| By age of youngest child: | Under 3 | 3 or over | ||||||||||
| Avg. total R FS payments in year 1 and 2 of 4-yr FU | $4,541 | -$392*** | -8.6% | $3,800 | -$339*** | -8.9% | ||||||
| By risk of welfare dependency | Most at risk (4) | Medium risk (4) | Least at risk (4) | |||||||||
| Avg. total R FS payments over 4-yr FU | $10,280 | -$473 | -4.6% | $6,175 | -$549** | -8.9% | $3,901 | -$531** | -13.6% | |||
| Avg. total R FS payments in year 4 of 4-yr FU | $1,928 | $50 | 2.6% | $1,032 | -$106 | -10.3% | $504 | -$11 | -2.2% | |||
| Avg. mo. HH FS payments in month before 4-yr FU | $185 | $7 | 3.8% | $115 | -$8 | -7.0% | $66 | -$12 | -18.2% | |||
| By disadvantage: | Highly disadvantaged (5) | |||||||||||
| Avg. total R FS payments over 4-yr FU | $12,249 | -$1,721** | -14.1% | |||||||||
| Avg. total R FS payments in year 4 of 4-yr FU | $2,440 | -$283 | -11.6% | |||||||||
| Jobs First | Recipients and applicants | By status at RA: | Recipient | Applicant | ||||||||
| n.a. | Avg. annual R FS payments in years 1 and 2 | $1,999 | $140*** | 7.0% | $1,209 | $217*** | 17.9% | |||||
| n.a. | Avg. annual R FS payments in year 3 | $1,596 | -$26 | -1.6% | $917 | $32 | 3.5% | |||||
| By disadvantage: | Most disadvantaged (3) | Least disadvantaged (3) | ||||||||||
| n.a. | Avg. annual R FS payments in years 1 and 2 | $2,267 | $57 | 2.5% | $972 | $241*** | 24.8% | |||||
| n.a. | Avg. annual R FS payments in year 3 | $1,892 | -$36 | -1.9% | $729 | $43 | 5.9% | |||||
| By age of youngest child: | Less than 6 | 6 to 11 | 12 to 18 | |||||||||
| n.a. | Avg. quarterly R FS payments in Q1-6 | $468 | $42*** | 9.0% | $457 | $84*** | 18.4% | $395 | $24 | 6.1% | ||
| n.a. | Avg. quarterly R FS payments in Q8 | $395 | $3 | 0.8% | $369 | $32 | 8.7% | $304 | -$41 | -13.5% | ||
| By aid receipt in year before RA: | Long-term recipient (7) | Short-term recipient (7) | New applicant (7) | |||||||||
| n.a. | Avg. quarterly R FS payments in Q1-6 | $563 | $31*** | 5.5% | $402 | $71*** | 17.7% | $300 | $53*** | 17.7% | ||
| n.a. | Avg. quarterly R FS payments in Q8 | $498 | -$21 | -4.2% | $315 | $13 | 4.1% | $226 | $31* | 13.7% | ||
| By employment in year before RA: | Not employed | Employed | ||||||||||
| n.a. | Avg. quarterly R FS payments in Q1-6 | $497 | $32*** | 6.4% | $387 | $65*** | 16.8% | |||||
| n.a. | Avg. quarterly R FS payments in Q8 | $422 | -$3 | -0.7% | $314 | $12 | 3.8% | |||||
| By earnings in year before RA: | No earnings | $1 to 5000 | Over $5000 | |||||||||
| n.a. | Avg. quarterly R FS payments in Q1-6 | $497 | $32*** | 6.4% | $428 | $48*** | 11.2% | $323 | $91*** | 28.2% | ||
| n.a. | Avg. quarterly R FS payments in Q8 | $422 | -$3 | -0.7% | $366 | -$15 | -4.1% | $235 | $51*** | 21.7% | ||
| NOTES: For full program names
and citations, see Table 3.4. Significance tests for treatment-control
differences is indicated by: *=10%, **=5%; ***=1%. Significance
of test for subgroups differences is indicated by: x = 10%; xx=
5%; xxx=1%. n.a. = not available. Abbreviations: FS=Food Stamp;
FU=follow-up; HH=household; Q=quarter; R=recipient. 1. Persons classified as "most disadvantaged" (1) had been on aid for at least 22 of the 24 months prior to random assignment; (2) had not worked in the prior year; and (3) did not have a high school credential. Persons classified as "least disadvantaged had none of these traits; persons classified as "moderately disadvantaged" had one or two. 2. Participants with low levels of education, short employment histories, and long welfare histories were assigned a 36-month time limit; other participants were assigned a 24-month time limit. 3. "Most disadvantaged" is defined as having no high school credential, not having worked in the year prior to RA, and having been on aid at least 21 of the 24 months prior to RA. "Least disadvantaged" is defined as having none of these traits. 4. "Most at risk" have risk score in top quartile of dependency index; "Least at risk" have score in the bottom quartile; "Medium risk" are in between. Dependency index is based on prior quarter of employment, months employed prior to RA, AFDC recipiency status in quarter prior to RA, months of AFDC prior to RA, age of youngest child, and high school credential status. 5. "Highly disadvantaged" consists of those in "most at risk" subgroup with no HS diploma or GED, no UI-reported earnings in year prior to RA, and 2 or more years of reported AFDC/TANF receipt prior to RA. 6. Potential barriers to employment are not having worked in the past six years; having been arrested since age 16; having either two or more children under age 6 or four children under age 12; having been fired from one's period of longest employment; and not having a high school credential. 7. "Long term" recipients are those who received aid for at least 22 of the 24 months prior to RA. "Short term" recipients are those who received aid for 1 to 22 months during the 24 months prior to RA. "New applicants" are those who received no aid during the 24 months prior to RA. |
A.4.1. Programs That Focus on Financial Work Incentives
Only WRP-IO provides results for income, welfare payments, and food stamp payments by subgroups (Panel A of Tables A.6, A.7, and A.8), in this case defined by a composite measure of disadvantage and for recipients versus applicants. For the entire sample, impacts on income and transfer payments were small and insignificant. For the subgroups considered, impacts are only significant for the least disadvantaged group, which experienced an increase in income and an increase in food stamp payments. The direction and magnitude of the effects are similar (but smaller) for the most disadvantaged group; the moderately disadvantaged group is the outlier. There are no strong differences between recipients and applicants.
A.4.2. Programs That Focus on Financial Work Incentives Tied to Hours Worked
Both New Hope and SSP report subgroup differences in income impacts (Panel B of Table A.6). New Hope shows the largest income gains for the more disadvantaged, defined by barriers to employment (one or more barriers compared with those with none). In contrast, SSP consistently finds larger income gains for the least disadvantaged, with significant differences among groups defined by education, employment status at random assignment, and welfare use history. For example, the income gains over three years are more than two times as large for SSP participants employed full-time at random assignment compared with those out of the labor force.
Only New Hope reports results for welfare payments and food stamp payments for different subgroups (Panel B of Tables A.7 and A.8, respectively). New Hope finds no differences in welfare payments for groups defined by employment barriers. Differences in food stamp payments are sharper, with a significant increase in benefits to those with two or more employment barriers in the second year of follow-up, a difference that is significant from that measured for families with fewer employment barriers.
A.4.3. Programs That Focus on Mandatory Work-Related Activities
None of the programs in this group consider differences in food stamp payments by subgroup (Panel C of Table A.8). L.A. Jobs-First GAIN considers only welfare payment impacts by various subgroups (Panel C of Table A.7). Overall, this program resulted in a significant reduction in welfare payments, and this result also holds for all the subgroups reported in Panel C of Table A.7; none of the differences between groups are statistically significant. This finding suggests that the program impacts in terms of reduced welfare benefit payments apply to all the subgroups analyzed, from the most to the least disadvantaged.
As above, a pooled analysis of the 11 NEWWS experiments along with 9 others (including FTP and MFIP) considered impacts for various subgroups. Panel C of Tables A.6 and A.7 reports the results for this pooled analysis in terms of impacts on income and welfare payments, respectively (Michalopoulos and Schwartz, 2000). The results suggest that income gains are strongest for the least disadvantaged, for example those with a high school credential, with two children, and applicants. The differences in income impacts among groups defined by education and recipiency status are statistically significant, but the size of the annual income difference is meaningful only for recipients versus applicants (over $700 per year higher for applicants).
In the case of welfare payments, all subgroups experience a statistically significant decline, from $200 to $500 per year. Even when the impacts differ by group (and the differences are significant when defined by the number of children and recipiency status), the magnitude of the differences tends to be small. For example, the programs reduced welfare use by an average of $218 a year among new applicants, compared to $433 a year among long-term recipients.
A.4.4. Programs That Focus on Financial Work Incentives and Mandatory Work-Related Activities
Two programs–WRP and FIP–consider subgroup differences in income impacts (Panel D of Table A.6) and welfare payments (Panel D of TableA.7), but only WRP reports subgroup differences in food stamp payments (Panel D of Table A.8).
WRP, which had no effect on income overall, shows little differences in the program impacts on income for the two subgroups considered. Only the least disadvantaged group, based on a composite measure, shows a significant positive impact on income. Subgroup differences are more pronounced for FIP. In three of the four contrasts, FIP finds larger income gains for the most disadvantaged groups, defined by earnings history and the age of the youngest child.
Differences in welfare and food stamp payment impacts are not as pronounced and the pattern of impacts by the level of disadvantage is less clear. FIP and WRP do not report the significance of between-group differences, and both positive and negative impacts on welfare payments are recorded. WRP shows no differences in food stamp payment impacts for groups, defined by a composite measure of disadvantage or recipiency status.
A.4.5. Programs That Focus on TANF-Like Bundles of Reforms
Only FTP and Jobs First report differences for subgroups in the impacts on income, welfare payments, and food stamp payments (Panel F of Tables A.6, A.7, and A.8). In FTP, income differences are larger and statistically significant for those least at risk of welfare dependency (a composite measure). However, the differences among the groups defined by dependency risk are not statistically significant. Jobs First in Connecticut, in contrast, appears to raise income most for the most disadvantaged in the first two years of the program or the first six quarters by most of the measures of disadvantage recorded in Table A.6. The statistical significance of the differences among groups is not reported for Jobs First.
In terms of welfare payments and food stamp payments, FTP generally shows the largest negative transfer payment impacts for those most at risk, defined by age of the youngest child, risk of welfare dependency, and a composite measure of disadvantage. The pattern is different only when subgroups are defined by the risk of welfare dependency (food stamp payments only) and by the length of the time limit (for both welfare and food stamp payments), which is longest for those with the most barriers to work. In the case of groups defined by the length of the time limit, the larger negative welfare payment and food stamp payment impacts for those with the 24-month time limit may be a behavioral effect of having a shorter time limit.
For the various measures of disadvantage, the Jobs First results tend to show that those with less disadvantage experience the largest increase in welfare or food stamp payments in the first two years or first six quarters, and the smallest decline in payments in the third year or the eighth quarter. One exception to this pattern is when groups are defined by the age of the youngest child. For many of the measures, the differences in the impact estimates among the groups are quite small, and since the statistical significance of the between-groups differences are not reported, it is difficult to firmly establish a pattern.
A.5. OTHER MEASURES OF WELL-BEING
While many of the demonstration studies consider impact estimates for separate population subgroups, the other measures of well-being are generally not included in these analyses. There are three exceptions to this generalization, but even these studies offer little basis for drawing broader conclusions about subgroup differences in other measures of well-being as a result of specific reform policies or policies as a bundle.
For example, the two-year NEWWS follow-up discusses some subgroup differences for health insurance coverage. Overall, there are some subgroup differences by disadvantage status, as measured by a composite measure and by the level of education; the number of work barriers; and recent work experience. However, no clear patterns by disadvantage status emerge overall, or between the different program models (e.g., LFA versus HCD).
MFIP includes an analysis of a subset of the other well-being measures available for MFIP urban single-parent families for a sample of urban and rural two-parent recipient families. (Comparable results are not provided for two-parent recent applicants.) Again, however, there are no clear patterns from these analyses. For example, the impact estimate for perceptions of financial strain is negative and is the same magnitude as the effect for single parents, but it is not statistically significant. The effect on the index of material hardship is also small, negative, and statistically insignificant. For two-parent families, MFIP is estimated to significantly increase the likelihood of currently having health insurance coverage (impact estimate of 12.4 percentage points) but the effect on continuous health insurance coverage over the three-year follow-up is less than one-half as large and statistically insignificant. This is the opposite of the pattern found for single-parent families, where the larger and statistically significant effect was found for the measure of continuous coverage.
Finally, FTP analyzes differences in a subset of other well-being measures by the risk of long-term welfare dependency. Although FTP’s favorable income impacts were concentrated among the group least at risk of long-term dependency, there were no systematic differences in measures of material hardship for the same subgroups. There was also no clear pattern of differences for groups defined by employment barriers.
A.6. CHILD WELL-BEING
As part of the review of the experimental studies conducted in Chapter 10, we have already seen that the impacts of various component policies of welfare reform can vary by the age of the child. MFIP also demonstrates that there can be differences in program impacts for long-term welfare recipients compared with recent applicants. In this section, we review the evidence that impacts vary with other characteristics of the child or family. Table A.9 summarizes the results for different subgroups for the experimental studies that conducted more disaggregated analyses.
| Name | Child Outcome Domains | Subgroups Analyzed Defined By | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| A. Programs that focus on financial work incentives | |||
| B. Programs that focus on financial work incentives tied to hours of work | |||
| New Hope | Behavior
problems School performance |
. Child sex | .
Favorable impacts on educational progress larger for boys . Favorable teacher and parent ratings of positive social behavior and teacher ratings of problem behavior larger for boys |
| . Parent's
employment experience pre-RA |
. No differences | ||
| SSP | Cognitive/academic
functioning Behavior and emotional well-being Health and safety |
. Child sex | .
Youngest cohort: No differences . Middle cohort: Impacts for girls more pronounced but not statistically different from boys . Oldest cohort: Impacts for girls somewhat larger and same direction as boys but not statistically different; exception is risk of depression impact for girls is unfavorable and boys it is favorable |
| . Parent marital status | . No differences | ||
| . Parent age | . No differences | ||
| . Parent education | . No differences | ||
| . Parent disability | . No differences | ||
| . Family size | . No differences | ||
| . Parent depression risk | . No differences | ||
| C. Programs that focus on mandatory work-related activities | |||
| LA Jobs-1st GAIN | Academic
functioning and schooling Behavioral and emotional adjustment Safety |
. Child sex | . No differences |
| NEWWS
Sites (COS only) Grand Rapids LFA Riverside LFA Atlanta LFA Grand Rapids HCD Riverside HCD Atlanta HCD |
Behavioral
adjustment School progress Health and safety |
.
By risk for poor development, defined separately or cumula- tively by sibling structure, low maternal education, work barriers, maternal mental health |
.
Few impacts found within subgroups . Children at higher risk had small impacts; favorable in 2 of 3 sites for education-focused programs and unfavorable for employment-focused programs . Children at lower risk had larger impacts that tended to be unfavorable and not vary by program approach |
| D. Programs that focus on financial work incentives and mandatory work-related activities | |||
| MFIP - Recipients | Behavioral
adjustment School performance |
. Child sex | .
Positive impacts for girls more pronounced but not statistically significantly differ from boys |
| . Race | . No differences | ||
| . AFDC recipiency history | . More
favorable effects for recipients with 5+ years on aid but not statistically significantly different from shorter-term recipients |
||
| . Maternal earnings history | . No differences | ||
| . Maternal educational attainment | . No differences | ||
| . Parents' potential barriers to work | . No differences | ||
| MFIP - Applicants | Behavioral adjustmentSchool performance | . Child sex | . Boys had less favorable impact on school engagement |
| . Race | . White
children had less favorable impacts for several school performance measures |
||
| . Maternal employment experience | . Those
with recent employment experience had less favorable impacts on several school performance measures |
||
| . Maternal educational attainment | . Those
with a high school diploma had less favorable impacts on several school performance measures |
||
| E. Programs that focus on other individual reforms | |||
| F. Programs that focus on TANF-like bundle of reforms (time limits with financial incentives, work-related activities, or both) | |||
| ABC | Maltreatment | . Years on welfare | . Neglect less favorable in 2 of 3 years for LT recipients |
| Foster care | . Years of education | . Neglect less favorable in 2 of 3 years for less than h.s. educ | |
| . Previous history of maltreatment | . Abuse
and neglect less favorable in 3 of 3 years for those with prior history |
||
| . Race | . Neglect less favorable in 2 of 3 years for nonwhites | ||
| . Age of youngest child | . Mixed results in at most one year | ||
| . Age of adult head | . No clear pattern of differences | ||
| FTP | School
outcomes Behavior |
. Risk of long-term dependence | .
Less favorable outcomes on achievement and suspensions/ expulsions for those at lowest risk of LT dependence |
| Jobs First | School achievement | . Race/ethnicity | . Benefits stronger for whites but no significant group differences |
| Behavior problems | . AFDC recipiency history | . No differences | |
| . Level of disadvantage | . No differences | ||
| NOTES: For full program names and citations, see Table 3.4. |
Four studies consider how impacts differ for girls versus boys. While L.A. Jobs-First GAIN showed no differences by the child’s gender, MFIP and SSP suggest girls in some age groups gain more than boys while the reverse is true for New Hope. SSP demonstrated impacts for girls on a range of indicators that exceed those for boys, more so in the oldest age cohort and somewhat less so in the middle age cohort. There were no differences for the youngest age group. MFIP found more pronounced effects for girls on some outcomes, particularly for recipients. In the case of New Hope, the favorable impacts on both educational progress and ratings of behavior are stronger for boys. Girls also have favorable impacts, but they are smaller than for the boys. Taken together, these studies suggest that there may well be differences between boys and girls in the impact of welfare reform, but the differences are not always consistent and may depend upon the pathways by which specific policies affect the family outcomes that determine child well-being.
Other child characteristics used to define subgroups include race and measures of developmental risk. Of the two studies that considered racial differences, MFIP found no differences for recipients, and less favorable impacts for white applicants on several school performance measures compared with blacks and a residual other ethnic group. ABC’s assessment of maltreatment found nonwhites with less favorable impacts in two of three years compared with whites. The NEWWS evaluation of the COS sample available for six sites indicates that various indicators of child developmental risk may lead to differential impacts, but there was no clear pattern of variation with the orientation of the program.
Differences by family background characteristics have also been examined. SSP and ABC both find no differences by the age of the parent. ABC and SSP also found no differences by other parental background characteristics (specifically, age of the youngest child for ABC, and, for SSP, marital status, family size, disability status, and depression risk). In the case of abuse and neglect, a prior history of such behavior is associated with less favorable impacts in the ABC evaluation.
Three of the studies consider differences by measures of welfare dependency, either prior history or future risk. Long-term MFIP recipients showed more favorable impacts, but they were not statistically different from the shorter-term recipients. ABC found less favorable impacts for child neglect for long-term recipients (more than four years out of last five years), while FTP’s impacts on achievement and suspensions were less favorable for those at lowest risk of long-term dependency.
Finally, two studies assess differences by prior work history of the mother or parents. Among MFIP recipients, there were no differences in child outcomes based on maternal earnings history or her potential barriers to work. The children of MFIP Applicants with recent employment experience had less favorable impacts for schooling outcomes. New Hope, despite large differences in impacts by work history, found no differences in child outcomes for those employed at random assignment versus those not employed.
108 In principle, econometric studies could provide subgroup-specific estimates, but few do, probably because of the small samples that result from subsetting the data.(back)
109 Miller et al. (2000) provide subgroup results for urban recipients for employment and earnings, but not for welfare use.(back)
110 The NEWWS programs focus primarily on work-related activity mandates, as discussed in Chapter 3. MFIP involved mandates for recipients once they had been on aid for 24 months and also included a financial work incentive. Although data from MFIP were included in the Michalopoulos-Schwartz analysis, Miller et al. (2000), who provide the estimates that are available for this synthesis, do not provide welfare impacts by subgroups for single-parent recipients. In FTP, the treatment and control groups were both subject to work requirements, but the treatment group had access to a wider range of services than the control group. The treatment group also faced a time limit and a financial work incentive. Although FTP and MFIP involve major reforms besides mandatory work-related activities, they account for only about 10 percent of the pooled sample, which implies that their other major reforms are unlikely to substantially affect the pooled results. The other studies included in Michalopoulos and Schwartz are from earlier time periods, including the GAIN evaluations of the late 1980s.(back)
111 For SSP, subgroup impacts are available only for employment.(back)
112 None of the econometric studies reviewed in Chapter 8 consider differences for subgroups other than the differences for groups defined by education discussed in Section 8.3.(back)
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