ACF OPRE: Sanction Policies

VII. Conclusion

The primary objective of this study was to shed light on the ways in which states and local welfare offices use the sanction process to increase participation in program activities. The information generated by the study may be particularly salient to states considering various approaches to increasing their work participation rates in response to the DRA, which changed the way the rates are calculated, changed the way the caseload reduction credit is calculated, and effectively increased the work participation rates required of states. With one exception—Texas, which shifted from a partial to an immediate full-family sanction in 2003—the sites included in the study did not introduce major changes to the basic structure of their sanction policies. In an effort to increase engagement in work and work-related activities, they did, however, make changes to the way they implement their policies and procedures. Below, we highlight key innovations implemented in the study sites. We then summarize what we learned from the study sites’ experiences. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of ways in which we might further our understanding of the impact of various sanctioning approaches on increasing participation in work activities and improving recipients’ overall well-being.

A. Key Innovations Implemented in The Study Sites

With an increased emphasis on achieving higher work participation rates, the implementation of TANF sanctions has taken on a greater importance in most of the local welfare offices included in this study. In fact, nearly all of the daily tasks completed by case managers and, to a lesser extent, contracted service providers relate to the sanctioning process in some way. These tasks include providing information to recipients on work requirements; developing employment plans to which recipients will be held accountable; tracking participation in program activities; and identifying and resolving barriers to participation. While the sites all undertake the same tasks in implementing TANF sanctions, they demonstrate considerable variation in the way they handle the tasks and the relative importance they place on each. Similarly, the sites made different decisions about better use of sanction policies and procedures to achieve higher work participation rates. Factors influencing their decisions included (1) the type of sanction policy already in place; (2) administrative structure, especially how roles and responsibilities were allocated between staff in the welfare office and contracted service providers; (3) overall philosophy and approach for helping recipients make the welfare-to-work transition; (4) the number of families subject to work-oriented sanctions; (5) the availability of funds to implement special initiatives; (6) the availability and use of information on the characteristics and needs of sanctioned families; and (7) legislative or legal constraints.

For example, Los Angeles County’s approach to improving the effectiveness of work-oriented sanctions was influenced by research commissioned by the county on the use of sanctions and the characteristics of sanction recipients. In addition, because participants in Los Angeles County are subject to a partial sanction and, therefore, remain in the denominator of the work participation rate, the county must engage a larger number of individuals, including sanctioned or noncompliant recipients, in work activities in order to achieve higher rates. The situation and influences in DeKalb County, Georgia were markedly different. With a stringent upfront work requirement in place, TANF recipients must demonstrate compliance with program requirements as a condition of receiving TANF benefits. Because most clients in DeKalb County come on to TANF already meeting requirements, sanctions are less important to achieving higher work participation rates. Aided by greatly reduced caseloads and a community resource specialist acting as a liaison between welfare staff and contracted service providers, the county emphasizes the importance of early identification and resolution of noncompliance for recipients who may not be complying with program requirements.

The strategies implemented by the sites with respect to sanctions fall into six broad categories: (1) changing sanction policies; (2) defining work requirements and communicating information about them; (3) monitoring program participation and identifying noncompliance; (4) re-engaging noncompliant recipients in program activities before imposition of a sanction; (5) revising processes to impose sanctions more efficiently; and (6) re-engaging noncompliant recipients in program activities after imposition of a sanction. Table VII.1 summarizes the strategies sites implemented in these areas. While the sites collectively implemented changes in each of these areas, they made the most significant changes with respect to efforts to engage noncompliant recipients in program activities. Most program administrators and staff in the sites perceived these changes as improvements that will contribute to increased participation rates. However, little to no data exist to provide evidence of the effect of these changes.

Table VII.1. Strategies Implemented Across Study Sites
Strategy		Site (State or County)
Changing Sanction Policies	Shift from a partial to full-family sanction	Texas
	Increased penalties for multiple sanctions	Utah
	Elimination of durational sanctions	California
Defining Work Requirements and Communicating Information about Them	Employability plans that intensify work requirements	DeKalb, Suffolk, Kern, Los Angeles, Duval, Pima
	Employability plans that include a broad range of activities	Salt Lake, Kern, Los Angeles
	Home visits during the TANF application process	Los Angeles
	A statewide social marketing campaign	Georgia
Monitoring Program Participation and Identifying Noncompliance	A specialized monitoring and tracking unit	Suffolk
	A web-based reporting system	Utah
	Liaisons between contracted service providers and case managers	DeKalb
Re-engaging Noncompliant Recipients in Program Activities Before Imposition of a Sanction	Problem solving sessions with highly skilled staff	Utah
	Mediation sessions with on-the-spot decision-making	Suffolk
	Home visits to encourage compliance planning	Los Angeles
Revising Processes to Impose Sanctions More Efficiently	Specialized staff for imposing sanctions	Texas, Suffolk, Pima, Duval
	Specialized staff for sanction prevention or re-engagement activities	Los Angeles, Kern, Suffolk, DeKalb
	Time constraints on imposing sanctions	Los Angeles
Re-engaging Noncompliant Recipients in Program Activities After Imposition of a Sanction	Outreach and group information sessions	Kern
	Barrier identification and resolution	Suffolk
	Immediate job placement	Suffolk
	Job search and job preparation services	Tarrant
	Provision of work supports	Georgia

Changing Sanction Policies. In recent years, many states have changed the key aspect of their sanction policy—the effect of the sanction on the TANF cash grant—sometimes as part of a larger reform of their welfare systems. All states that have done so have moved to a more stringent model—that is, from a partial to a full-family (six states) or from a gradual full-family to an immediate full-family sanction policy (three states). One of the states in the study—Texas—made major changes to its policy by shifting from a partial to an immediate full-family sanction. In the wake of its new policy, Texas has experienced a substantial increase in its work participation rate—from 28.1 in FY 2003 to 34.2 in FY 2004. Administrative data suggest that the policy changes are affecting the work participation rate primarily by reducing the TANF caseload. Other states in the study made more minor changes, some of which increased and others that eased the stringency of sanctions. Utah, for example, decreased the time it takes to impose a sanction and increased the stringency of the penalties for repeat sanctions. California eliminated durational sanctions in an effort to reengage clients in federally countable work activities sooner.
Defining Work Requirements and Communicating Information about Them. Acknowledging that many studies show that TANF recipients do not understand either what is expected of them or the consequences for not meeting those expectations, all of the sites tried to do a better job of communicating program expectations to recipients. In most sites, workers talked about work requirements and potential sanctions during nearly every client interaction, most of which occurred over the telephone. Building on home-visiting efforts already in place to detect fraud, Los Angeles used its Home Interview Program to provide information on work requirements and to schedule orientation appointments for new TANF recipients. Georgia undertook a major effort to change the key messages conveyed to staff and recipients. The initiative, entitled “The Right Work The Right Way,” aimed to convey the message that welfare is not good enough for any family. Georgia’s TANF caseload has declined consistently and substantially since the implementation of the initiative and, at the same time, its participation rate has been rising sharply—from 10.9 percent in FY 2003 to 24.8 in FY 2004 and 69.0 percent by April 2006. Administrative data suggest that fewer people have entered the TANF rolls, but the state has not increased the absolute number of recipients engaged in work activities.
Monitoring Participation in Program Activities and Identifying Noncompliance. Since the start of welfare reform, case managers, usually located in the TANF office, have had primary responsibility for monitoring participation in program activities and deciding when to impose sanctions. Given that contracted service providers often offer the work activities in which TANF recipients are required to participate, these organizations also play a key role in gathering and reporting information on program participation to case managers. Each study site faced the challenge of developing a reporting system that would meet the more stringent reporting requirements set forth in the DRA and the Interim Final Rules while still allowing case management staff time to provide personal support to recipients, especially those with substantial barriers to employment. In an effort to create an efficient system for collecting information on program participation, Suffolk County created a specialized monitoring and tracking unit that assigned each staff member responsibility for collecting program participation information from a particular type of employment service provider (e.g., work experience, job search, education and training, and so forth). Utah created a new Web-based reporting system that allows case managers to monitor the work participation of each of their cases in real time. In an effort to identify and address participation problems immediately, in DeKalb County, Georgia three staff members (called community resource specialists) act as a liaison between contracted service providers and case managers.
Re-engaging Noncompliant Recipients before Imposition of a Sanction. In the absence of specific procedures for addressing participation issues before a sanction, the likelihood of any dialogue between client and case manager often depends on the client-case manager relationship. Establishing a protocol can ensure that all noncompliant clients have the same opportunities to present evidence of good cause for their nonparticipation and/or to work with program staff to resolve barriers to participation and develop a plan for future compliance. In addition to standard sanction notifications (or warning letters) and routine telephone calls and letters, several sites implemented special initiatives to work more pro-actively with clients before imposing sanctions. For instance, Utah developed an extensive two-phase problem-solving process through which various staff members assist clients in their efforts to comply with program requirements before imposition of a sanction. Kern and Los Angeles counties in California both instituted a cause determination and compliance planning process that occurs before sanctioning. Home visits are an integral part of that process in Los Angeles County. Suffolk County conducts mediation sessions after which clients found to have good cause for nonparticipation are immediately re-engaged in program activities.
Revising Processes to Impose Sanctions More Efficiently. In an effort to maximize the resources available for conciliation and re-engagement activities, some sites have attempted to streamline staff roles and sanction processes. To reduce the time and effort required to impose a sanction, some sites have designated one staff person (Duval County Florida, and Arizona, for example) or created a separate unit (Tarrant and Suffolk counties) solely responsible for imposing sanctions. Other sites (Utah) have invested in new data systems that reduce the time and effort required to transfer information between employment service providers and case managers. Finally, some sites (Los Angeles, Kern, Suffolk, and DeKalb counties) have hired staff specifically and exclusively dedicated to one or more sanction-related functions, such as home visits and other outreach efforts to noncompliant clients and formal or informal conciliation with noncompliant clients.
Re-engaging Noncompliant Recipients after Imposition of a Sanction.The most innovative initiatives implemented by the study sites were aimed at re-engaging noncompliant clients in program activities after the imposition of sanctions. Two sites—Kern County, CA and Suffolk County, NY—conduct extensive outreach to sanctioned clients to identify and resolve barriers to participation. Kern relies on in-house staff and Suffolk contracts with a local social service agency for these activities. Two sites—Suffolk County and Tarrant County, TX—have implemented work programs targeted to sanctioned clients who want to come into compliance with program requirements. Suffolk contracts with a local social service agency to explore how clients in a second or subsequent sanction live on a reduced grant and whether they are in fact immediately employable. The agency then refers clients immediately employable to a temporary employment agency for job placement. Tarrant County contracts with a local social service provider to engage sanctioned clients in 40 hours of work-related activities per week for 4 consecutive weeks. Activities include job search, community service, transitional jobs, or others as needed. In addition, the agency taps community partners to assist in providing sanctioned clients with specialized services such as mental health treatment. Finally, to encourage clients to work or participate in activities while in sanction status, the state of Georgia restored access to two highly valued work supports—childcare and transportation—to clients who do so.

B. What We Learned From the Study Sites’ Experiences

The experience of the study sites provides several lessons for state and federal policymakers and for program administrators. Broadly speaking, their experience expands our knowledge of the range of approaches used by states and local TANF offices to engage more recipients in work and work-related activities. But this study also has another contribution to make: identifying what we have learned from the sites’ experience in implementing policy and programmatic changes that can help decision makers consider the limits and possibilities for using sanction policies and procedures to increase participation in work and work-related activities. Specific lessons from the study sites’ experience are summarized below.

Although nearly all TANF recipients are included in a state’s work participation rate calculation, most of the study sites continue to exempt clients with serious personal and family challenges from work requirements; none of the study sites narrowed its exemption policies in response to the DRA. The countable and allowable work activities as laid out by HHS in the interim final regulations provide the framework used by all the sites to both set program expectations and engage TANF recipients in program activities. However, all sites acknowledge that it is not feasible for all recipients to participate in these activities for the full number of required hours. Except for Utah, all sites exempt some recipients from work activities despite consequences for the participation rate. And, all sites, including Utah, require some recipients, especially those with mental health conditions or substance abuse issues, to participate in alternative activities such as mental health or substance abuse treatment even though these activities are not countable. By engaging recipients with personal challenges in such activities, state and localities seek to increase their capacity to participate in federally countable or allowable activities at a later time. These cases present a dilemma for sites because they account for a non-trivial share of the TANF caseload. However, because states and counties have long depended on medical or mental health professionals for guidance on setting reasonable expectations for these recipients, they are not inclined to simply disregard that advice and subject recipients to program requirements that are beyond their reach. In light of these concerns, Utah is experimenting with providing supported work opportunities for recipients who can work at least for some time but who cannot initially be expected to work 20 or 30 hours per week. California is considering serving these recipients in a solely state-funded program to remove them from the participation rate calculation.
Case managers devote substantial time to gathering and verifying participation data, limiting the time they have to provide personal support to help recipients resolve participation barriers. To address this issue, some of the sites have hired dedicated workers either to gather and verify work participation data or to provide specialized support to recipients who need it. The conventional wisdom about case management is that it is the service delivery mechanism through which TANF recipients receive the personal attention they need to develop an employment plan and to resolve barriers to employment. Yet, in nearly all sites, case managers met with most recipients in person only rarely, and spent most of their time gathering information on program participation and trying to re-engage nonparticipating recipients. The more stringent reporting requirements that must now be met by states have increased the time case managers and other service providers need to spend documenting participation in program activities, leaving even less time for personal attention. To address this problem, Los Angeles County is planning to dedicate a group of case managers to work intensively with clients who have gone through the county’s sanction conciliation process to encourage engagement in program activities and to continue to address and identify additional personal and family challenges. The plan is premised on the notion that more personal attention, especially at critical junctures such as immediately after an individual agrees to participate in program activities after a period of noncompliance, would lead to an increase in participation. DeKalb County has addressed the issue by using Community Resource Specialists to serve as liaisons between case managers and contracted service providers; specialists collect participation reports from providers daily and pass information on to case managers.
Sanction conciliation processes are an important safeguard for clients; in particular, those that involve a variety of staff can assist case managers in making difficult decisions. Case managers and program managers acknowledge that there is a “gray area” concerning whether or not a sanction should be imposed. When case managers do not have much interaction with clients, they often base their sanction decisions solely on participation data while putting little weight on factors that might have contributed to the noncompliance. When case managers have more interaction and more information about the client at their disposal, they must use their skills to set program expectations at a level that both motivates the client to make progress towards self-sufficiency while acknowledging personal and family challenges that might get in the way. In addition, the more contact case managers have with clients, the more they must rely on their judgment to distinguish between recipients who have deliberately chosen not to participate in program activities and those who cannot participate because of personal or family limitations, or the presence of an undiagnosed disability. Some sites have implemented extensive conciliation processes and have done so because they believe it is important to ensure that sanctions are used as they were intended—to encourage compliance with program requirements and not to penalize recipients who face logistical, personal, and family challenges that compromise their ability to meet program expectations. This means checking the decisions of case managers who often exercise considerable discretion in deciding whether to initiate a sanction. Conciliations help case managers process the information they have and obtain different perspectives from other program staff involved with the client. They also provide an important safeguard for families, making it less likely that sanctions will create undue hardships on families that may already be struggling to meet their day-to-day responsibilities.
While there were exceptions, the sites with partial sanction policies focused more intensively than sites with full-family sanctions on reducing their sanction rates. In partial sanction sites, sanctioned clients remain indefinitely on the caseload and in the denominator of the federal work participation rate. Thus, to meet high work participation rates, sites with partial sanction policies have particular incentive both to prevent sanctions from occurring and to implement strategies that help clients to cure their sanctions. Generally, the sites in which the imposition of sanctions had the most effect on work participation rates—Kern County and Los Angeles County, CA and Suffolk County, NY—were the sites that did the most to help clients prevent and/or cure sanctions. Though there were exceptions, the other sites in the study generally relied either on identifying noncompliance quickly and removing nonparticipants from the caseload or on stringent applicant work requirements to meet required participation rates. Utah was one exception; after changing policy to remove nonparticipants from the caseload more quickly, the state placed more emphasis on its problem solving, or sanction conciliation, process in an effort to balance swifter sanctions with client protections and preventative measures.
To meet high work participation rates, it is not enough for states with partial sanction policies to reduce their sanction rates; they must actively assist nonparticipants to comply with program requirements. In partial sanction states, even a low sanction rate can result in a significant accumulation of sanctioned cases in the denominator. In Suffolk County, for example, only about five percent of cases receive a sanction each month, but fully one-third of cases in the denominator are in sanction status each month. Simply reducing the percentage of cases in sanction status, however, may not be enough to affect the work participation rate. Los Angeles County, CA recently implemented a home-visiting program, whose primary goal is to conduct outreach to and conciliation with nonparticipating clients. The number of recipients sanctioned in the county has been declining substantially since implementation of the program, but the decline has not coincided with an increase in the county’s work participation rate. Rather, many nonparticipating clients have personal and family challenges that make them exempt from or unable to fully fulfill the federal work requirements, and others who are employable and agree to comply during the conciliation process do not follow through. To achieve higher work participation rates, states and counties must look closely at everything they do not only to reduce sanctions, but to engage recipients by ensuring that: (1) recipients understand what is expected of them; (2) logistical supports such as child care and transportation are in place to make participation possible; (3) personal and family challenges that may affect an individuals’ ability to participate are identified and addressed; and (4) a broad enough range of program activities are in place to address the circumstances and needs of each recipient.
The highest work participation rates are in full-family sanction sites and reflect primarily fewer nonparticipating clients on the caseload rather than more clients engaging in program activities; while some families who leave the TANF rolls find employment, many do not. The study sites that appear to be most likely to meet or come close to meeting the required work participation rates for single parent families (Georgia, and Texas) have full family sanctions or other policies that remove nonparticipating families from the caseload. Georgia’s high work participation rate appears to stem not from the use of full family sanctions, but from a stringent up-front work program that requires TANF applicants to demonstrate a high level of program participation before their application for assistance is approved. This practice not only reduces the denominator, but also ensures that only clients who are likely to meet the work requirements actually enter the caseload. While some of those who do not enter the caseload secure employment, many do not. When Texas shifted from a partial to a full family sanction, its work participation rate increased substantially, reflecting primarily a drop in the number of people on the caseload rather than a sustained rise in the number of families participating in work activities. In the first year that full family sanctions were in effect, relatively more clients subject to those sanctions left welfare without employment than those previously subject to partial sanctions.
Additional research on effective strategies for engaging large numbers of recipients in work and work-related activities is necessary; in the absence of such research, the sites relied on their professional judgment to decide how to use their limited resources to increase participation in program activities. Facing a scarcity of evidence on effective strategies for engaging large numbers of recipients in work and work-related activities, the study sites relied on their professional judgment to decide how to use their limited resources to increase participation in these activities. All sites would welcome ideas on proven strategies for meeting the higher work participation rates. However, because such information is not readily available, program administrators—often in conjunction with legislators, line staff, and advocates—relied on their professional judgment and the best information they had on the characteristics, needs, and dynamics of their caseload to decide how to achieve higher work participation rates. More effective use of sanction policies and procedures is just one of many strategies study sites and other states and localities are using to try to increase participation in countable program activities in order to meet the higher work participation rates. Other strategies program administrators within and outside the study sites are implementing or considering include improving the structure and content of existing programs, especially job-search and job-placement programs, creating paid and unpaid work experience programs, expanding participation in vocational training programs, moving recipients with disabilities to the Supplemental Security Insurance (SSI) program, creating special state programs for two-parent families and for recipients living with a disability, and creating temporary intake diversion programs that aim to triage recipients based on their ability to succeed in a work-based assistance program. Most program administrators in the study sites don’t believe that any one strategy will lead them to higher work participation rates. Rather, they expect that changes throughout their program (some big and some small) will be necessary to meet the higher rates.

C. Expanding the Knowledge Base: Evaluating the Impact of Various Sanction Policies and Procedures on Work Participation and Related Outcomes

The study sites are good examples of how states and local TANF offices use sanction policies and procedures to achieve higher work participation rates. However, absent a rigorous experiment designed to test the impacts of these approaches, we cannot know whether any of them will, in fact, have a positive impact on increasing participation in program activities or what impact they will have, if any, on other key outcomes of interest such as employment and material hardship.

Given the keen interest in increasing participation in work activities and the limited information on effective strategies for doing so, the current policy and programmatic environment provides an opportunity to rigorously test the impact of sanction policies and procedures on program participation, employment, and material hardship. For instance, states and local welfare offices are looking for new approaches to increase work participation rates, and some large states (e.g., California and New York) are investing additional financial resources in county welfare offices for the purpose of experimenting with new approaches. Large numbers of recipients are involved in these efforts, as demonstrated not only by those who have been touched by Los Angeles’ Home Visiting Outreach Project, but also by the many recipients who remain in sanction status in Los Angeles County and other large counties/cities in California and New York.

The following are two examples of research questions that could be incorporated into random assignment demonstration projects that would test the nature and extent of the link between sanctions and participation in work activities:

Are more severe sanctions (for instance, full family sanctions versus partial sanctions or sanctions that are imposed more quickly) more effective in increasing participation in work and work-related program activities? What is the effect of more severe sanctions on employment and earnings, and on family well-being?
Does the provision of more intensive services, either at the point at which TANF recipients are informed about work requirements or after they have failed to comply with work requirements, significantly increase the number of recipients who participate in work activities? What is the effect of the provision of more intensive services on employment and earnings, and on family well-being?

Below we describe experiments that could be conducted to answer these questions.

1. An Experiment to Test the Impact of Major Policy Changes

Several states have recently moved from a partial to a full family sanction policy. In light of the increased pressure to meet higher work participation rates, more states may follow suit. With advance planning, this shift could provide a unique, natural laboratory for rigorously evaluating proponents’ claims that full family sanctions encourage greater participation in work activities and opponents’ claims that such sanctions simply remove families from the caseload— especially those facing such challenges as mental health, cognitive, and substance abuse—without increasing participation in work or work-related activities. For instance, in states planning to move from partial to full sanctions, the new policy could be phased in by randomly assigning applicants and current recipients to treatment and control groups. The treatment group would be subject to full family sanctions, while the control group would continue to be subject to the partial sanction. The difference between outcomes for the two groups would be a measure of the new policy’s impact on program participation, employment, and material hardship. However, to examine these impacts effectively, the control group would need to be subject to the partial sanction policy for a minimum of 12 months and potentially for 30 to 36 months. A demonstration could be designed around at least three different options.

States could be encouraged to vary only the financial penalty associated with the sanction while keeping all other sanction procedures in place (e.g., when and how recipients are contacted about noncompliance). This type of demonstration would be a pure test of the effectiveness of a higher financial penalty.
States could be encouraged to consider all dimensions of a sanction policy and to alter one or more of these dimensions in a way that reflects their philosophy about implementing work requirements and imposing penalties for noncompliance. For example, a state that is considering moving from a partial to a full family sanction may require an extensive conciliation process similar to the one implemented in Los Angeles County or Utah (see Chapter IV, Section B) even though such a requirement is not now part of that state’s policy. In a multi-site demonstration project, this approach would most likely be a test of partial versus full-family sanctions in which the practices put into place to encourage compliance before or after a sanction is imposed are varied from site to site. The risk of such a design is that different impacts in different sites become difficult to interpret. With enough sites and some control over the degree of variation in the design of the full-family sanction policy, it may be possible to draw some inferences from demonstration results about whether more subtle differences in sanction policies make a difference.
States could be required to implement a specific full-family sanction policy in order to participate in a demonstration project. The advantage of this option is that the treatment would be the same across all sites, making it easier to interpret the cross-site results. Given the absence of evidence on which to base decisions about what should constitute the full-family sanction policy, the challenge posed by this option might be to define the parameters of the full-family sanction policy or, in other words, the “treatment policy.” One strategy for defining that policy would be to create a full-family sanction policy that includes the elements that have been selected by the majority of states that have implemented full-family sanctions.

2. Experiments to Test Alternative Services for Families That Are or May be Sanctioned

Owing to concerns about increases in recipients’ material hardship and the presence of serious personal and family challenges, some of the study sites made a special effort to reach out to and/or provide additional services for families at risk of sanction or already sanctioned. To test the effectiveness of these services, a demonstration project could be designed to leave the current sanction policy intact while varying the procedures and/or services that accompany the implementation of the policy. Such a demonstration would be easier to implement than a demonstration that involves policy changes because it would not require legislative changes. However, in states or counties that do not have extensive programs and procedures that govern outreach and/or offer more intensive case management services, additional costs would be involved.

In this experiment, all recipients would be subject to the same sanction policy, but the treatment group would be offered additional services, either at the point at which a recipient is notified of the work requirements, when a sanction is being considered, or after it has been levied. The additional services that might be part of such a demonstration project include more intensive outreach efforts to encourage participation at the start of the program, an intensive problem-solving process like the one implemented in Utah, intensive outreach (e.g., telephone calls, home visits, conciliation reviews) to encourage nonparticipating recipients to comply with program requirements, and intensive case management to uncover potential barriers to participation and to provide needed services. Below are examples of several experiments that could be used to determine whether different approaches to implementing TANF sanctions result in greater participation in work activities.

To determine the impact of making sure that recipients understand what is expected of them, an experiment could be set up to test alternative methods of informing clients about work requirements and sanctions. For instance, it would be possible to test whether clients informed about work requirements and sanctions through home visits (as in Los Angeles County) participate in program activities at a significantly higher level and move more readily into work than recipients who are informed about work requirements through typical avenues such as letters, individual meetings with case managers, and individual or group orientation sessions. It would also be possible to set up a three-way test of the relative impact of standard procedures, repeated phone calls at different times during the day, and home visits.
To determine the impact of implementing various reengagement efforts, an experiment could be set up to test less versus more intensive efforts to engage recipients before imposing a sanction. For example, control group members might receive only a letter instructing them to contact their case manager to both discuss reasons for nonparticipation and develop a new employment plan; the treatment group, on the other hand, might be provided with an opportunity to attend an in-person problem-solving and/or conciliation meeting (as in Utah, Suffolk County, or Kern County). Some recipients could also be presented with a conciliation opportunity followed by a home visit (as in Los Angeles County). A three-way test that includes home visits for some, but not all, recipients who are offered an opportunity to participate in a conciliation meeting could determine whether the cost associated with home visits is justified by significantly higher levels of program participation and a lower incidence of material hardship.
To determine whether providing specialized work activities results in significantly higher levels of participation in program activities and/or higher employment rates, an experiment could be set up to test the effect of providing job search assistance, job readiness training, work experience, or transitional jobs to sanctioned clients (as in Tarrant and Suffolk counties) versus providing no employment and training services or providing minimal supports on sanction cure rates, work participation rates, and employment rates.

In the current environment, sanctions are perceived as a crucial tool for encouraging TANF recipients to participate in work activities. Because states and counties are looking to implement innovative ideas that will help to boost their work participation rates, today’s environment is ideal for testing whether some of the strategies implemented by the study sites have the potential to significantly increase work participation and employment rates without significantly increasing material hardship. While discussions of the use of TANF sanctions inevitably turn to the relative benefits and costs of partial versus full-family sanctions, the study sites’ experience suggests that sanctions are implemented in many different ways. While some of these differences are subtle, others represent discrete program approaches that that could be rigorously tested to determine their effectiveness.

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