Studying the Consequences of Hurricane Katrina for ACF Service Populations: Annotated Bibliography

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Preface

The Urban Institute has undertaken a 12-month project to assess the feasibility of studying the consequences of Hurricane Katrina for Administration for Children and Families (ACF) service populations. The assessment is concerned with Katrina's consequences for child and family well-being and the need for ACF services. The analysis is organized around four substantive areas: migration and resettlement, income and employment, program needs (that is, needs for services), and program effects (that is, systemic effects on delivery systems). As part of its assessment of how to study the consequences of the hurricane, the Urban Institute project team has undertaken a broad literature review and produced a large bibliography on works that address the human, social, and economic dimensions of the storm, beginning with landfall in August and September 2005.

To identify the vast array of materials of potential interest, we used a systematic approach to gathering all known studies and relevant writings, using search terms specific to the disasters as well as broader but related topics concerning how regions, communities, economies, people, programs, and policies were affected, and what current and future needs will be. The search through electronic clearinghouses on Hurricane Katrina–related subjects encompassed electronic and print media, academic journals, and work developed by nonprofit and for-profit organizations, foundations, and federal, state, and local governments. For example, we searched the Brookings Institution and Living Cities, Inc. "Katrina Reading Room"; the Urban Institute's series *After Katrina*; and http://www.Hurricane-Katrina.org, a selected list of over 25 national and state-level nonprofit and private sector organizations that are known to have produced relevant work in the aftermath of the 2005 hurricanes. We also reviewed relevant reports from key government agencies such as the Department of Health and Human Services and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and others engaged in research, such as the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Research Service, the National Science Foundation, and the National Research Council. Similarly, we searched a selected list of national, state, and local newspapers and magazines that might be expected to have produced analyses of the effects of the storms, or detailed accounts of local conditions important to understanding the context of developments and the effects of the storms.

In addition to these sources and in order to use different perspectives to identify relevant materials, we used a variety of online search engines, several college and university library systems that have created guided search strategies since the storm (such as Brown University's "Katrina Disaster Response," and Michigan State University's "Hurricane Katrina: Research and Resources"), and several relevant research databases in EBSCOHost. We also conducted a comprehensive search of JSTOR, an archive of scholarly journals. Finally, we reviewed a bibliography prepared by the Urban Institute as a primer for participants in a joint conference of the Institute and the Louisiana Association of Nonprofit Organizations held in November 2006 to consider the efforts of nonprofit organizations in disaster response and recovery, and we consulted with internal and external experts from various fields to alert us to any recent publications or works in progress that might be relevant to our effort. Because of our ongoing work related to Hurricane Katrina, we are also the beneficiaries of formal (for example, Tulane University's KATRINARESEARCH-L listserve) and informal sources for information on

research efforts related to Katrina and disaster response, and we have brought these sources to our search.

Rosa Maria Castaneda conducted the search, which concluded in January 2007, although a few additions that have come to our attention since have been added. Brendan Saloner undertook the lion's share of initial reading, and LaTasha Holloway helped manage the database, edit, and provided quality control for the final product.

We have winnowed down more than 300 works that emerged from the search to about half that number, which appear on the following pages. Our bibliography is nonetheless expansive and diverse, including many forms of description and analysis of the human, social, or economic dimensions of the hurricane. The inclusions are deliberately diverse because the bibliography serves dual purposes. In addition to informing the ACF, the bibliography has been used to provide background to four teams of experts who have been convened for this project to assess research completed or underway, important gaps in that research, and the research capabilities of existing datasets to inform the questions of interest to ACF. As such, the works included are a mix of research studies, journal articles, conference proceedings, reports, speeches, essays, opinion pieces, issue analyses, and fact sheets, selected in part for their utility to the working groups. The breadth of information provides a rich view of what is known to date and the issues of importance to understanding the consequences of the storm.

Abramson, David, and Richard Garfield. *On the Edge: Children and Families Displaced by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Face a Looming Medical and Mental Health Crisis*. New York: Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health, National Center for Disaster Preparedness, April 2006. http://www.ncdp.mailman.columbia.edu/program_special.htm

This is an assessment of the medical and mental health needs of children displaced by Hurricane Katrina, as well as the social service needs of displaced households, based on a survey of a random sample of 665 households residing in FEMA-subsidized hotels and trailer parks in February 2006, and a subsample of children within the sample households. The study finds that children suffer from high rates of chronic health conditions—a rate one-third higher than the general pediatric population in the U.S.—and poor access to care. Nearly half of the parents sampled reported children with emotional and behavioral problems not present before the hurricane. Forty-four percent of caregivers did not have health insurance. Households sampled have moved 3.5 times since the hurricane, and the percent of households with at least one wage earner declined from two-thirds prior to the hurricane to less than half since the hurricane.

Administration for Children and Families, Office of Family Assistance. *Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program Instructions*. Washington, DC: Administration for Children and Families, October 11, 2005. http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/pi-ofa/pi2005-6.htm

This document, issued to state agencies that administer the TANF program, summarizes policies governing families affected by Hurricane Katrina. The document outlines how states can use broad discretion under current statute to provide services to TANF-eligible populations and provides particular guidance on eligibility-payment determination and residency requirements. Although states are still constrained by existing maintenance of effort requirements and can face penalties for failure to comply, ACF will not impose penalties on states that can demonstrate reasonable cause, such as the hurricane conditions, for failure to comply with existing statutory requirements.

American Red Cross. *A Year of Healing: The American Red Cross Response to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma*. Washington, DC: American Red Cross, 2006. http://www.redcross.org/images/pdfs/Katrina_OneYearReport.pdf

This report documents the relief effort provided by the Red Cross, along with its partners, in response to the hurricanes. It notes that the Red Cross opened 1,400 shelters, provided 68 million meals and snacks, and offered 3.8 million overnight stays. The report contains several vignettes pertaining to civic engagement, the use of Internet technology, and leadership in crisis situations.

Anlian, Steve. *Home-Buying Vouchers for Storm Victims*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, September 2005.
http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=900881

The author draws on historical international relief efforts, such as the 1988 earthquake in Armenia, to illustrate some of the difficulties in responding to a massive disaster and to advocate for the use of multistate housing vouchers for displaced hurricane victims. A housing voucher program would give choice and opportunity to low-income hurricane victims and would have a positive impact on metropolitan economies. While not sufficient in themselves, vouchers, the author argues, would make an important difference in the effort to resettle displaced persons.

Auer, Jennifer Claire, and Linda M. Lampkin. *Open and Operating? An Assessment of Louisiana Nonprofit Health and Human Services after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, February 2006. http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=900916

This study of the status of the nonprofit health and human services sector in Louisiana reports the findings from a telephone and mail survey conducted in November and December 2005 of 712 nonprofit organizations based in the 37 parishes most affected by hurricanes Katrina and Rita. About 95 percent of respondents indicated that the organization was affected by the storm. Forty percent of the New Orleans based nonprofits reported that they lacked clients to serve, while almost half of the nonprofits outside of Greater New Orleans are serving considerably more clients. Over 60 percent of survey respondents are receiving new hurricane-related funding, mostly from charitable donations. Housing is the greatest need, followed by mental health and employment-related services, health care, and emergency cash and food assistance. Almost half of the 177 organizations from the New Orleans metropolitan area and 87 percent of the organizations in other areas expected to be fully operational within a year.

Bascetta, Cynthia. *Disaster Preparedness: Preliminary Observations on the Evacuation of Vulnerable Populations Due to Hurricanes and Other Disasters*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, May 18, 2006.
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06790t.pdf

This testimony, delivered to the Senate Special Committee on Aging, provides preliminary observations on challenges related to hurricane evacuations faced by hospital and nursing home administrators, the federal programs that support these evacuations, and by states and localities that must transport vulnerable populations. Examples include providing for the necessary medical care for elderly and sick patients en route to their evacuation destinations, and assuring that quality care would be available for these patients at their destinations. Observations are based on site visits and interviews with state and local administrators, as well as a review of key policies.

Bea, Keith, et al. *Federal Emergency Management Policy Changes after Hurricane Katrina: A Summary of Statutory Provisions*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,

November 15, 2006.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33729.pdf

This report summarizes key legislation enacted by the 109th Congress and policy changes in federal agencies in response to Hurricane Katrina. It reviews provisions of Title VI of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, as well as changes to the Stafford Act. The report lays out changes in the organizational structure of DHS and FEMA as well as in the roles and responsibilities of different federal agencies in responding to disasters, and particularly in providing emergency housing, counseling, and cash assistance.

Bernstein, Mark A., et al. *Rebuilding Housing along the Mississippi Coast: Ideas for Ensuring an Adequate Supply of Affordable Housing*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Gulf States Policy Institute, 2006.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2006/RAND_OP162.sum.pdf

This report to the Governor's Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal considers housing policy options that could be applied to disaster situations such as those posed by Hurricane Katrina. Drawing on current housing policy and previous disaster responses, the authors develop a definition of affordable housing and identify key housing services needed, such as lowering costs and providing homebuyer education. They also discuss specific reconstruction needs of the Gulf Coast region and suggest how housing policy could be improved: for example, through better oversight and coordination, and by lowering lending costs and other barriers to homeownership.

Berube, Alan, and Steven Raphael. "Access to Cars in New Orleans." Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, September 2005.
http://www.brookings.edu/metro/20050915_katrinacarstables.pdf

The paper includes tables that show disparities in access to cars by race, class, and region of the country. The analysis focuses on New Orleans and implications for the population before and after Hurricane Katrina. It uses data from the 2000 Census of Population and Housing to show that one in four New Orleans residents lacked access to a car. African Americans have considerably less access, which is partly a reflection of income differentials. Children and the elderly were the least likely to live in households with access to cars.

Boodman, Sandra G. "Uncharted Territory: Mental Health Experts Struggle to Forecast Katrina's Psychological Impacts and Best Treatments." *Washington Post*, September 13, 2005.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/12/AR2005091201445.html

This article examines possible mental health effects in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. It reports that more than 1,700 children under 18 do not know where their relatives are. Victims may be at risk of developing posttraumatic stress disorder and other acute stress disorders. Children may become unusually aggressive, clingy, or

withdrawn. The article draws on the experiences of victims of Hurricane Andrew and the recent tsunami in the Indian Ocean, and on the opinions of experts who suggests that the mental health system is not equipped to deal with the large-scale trauma created by Katrina and that faith-based organizations—likely to be used by African Americans victims—may not have appropriate capacity in mental health counseling.

Boris, Elizabeth T., and C. Eugene Steuerle, eds. *After Katrina: Public Expectation and Charities' Response*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, May 2006. http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=311331

This conference report from a joint Urban Institute and Harvard University roundtable discussion covers issues related to expectations and capacity of the charitable sector to respond to disasters, and lessons learned from recent disasters including Hurricane Katrina. The strengths of nonprofits include their inherent flexibility; their weaknesses include institutional limits, potential mismanagement, and the need to honor donors' intents. Contrasting the responses to September 11 and Katrina, participants generally agreed that nonprofits work most effectively when the government response is strong. The report concludes that while charities can be powerful advocates on behalf of victims during a time of disaster, there is a need to improve the public's understanding of and expectations of the charitable sector.

Brady, Raymond J. *Louisiana Workforce Training Efforts to Rebuild Hurricane Disaster Areas*. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana Workforce Commission and Louisiana Recovery Authority, 2006. http://www.lra.louisiana.gov/CRITICALRECOVERYOCCUPATIONS101306.pdf

This report projects employment demand for jobs that require two years or fewer of training and are in key sectors related to recovery, including the oil, gas, construction, advanced manufacturing, transportation, and health care industries, and the cultural economy, which together account for 47 percent of the total wage and salary employment in the region. The author uses historical Bureau of Economic Analysis data from 1990–2004, parish-level data from 2005, and Bureau of Labor Statistics regional data from 2005. Using predictive statistical models weighted to accommodate the shock in employment trends caused by Hurricane Katrina, the analysis forecasts that there will be 33,000 new jobs required between 2006 and 2009, and of these jobs, 27,000 positions will be in the Katrina recovery area. After the initial recovery period through 2009, it is predicted that there will be a slowdown in job growth and recovering to pre-Katrina employment levels will take approximately a decade.

Briggs, Xavier de Souza. "After Katrina: Rebuilding Places and Lives," *City & Community* 5, no. 2 (June 2006): 119–28. http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1540-6040.2006.00165.x

The author reviews aspects of economic and social life of the affected population prior to the hurricane and advocates a less-segregated city with a better developed economy with better wages for those who return. He uses findings from the Moving to Opportunity

demonstration, an experimental housing program with a multisite longitudinal evaluation, to consider rebuilding options that would ensure the best outcomes for the poorest residents displaced from New Orleans. He discusses many nuances of the intervention, including the need for housing stability after dislocation. Relocation assistance should not replace a comprehensive plan for rebuilding that would incorporate the needs of the poor who plan to return, but instead should ensure choice based on informed preferences.

Bring New Orleans Back Health and Social Services Committee. *Report and Recommendations to the Commission*. New Orleans, LA: Bring Back New Orleans Commission, January 2006. http://www.bringneworleansback.org/Portals/BringNewOrleansBack/Resources/Health%20and%20Social%20Services%20Presentation.pdf

This report presents recommendations for rebuilding the health and human service sectors in Louisiana based on public hearings and other work of the Health and Social Services Committee of the Bring Back New Orleans Commission**.** The Committee recommends structural changes to the system of health care, including payment models to open up access to care, and increasing access to Medicaid and SCHIP. It suggests increasing the number of community health centers and helping to subsidize care in hospitals. The committee also makes recommendations for hospital care, primary care, public health, human services, and environmental health, and recommends increasing coordination between the human services and health services sectors. With respect to human services, the report identifies major challenges in areas such as supporting vulnerable and special needs populations, lack of collaboration between service providers, lack of performance-based standards, and insufficient affordable housing. The report emphasizes the need for service integration and improved client-driven practices.

Brodie, Mollyann, et al. "Experiences of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees in Houston Shelters: Implications for Future Planning." *American Journal of Public Health* 96, no. 8 (August 2006): 1402–08. http://www.ajph.org/cgi/content/abstract/96/8/1402

This study reports on the experiences of the evacuees in the storm and its aftermath, based on a survey of 680 Hurricane Katrina evacuees residing in emergency shelters in the Houston area from September 10–12, 2005. The survey was jointly designed by the Washington Post, the Kaiser Family Foundation, and the Harvard School of Public Health. The results show that many evacuees suffered physical and emotional stress during the storm and that the victims were disproportionately African American, low income, and without health insurance.

Brookings Institution. *Key Indicators of Entrenched Poverty*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2005. http://www.brookings.edu/metro/20050920_povertynumbers.pdf

This is a one-page fact sheet on the prevalence of different poverty-related conditions in New Orleans and Jefferson Parish in Louisiana, and in Biloxi, Mississippi. The document

uses 2000 and 2004 data from the U.S. Census Bureau and 2005 data from HUD that show the number of black and white households in each locality without a car, the percentage of households living in public housing, and the number of families with incomes below the poverty level.

———. *New Orleans After the Storm: Lessons from the Past, a Plan for the Future*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, October 2005. http://media.brookings.edu/mediaarchive/pubs/metro/pubs/20051012_NewOrleans.pdf

This report is a spatial analysis of the impact of Hurricane Katrina in seven parishes in the New Orleans area based on the decennial censuses from 1970 to 2000, and on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and Bureau of Economic Analysis. The authors use GIS mapping to estimate the housing stock of flood- and storm-affected areas in order to estimate the magnitude of the impact. Census data show that before Katrina, the New Orleans area was declining in population and becoming more racially polarized between the city and the surrounding region. Individuals living in storm-affected areas were disproportionately less likely to have access to a car and more likely to be black and poor. The authors present an agenda for federal action in reconstruction that emphasizes sustainable development, neighborhood integration, and economic revitalization.

Brown, Sharon P., and Patrick Carey. "Conducting the Mass Layoff Statistics Program: Response and Findings." *Monthly Labor Review* 129, no. 8 (August 2006): 70–75. http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2006/08/art6full.pdf

This article discusses methodological challenges to collecting claims data and determining the nature and impact of job layoffs in areas affected by Hurricane Katrina. Challenges include problems in the accuracy of unemployment data collected in the context of an unprecedented volume of unemployment insurance claims and discrepancies in administrative data from employer reports. Five states, Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, had mass layoffs due to Katrina, with the highest concentrations in Louisiana and Mississippi. The food, retail trade, health care, and social assistance sectors were the most affected, and employers in manufacturing and construction reported the largest number of separated workers. In hurricane-related occurrences, nearly 30 percent of all claimants were younger than 30, 60 percent were women, and 56 percent were African American.

Brown, Sharon P., Sandra L. Mason, and Richard B. Tiller. "The Effect of Hurricane Katrina on Employment and Unemployment." *Monthly Labor Review* 129, no. 8 (August 2006): 52–69. http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2006/08/art5full.pdf

This article explains how employment and unemployment estimation procedures using Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Local Area Unemployment Statistics were affected by Hurricane Katrina, and offers estimates of both for the Gulf Coast region in the aftermath of the storm. Based on the Current Population Survey and Unemployment Insurance (UI) claims in BLS geographic areas, Louisiana processed 224,200 UI claims in the five

weeks following Hurricane Katrina, compared with 193,000 claims for all of 2004. However, the validity of the estimates are limited because the State of Louisiana implemented a temporary waiver on reporting provisions that greatly affected the filing rates for UI, which it later revised, and many Louisiana evacuees filed UI claims in other states.

Bureau of Labor Statistics. "The Labor Market Impact of Hurricane Katrina: An Overview." *Monthly Labor Review* 129, no. 8 (August 2006): 3–10. http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2006/08/art1full.pdf

This article provides a compilation of Bureau of Labor Statistics descriptive statistics about the impact of Hurricane Katrina on employment and wages in Louisiana and Mississippi. St. Bernard, Orleans, and Jefferson parishes had the largest proportional declines in employment between September 2004 and September 2005. In Mississippi, employment in Jackson, Harrison, and Hancock counties declined by approximately 9 to 14 percent in September 2005. Damage in Mississippi was spread over the coastal areas due to the storm surge; damage in Louisiana was more concentrated and due to flooding. The largest job losses in Louisiana occurred in education and health services, leisure and hospitality, trade, transportation, and utilities. Black evacuees were nearly five times more likely to be unemployed than whites.

Burman, Leonard E., and Laura Wheaton. "Who Gets the Child Tax Credit?" *Tax Notes,* October 17, 2005. http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=411232

This is principally an analysis of the child tax credit (CTC), utilized disproportionately by middle-income white families because benefits are linked to tax liability and many low-income families have little or no tax liabilities. The authors note the work incentive features of both the CTC and the earned income tax credit (EITC), and that the Katrina Emergency Tax Act of 2005 allows families receiving the EITC and the CTC and who lost their jobs because of the storm to use their prior year's earning to compute their tax refund.

Cahoon, Lawrence S., et al. "The Current Population Survey Response to Hurricane Katrina." *Monthly Labor Review* 129, no. 8 (August 2006): 40–51. http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2006/08/art4full.pdf

This paper describes changes in data collection and analysis procedures for the Current Population Survey in the context of Hurricane Katrina. Disaster conditions posed unique challenges to the safety of agency employees, and changed the ability to track respondents who were displaced because of the storm. The paper gives a detailed analysis of how the survey team changed sampling, data classification, and estimation procedures. It also provides a chart with the additional questions that were added for survey respondents affected by Hurricane Katrina. Some data are included on employment changes based on changes in residence.

Center for Social Inclusion. *Race to Rebuild: The Color of Opportunity and the Future of New Orleans*. New York: Center for Social Inclusion, October 2006. http://www.soros.org/resources/articles_publications/publications/racetorebuild_20060908/racetorebuild_20060908.pdf

This report reviews economic conditions prior to Hurricane Katrina and policy interventions in the recovery phase, with special emphasis on low-income black, Latino, and Vietnamese populations. It argues that low-income communities in New Orleans suffered from large-scale divestment of resources, the area was racially polarized by suburbanization, and few resources were available for local development projects. Neighborhoods worst affected by the storm—the Lower Ninth Ward, Bywater, and Village del'Est—were some of the poorest in the city prior to the storm. The report recommends that measures be taken to restore public housing, restructure zoning laws to allow for more development of subsidized housing in affluent communities, and increase the low income tax credit. It contains additional recommendations for improving school flexibility and the quality of public transit.

Centers for Disease Control. "Assessment of Health-Related Needs after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Orleans and Jefferson Parishes, New Orleans Area, Louisiana, October 17–22, 2005." *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report* 55, no. 2 (January 20, 2006): 38–41. http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5502a5.htm

This study offers an assessment of household health status seven weeks after Hurricane Katrina, based on in-person interviews of a sample of households together with interviews of officials in state and local public health and mental health agencies in Orleans and Jefferson parishes. The survey measured the availability of utilities as well as the prevalence of selected health conditions, and found that 56 percent of households had one or more members with a chronic health condition, 50 percent of adults exhibited levels of emotional distress, 23 percent reported problems obtaining medical care, and 9 percent of households had problems obtaining prescription medications. Less than 2 percent of respondents had utilized mental health services.

Chamlee-Wright, Emily. "After the Storm: Social Capital Regrouping in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina." *Working Paper* 70. Fairfax, VA: George Mason University, Mercatus Center, 2006. http://www.mercatus.org/repository/docLib/20060823_After_the_Storm.pdf

This paper discusses the role of social capital in community development and rebuilding, focusing on network strategies used by returning evacuees to rebuild. The findings are based on 63 interviews, using both purposive and random multistage sampling of affected populations, conducted between April and July 2006 in selected neighborhoods in New Orleans and Mississippi. The paper analyzes how certain social networks facilitated resourcefulness and access to resources after the hurricane. The author discusses different organizational dynamics that help or hinder disaster relief. Rigidity of federal bureaucracy, including restrictions on funding under the Stafford Act, prevented FEMA

and other agencies from developing effective relief responses. Resilience in the business sector was made possible, in part, by the enlightened self-interest of suppliers and retailers. The paper includes reflections on charitable giving and the role of the nonprofit sector.

Clayton, Richard L., and R. Spletzer. "Worker Mobility Before and After Hurricane Katrina." *Monthly Labor Review* 129, no. 8 (August 2006): 11–21. http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2006/08/art2full.pdf

This article presents estimates of labor migration from New Orleans to Texas after Hurricane Katrina, along with estimates of wage and employment effects of the hurricane on local economies. Merging the quarterly wage records compiled for Unemployment Insurance purposes with the Quarterly Census of Earnings and Wages, a Bureau of Labor Statistics dataset, allows for an analysis of the earning histories, employment sectors, and locations of Louisiana and Texas workers in 2004 and 2005. The data show a steep 25 percent decline in employment in the New Orleans MSA, a 19 percent decline in the number of employers, and a 30 percent increase in the number of separations in Louisiana in the fourth quarter of 2005 compared to the fourth quarter of 2004. A cross-state mobility analysis reveals that, on average, persons who moved from the New Orleans MSA to Texas in the fourth quarter of 2004 experienced a quarterly earnings gain of $2,262. Workers making the same move in the fourth quarter of 2005 gained an average of only $20, and the median worker who moved experienced an earnings reduction. The authors suggest that, due to Katrina, more lower-wage workers were moving and displaced workers may have had fewer weeks of labor market participation than their counterparts a year earlier.

Colgan, Charles S., and Jefferey Adkins. "Hurricane Damage to the Ocean Economy." *Monthly Labor Review* 129, no. 8 (August 2006): 76–78. http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2006/08/art7full.pdf

The authors use data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages to measure the impact of the hurricanes in 2005 to the ocean economy. This sector includes marine construction, seafood processing and marketing, aquaculture, shipbuilding, minerals, marine transportation, and tourism. In 2004, the ocean economy in the Gulf Coast region employed 291,830 people and paid $7.7 billion in wages. The authors present charts that demonstrate the severity of the impact on the ocean economy for different regions. The most heavily impacted areas were between Jackson County, Mississippi, and Cameron Parish, Louisiana.

Dao, James. "Study Says 80% of New Orleans Blacks May Not Return." *New York Times*, January 27, 2006. http://www.truthout.org/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/48/17267

This article summarizes the findings of a Brown University study on migration and resettlement in New Orleans. Using data from the 2000 Census as well as federal damage assessment maps, it estimates that 354,000 people were affected by Hurricane Katrina, 75

percent of whom were African American. The author estimates that New Orleans could lose as much as 80 percent of its black population if the neighborhoods affected are not rebuilt. The release of the study coincides with uncertainty about what parts of the city will be rebuilt and what kinds of government assistance will be made available for this effort. The article quotes Brookings Institution demographer William Frey, who has suggested that many evacuees have already reestablished their lives in cities such as Houston.

De Vita, Carol J., ed. *After Katrina: Shared Challenges for Rebuilding Communities*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2007. http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=311440

This is a collection of conference papers from the Louisiana Association of Nonprofits/Urban Institute conference, *Translating Research into Action: Nonprofits and the Renaissance of New Orleans*, held in New Orleans in November 2006. The six chapters cover affordable housing, the impact of the storm on young children and effective interventions for children, cultural revitalization in New Orleans, public and environmental health, rebuilding assets, and preparing nonprofits for the next disaster.

Dick, Andrew, and Soeren Mattke. "The Level of State Involvement in the Reconstruction of the Municipal Healthcare System." *RAND Working Paper*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, October 2005. https://rand.org/pubs/working_papers/2005/RAND_WR308.pdf

This paper focuses on rebuilding the health care system in the New Orleans area after Hurricane Katrina. The authors acknowledge that difficult decisions will need to be made in allocating resources and establishing priorities, especially in the face of scarce resources and substantial uncertainty. Issues to consider include changes in medical technology and the level of responsiveness to the threat of bioterrorism. The paper considers market-based and consensus-based decisionmaking processes, and discusses issues related to Medicaid reimbursement, financial incentives, and medical record keeping.

Elliot, James R., and Jeremy Pais. "Race, Class, and Hurricane Katrina: Social Differences in Human Responses to Disaster." *Social Science Research* 35, no. 2 (June 2006): 295-321. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6WX8-4JT3RYV-2&_user=1424961&_coverDate=06%2F30%2F2006&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&view=c&_acct=C000052682&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=1424961&md5=48c9ecc854d404bbfc0b442627fd0648

This study uses survey data collected from Hurricane Katrina survivors to examine how race and class influence human as well as institutional responses to the disaster. The authors provide a historical, demographic, and sociological overview of race and class issues in Katrina-affected areas They examine a Gallup survey of 1,500 Katrina survivors age 18 and older drawn from a random sample of 460,000 people registered in a Red Cross database. Issues of interest include timing of evacuation, stress and emotional support, and likelihood of return. The paper includes regression results measuring the

relative impacts of selected racial and class characteristics on selected outcomes. It concludes that race and class affect some populations differently, underscoring the need to examine these two characteristics in combination as well as independently.

Enarson, Elaine. "Women and Girls Last? Averting the Second Post-Katrina Disaster." In *Understanding Katrina: Perspectives from the Social Sciences*, New York: Social Science Research Council, November 15, 2005. http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Enarson/

This paper focuses on family and economic challenges confronting women affected by Hurricane Katrina. The article notes that women are disproportionately represented in first-responder professions, such as teaching, health and mental health care, crisis work, and community advocacy, which may in part explain why women disproportionately suffer from posttraumatic stress disorder. Based on accounts of violence toward women at the Superdome, women are in danger of being victims of rape and domestic violence. New vulnerabilities are likely to emerge from unstable living and working arrangements. Low-income women, including public housing residents and residents of mobile homes, may encounter difficulty securing housing because priority is given to homeowners. To help women reenter the labor force, it will be necessary to rebuild the child care, transit, education, and health care infrastructure. The author also questions the applicability of youth employment projects to young women.

Ensellem, Maurice. *Reforming Disaster Unemployment Assistance to Support Families Left Jobless after Hurricane Katrina, Their Employers and the Region's Economy*. New York: National Employment Law Project, September 13, 2005. http://www.nelp.org/docUploads/DUAReform.pdf

This is a policy brief advocating reform of the Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) program. As it is currently structured, DUA provides benefits for only certain categories of workers not already covered under state unemployment insurance benefits. The author looks at the current structure of the DUA legislation and argues that it should be broadened to include families also eligible for state UI insurance, its duration should be extended, and the scope of the benefits should include workers in secondary industries also affected by the hurricane.

Falk, Gene. *Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF): Its Role in Response to the Effects of Hurricane Katrina*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 16, 2005. http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-7644:1

This report outlines policies and guidelines for the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program relevant to access and benefits for persons affected by Hurricane Katrina, including adjustments made for selected states impacted by the storm and its evacuees. States directly impacted by Hurricane Katrina—Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi—were allocated additional funding. The federal program also covered 100 percent of the costs of benefits for evacuees in other states. Residents of directly

affected states were not required to meet TANF eligibility requirements, including work requirements and time limits, and states providing benefits to evacuees would not incur penalties for failure to comply with most TANF requirements. States could also receive advance funds and spend previously unspent TANF funds for benefits to affected families. Legislation allowed for additional TANF allocations for 14 months between August 2005 to September 2006, in order for states to assist evacuees.

Fass, Sarah, and Nancy Cauthen. *Child Poverty in States Hit by Hurricane Katrina*. New York: National Center for Children in Poverty, September 2005. http://www.nccp.org/publications/pdf/text_622.pdf

This fact sheet presents statistics on child poverty in the Gulf Coast region in the three years prior to Hurricane Katrina, using pooled estimates from the U.S. Current Population Surveys in 2002, 2003, and 2004. Over 13 percent of children in Louisiana, 12 percent in Mississippi, and 8 percent in Alabama lived in extreme poverty, compared to a national average of 7 percent. These children were disproportionately African American. In New Orleans, 38 percent of children lived in poverty, compared to a national average of 17 percent. Twenty-one percent of households in New Orleans did not have a car, and 53 percent were renters, of whom 41 percent spent more than 35 percent of their income on rent. Across the Gulf States, black children were far more likely to live in poor families than were children from white families (e.g., in Louisiana, 44 percent of black children lived in poor families, compared to 9 percent of white children). The authors conclude by pointing out that child poverty continues to rise across the United States.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. *Dealing with Emotional Impact of Hurricane is a Key Part of Recovery*. Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, August 2006. http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=28779

This is a news release describing the use of funding provided to the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals for mental health counseling through Louisiana Spirit, a joint Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Substance Abuse and Mental Health Service Administration initiative. The funding is designated for crisis counseling, not long-term inpatient care. FEMA approved $18.5 million for Louisiana's immediate service crisis counseling program. Behavior problems that may occur in response to trauma and how counseling might help treat these problems is also described.

———. *FEMA Funded Program Reaches Out to Louisianans*. Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, August 2006. http://www.louisianaweekly.com/weekly/news/articlegate.pl?20060821n

This is a two-page news release announcing the award of a $34.7 million grant for crisis counseling for Hurricane Katrina victims. According to officials quoted, the grant will enable the state to provide counseling due to stress and depression, and provide outreach services, public information, and community networking. This is the second largest

FEMA mental health grant—FEMA awarded a grant of $132 million for stress related to the September 11 attacks.

———. *FEMA Public Assistance Division Still Busy One Year after Katrina*. Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, August 2006. http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=29068

This is a news release describing the FEMA Public Assistance program, which works to rebuild schools, hospitals, jails, and fire and police stations. As of August 2006, FEMA obligated a total of $3 billion for public assistance projects. The release highlights FEMA's work in New Orleans clearing debris, repairing the Superdome, rebuilding the zoo, and renovating Charity Hospital.

_____. *Native Americans Find Shelter with Tribes after Katrina*. Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, August 2006. http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=29062

This article tells the story of members of a Native American tribe who took refuge from Hurricane Katrina on a reservation in Baldwin, Louisiana. Tribal members temporarily relocated to the reservation where they stayed at an assisted living facility. FEMA also put trailers on the reservation. The article discusses the adjustment of tribe members to their new lives on the reservation and the provision of supportive services, such as counseling, to the evacuees.

———. *One Year after Katrina, Recovery in Alabama Continues: FEMA Aid at $970 Million*. Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, August 2006. http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=29185

This news release discusses spending on recovery and rebuilding in Alabama. Total federal and state disaster assistance was $970.5 million, including $127.2 million in assistance to individuals and families and $634.5 million for infrastructure rebuilding, crisis counseling, flood insurance payouts, and costs for equipment and personnel.

———. *Public Assistance Funds Help Communities Get Back on Their Feet*. Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, August 2006. http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=29042

This is a news release on the effort to rebuild infrastructure along the Mississippi Gulf Coast. FEMA funded 9,800 community projects totaling $2.1 billion along the Gulf Coast in the first 12 months after Hurricane Katrina. Funds to jurisdictions have been distributed by the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency. The report mentions several projects that have been initiated using FEMA funds, including debris removal.

Fellowes, Matt, and Amy Liu. *Federal Allocations in Response to Katrina, Rita and Wilma: An Update*. Washington, DC: The Brooking Institution, August 21, 2006. http://www3.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20060712_Katrinafactsheet.pdf

This fact sheet presents an overview of federal allocations (not spending) for hurricane relief in the Gulf Coast region across all sectors, with detailed funding by type of program. The $109 billion in allocations and $8 billion in tax relief are split among five Gulf states from Florida to Texas. The monies are dedicated to both immediate needs, such as housing, and long-term disaster relief. Federal agencies, not cities and states, administer much of the funding.

Fetterman, Mindy. "Replacing Lost Housing is Off to a Slow Start." *USA Today*, April 17, 2006. http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2006-04-16-new-orleans-housing-usat_x.htm

This article reports on delayed housing development in New Orleans, especially for low-income individuals. By April 2006, the bulk of development had been confined to the French Quarter and distant suburbs. None of the planned development was directed at low-income areas such as the Ninth Ward. Some homebuilding was being directed by Habitat for Humanity and Catholic Charities. Property owners were awaiting information on how much money they might obtain if they abandoned their property.

Fischer, Will, and Barbara Sard. *Bringing Katrina's Poorest Victims Home: Targeted Federal Assistance Will Be Needed to Give Neediest Evacuees Option to Return to Their Hometowns*. Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, November 3, 2005.
http://www.cbpp.org/11-2-05hous.htm

The authors assess various policy interventions for creating affordable housing for low-income families returning to New Orleans. They argue that housing assistance should help people rebuild as well as make housing more affordable to assist in disbursing populations from high-poverty, high-crime neighborhoods into mixed-income residential areas. The authors argue that the administration's Urban Homesteading plan is unlikely to assist more than a small fraction of the families displaced by the storm, and the private sector alone will not be able to meet the housing needs. They recommend that pre-Katrina housing subsidies be restored, a portion of rebuilding aid go toward making additional housing affordable to the poorest families, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit and the HOME Investment Partnership Act (a federally-funded block grant) be used to offset anticipated rises in housing costs, and a regional entity for housing administration be created for the entire damaged area.

———. *Housing Needs of Many Low-Income Hurricane Evacuees Are Not Being Adequately Addressed*. Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, February 27, 2006. http://www.cbpp.org/2-23-06hous.htm

The authors present housing options for low-income populations affected by Hurricane Katrina, and make recommendations for a federal response through supplemental appropriations and legislation. They recommend continuing funding for temporary housing but using HUD-administered rental assistance. The creation of two different rental assistance programs—through HUD and FEMA—led to confusion, and there is a need for integrating the housing programs into Section 8, the largest federal rental assistance program. Key recommendations include providing assistance to help repair the approximately 20,000 vacant apartments in New Orleans that could be made habitable with relatively modest repairs, and restoring the prehurricane supply of federally subsidized housing—estimated by HUD to cost $450 million—of which a portion can be covered through existing appropriations to the HOPE VI program. They also suggest authorizing additional housing vouchers, including 13,500 additional project-based vouchers.

Fletcher, Laurel E., Phuong Pham, Eric Stover, and Patrick Vinck. *Rebuilding after Katrina: A Population-Based Study of Labor and Human Rights in New Orleans*. University of California–Berkeley and Tulane University, June 2006. http://www.hrcberkeley.org/download/report_katrina.pdf

The authors conducted interviews with 25 key informants, a targeted sample of 148 Latino workers at sites in New Orleans and Kenner, and a random sample of 212 workers in Orleans Parish. Nearly half of the reconstruction workforce was Latino, 25 percent were illegal immigrants, 5 percent held temporary work visas, and all in the last two groups were Hispanic. About half of the construction workers and three-quarters of the undocumented workers did not live in the area before Hurricane Katrina. Most of the undocumented workers were married, but would not be joined by their spouses within the year.

Food Research and Action Center. *Food Stamp Participation Levels in October 2005 Reflect Strong Hurricane Relief Response*. Washington, DC: Food Research and Action Center, 2005. http://www.frac.org/html/news/fsp/05.10_FSP.html

This is a report on changes in nationwide food stamp participation levels in October 2005, with preliminary data on increases in caseloads due to Hurricane Katrina. In October 2005 food stamp participation rose by 1,809,387 compared to August 2005. The report mentions the role of the Disaster Food Stamp program in providing assistance to residents of Louisiana, Texas, Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, and Arkansas, and outlines participation trends from 2001 to 2005.

Frey, William H. *The New Great Migration: Black Americans' Return to the South, 1965–2000*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, May 2004. http://www.brookings.edu/urban/publications/20040524_frey.htm

The author analyzes migration data at the regional, state, and metropolitan levels in four decennial censuses. The South had net gains of black migrants from all other regions during the 1990s; southern metropolitan areas, such as Atlanta, led the way in attracting

black migrants. Blacks were more likely than whites to select destinations in the South, and college-educated individuals led the new migration into the South. New Orleans, according to tables presented, is shown to have lost population in every sample period.

Frey, William H., and Audrey Singer. *Katrina and Rita Impacts on Gulf Coast Populations: First Census Findings*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, June 2006. http://www3.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20060607_hurricanes.pdf

Using the 2005 Special Population Estimates for Impacted Counties in the Gulf Coast Area and the 2005 American Community Survey Special Product for the Gulf Coast Area, the study examines (1) population changes over the July 1, 2005, to January 1, 2006, period; (2) changes in demographic, economic, and housing attributes of the New Orleans metropolitan area after Hurricane Katrina; and (3) effects on populations in other areas along the Gulf Coast as a result of the storm. The Orleans and St. Bernard parishes lost 63.8 percent and 94.8 percent of their populations, respectively, while Harris, Texas (Houston), and East Baton Rouge gained 2.5 percent and 4.3 percent population, respectively. In the New Orleans metropolitan area, hurricane-induced changes produced a population that was more white, less poor, more transitory, more likely to be homeowners, and more likely to own a car. The post-storm mean income was $64,000, compared to $55,000 prior to the storm. In contrast, counties along the Mississippi coast lost a sizeable share of their white residents and homeowners after the hurricane, while other Gulf Coast metropolitan areas, especially those that gained residents, experienced little shifts in demographic profile. After New Orleans, the coastal counties in Mississippi lost the largest proportionate number of people as a result of the storm, and the proportion of whites declined from 78 percent to 69 percent.

Gabe, Thomas, Gene Falk, Maggie McCarty, and Virginia W. Mason. *Hurricane Katrina: Social-Demographic Characteristics of Impacted Areas*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, November 4, 2005. http://www.gnocdc.org/reports/crsrept.pdf

The authors report on the demographic, socioeconomic, and housing characteristics of those most directly and severely affected by Hurricane Katrina. Figures are based on mapping methods using Geographic Information System and FEMA damage assessments from September 21, 2005, applied to Census 2000 data (estimates may miss inland damage in Mississippi). More than 700,000 people (645,000 in Louisiana and 66,000 in Mississippi) were displaced. Those hardest hit were more likely than Americans to be poor, minority, educationally disadvantaged, and less connected to the workforce, and thus have fewer resources to reestablish themselves after the storm. The report includes maps and demographic and housing data.

Garber, Molly, et al. “Hurricane Katrina’s Effects on Industry Employment and Wages.” *Monthly Labor Review* 129, no. 8 (August 2006): 22–39. http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2006/08/art3full.pdf

This article discusses the challenges of developing reliable estimates of employment and wages in Katrina-affected areas using existing Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data collection systems and analysis of BLS employment and wage surveys. The massive devastation to property, infrastructure, communications, and the environment posed challenges to the BLS data collection systems. The article focuses on two BLS programs that measure employment and wages by industry: the Current Employment Statistics (CES) and the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), both of which are combined federal-state systems. The CES is a survey of 400,000 businesses nationwide; its figures are released one month after the survey month. QCEW is a virtual census of monthly employment and quarterly total wages derived from Unemployment Insurance records, and therefore more comprehensive but less timely than the CES. The article contains concluding notes on reconciling the two data sets and developing future disaster response procedures.

Garcia, Robert, and Marc Brenman. *Katrina and the Demographics of Disaster and Reconstruction*. Los Angeles: Center for Law in the Public Interest, September 15, 2005. http://www.cityprojectca.org/blog/archives/173

The authors present recommendations on recovery and relief for those affected by Hurricane Katrina, with special emphasis on low-income minority populations. They recommend the creation of a local oversight committee and the provision of rebuilding jobs for small businesses and local workers. They recommend using the experience of Los Angeles region in its $14.4 billion effort to modernize its schools as an example of rebuilding, and its efforts to clean and repair the Los Angeles River as a model for reconstruction of New Orleans. They focus on how to make the rebuilding effort inclusive, just, and equitable.

Gault, Barbara, et al. *The Women of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast: Multiple Disadvantages and Key Assets for Recovery*. Washington, DC: Institute for Women's Policy Research, October 2005.
http://www.iwpr.org/pdf/D464.pdf

This is an analysis of gender and racial inequality in the labor market in the areas affected by hurricanes Katrina and Rita, based principally on analysis of Census data and previous research from the Institute for Women's Policy Research (IWPR). The authors compare selected demographic characteristics of affected areas to the United States as a whole. Female-headed households are disproportionately likely to be living in poverty, in part due to the nature of jobs available to women and their availability to participate in the workforce. They also present findings from the IWPR report *The Status of Women in the States* that show that the quality of life for women in several central southern states, including Mississippi and Texas, is in the bottom half of the statewide composite index. Many of the cities where evacuees have relocated face similar problems with poverty and low earnings (e.g., Jackson, Baton Rouge, Little Rock, and Mobile all have higher poverty rates for women than New Orleans). Among the key recommendations are improving wages through sustained disaster relief and an increase in the minimum wage; providing funding for job training and education in the Gulf Coast region, especially in

non-traditional occupations; increasing access to public assistance, such as TANF; streamlining the application process for other safety net programs, such as Medicaid and WIC; and expanding access to quality child care.

Gelles, Richard J. "Responding to the Needs of the Lost and Forgotten: Foster Children and Battered Women Before and After Hurricane Katrina." *The Field Center for Children's Policy Newsletter*, Spring 2006. http://www.sp2.upenn.edu/fieldctr/newsletters/spring2006/responding.html

This article focuses on the plight of foster children and battered women, including HHS statistics on children in the foster care system. Thirteen thousand children were in the foster care system in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama in August 2005. In the Greater New Orleans area 179 women resided in domestic violence shelters. These populations, which were disproportionately low income, faced unique social support challenges. The author reports a critical lack of accurate data on the number and racial composition of children in foster care in Katrina-affected states and discusses the difficulties of restoring and continuing benefits for foster families after the storm.

Gillette, Becky. "Few Coast Industries and Businesses Closed Permanently." *Mississippi Business Journal* (Jackson, MS), August 28–September 3, 2006. http://www.allbusiness.com/north-america/united-states-mississippi/4087030-1.html

This newspaper article reports on the recovery of businesses along the Mississippi Gulf Coast. According to the president of the Mississippi Manufacturers Association, few manufacturers had gone completely out of business. Manufacturers' facilities were built to stronger standards than most homes and were less affected by the storm surge than coastal homeowners and renters. In Jackson County the two largest employers, Northrop Grumman and Chevron, were able to resume business operations quickly. Pascagoula County has made a substantial recovery, helped by factors such as sales tax revenue. Corrosive salt water caused substantial damage, and many seafood-processing plants were wiped out. The biggest challenge for businesses remains securing a qualified labor pool, although insurance payments will stimulate business along the Gulf Coast.

———. "Still No Firm Numbers for Businesses Destroyed by Katrina." *Mississippi Business Journal* (Jackson, MS), November 13-19, 2006. http://www.allbusiness.com/north-america/united-states-mississippi/4110123-1.html

This article notes the lack of a reliable estimate of how many businesses were destroyed by the hurricanes along the Gulf Coast. According to the article, the Small Business Administration had received 10,969 business applications for disaster recovery loans, 4,633 of which had been approved for a total of $540,797,500. The rebuilding of businesses was proceeding quickly in some places on the Mississippi Coast, such as the I-90 corridor, and not at all in others. The article speculates that the business profile along the beachfront may become more tourist oriented, and the big box retailers will move north where insurance premiums are lower. There may also be more mixed-use

developments. Increased purchasing at retailers such as Wal-Mart, Lowe's, and car dealerships has led to large increases in sales tax revenue.

Golden, Olivia. *Young Children After Katrina: A Proposal to Heal the Damage and Create Opportunity in New Orleans*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, February 2006. http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=900920

This report examines the Head Start and Early Head Start programs and suggests a framework for delivering child care in Louisiana. Before the hurricane, Louisiana's capacity to meet the needs of young children was limited, especially for babies and toddlers, and quality of care varied greatly. Head Start served about 60 percent of poor 3- and 4-year-olds. Hurricane Katrina disproportionately affected young children, and the experiences of separation from parents and living in shelters appears to have been emotionally traumatizing for young children. While comprehensive data are not available, the storm appears to have seriously damaged the early child care infrastructure. Among several proposals, the author suggests expanding the Early Head Start and Head Start programs, which have been demonstrated to have a positive effect in a variety of different settings, at an estimated cost of $25 million for 2006 for all children and their families who return.

Golden, Olivia, and Margery Austin Turner. *Resiliency is Not Enough: Young Children and the Rebuilding of New Orleans*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, November 2005. http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=900900

The authors examine two possible interventions in early education and housing for children and families who return to Louisiana. They suggest that Head Start be made available to all families returning to Louisiana after the hurricanes, since research provides evidence that the program can help children learn, address health needs, and strengthen families. They also suggest an expansion of affordable housing using the HOPE VI model, which has replaced distressed housing projects with high-quality units in economically diverse areas.

Gordon, Meghan. "N.O. Population Hits 200,000, New Data Show." *Times Picayune* (New Orleans), November 29, 2006. http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?/base/news-7/116478214847900.xml&coll=1

This newspaper article summarizes findings from a door-to-door survey of the New Orleans metropolitan area released by Louisiana Recovery Authority in November 2006. Findings indicate that two-thirds of residents from New Orleans and its suburban parishes have returned since Hurricane Katrina—40 percent (200,000) of the residents have returned in New Orleans, 97 percent (440,000) have returned to Jefferson Parish, and 38 percent (24,500) to St. Bernard Parish. Mayor Ray Nagin has challenged the estimates as too low, but officials in Jefferson Parish agree with estimates for their parish. The return of residents from group housing has been disproportionately low. The racial composition of New Orleans has changed from 67 percent in the 2000 Census to 47 percent black

according to the survey, and from 28 percent to 43 percent white. Rates of homeownership and relocation differed significantly by parish.

Greenstein, Robert. *Meeting the Basic Needs of Hurricane Katrina Victims: Recommendations to Federal Policymakers*. Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, October 20, 2005.
http://www.cbpp.org/9-9-05pov.pdf

This policy brief contains recommendations related to housing, income assistance, health care, and nutrition programs to meet the basic health and human service needs of hurricane victims. Among the key recommendations are that FEMA use HUD to distribute Section 8 vouchers. The paper offers a two-pronged income assistance proposal, with Disaster Unemployment Assistance as the primary tier and a range of income supports as the secondary tier. The paper recommends a form of the Medicaid Temporary Disaster Relief program offered to those in the Gulf Coast, coupled with increased federal assistance for those states dealing with an influx of evacuees. Food stamps should be extended using a short-term disaster food stamp program, modification of eligibility rules, and increased federal support to states experiencing caseload fluctuations. The federal government should increase the WIC allocation to meet the increased costs incurred under the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program. An additional $3.1 billion will be needed, according to the brief, for the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program. Restrictions on program access for legal immigrants should be lifted to allow them to rebuild their lives.

Hanson, Kenneth, and Victor Oliveira. *The 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes' Effect on Food Stamp Program Caseloads and Benefits Issued*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture, February 2007.
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/err37/err37.pdf

This analysis examines changes in the Food Stamp program's caseload in the Gulf Coast during the 2005 hurricanes. Using 13 months of administrative data, it examines participation in both the disaster food stamp program and the conventional program. The study finds few long-term impacts of increased utilization in hurricane-affected states, but varying short-term impacts of duration and magnitude at the state level. The paper includes detailed discussions of its regression procedures for creating the estimates.

Hartman, Chester, and Gregory D. Squires, eds. *There Is No Such Thing as a Natural Disaster: Race, Class, and Hurricane Katrina*. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 2006.

This book is a collection of chapters written by academics and activists on the socioeconomic and racial impact of Hurricane Katrina, and the underlying structural causes of the social disaster. Chapters address economic development, housing policy, education, community activism, cultural preservation, historical factors, race and gender, and factors specific to elderly populations.

Hatry, Harry, Martin Abravanel, and Shelli Rossman. *What Happens to Victims? A Research Guide for Disaster-Response Studies.* Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2006. http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=411347

This guide to research on disaster response establishes starting points for assessments of the extent to which victim services needs are met during and following disasters. It provides a series of checklists of outcomes, service quality indicators, demographic characteristics, and related information across a range of critical service areas.

Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. "Giving Voice to the People of New Orleans: The Kaiser Post-Katrina Baseline Survey." Menlo Park, CA: Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, May 2007.

The report, the first of three similar surveys planned by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, presents baseline findings across wide-ranging areas of well-being for residents living in New Orleans one year after the hurricanes. The vast majority of residents have suffered some significant setback in the year since the storm, most commonly in their financial and housing situations. Employment situations had deteriorated in the interim for roughly one in six, who either became newly unemployed or had jobs with lower wages or fewer benefits. Access to health care had also deteriorated for more than a third. About a fifth reported declined physical health or mental health. A quarter of respondents said increased stress had altered their behaviors in ways that had taken a toll on their relationships. Subsequent surveys will follow in 18-month intervals.

———. "Survey of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees." Menlo Park, CA: Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, September 2005.
The paper presents data in table format from a comprehensive survey of New Orleans evacuees conducted less than two weeks after the hurricanes. It is based on 680 adult respondents living in Houston, Texas, largely in shelters. It covers basic demographic characteristics, circumstances around evacuation, information on respondents' economic situations and assets, health care access, current and future plans, and opinions about the response effort, assistance, and services. The survey was designed and funded jointly by the Washington Post, the Kaiser Family Foundation, and the Harvard School of Public Health.

Holzer, Harry J. *Back to Work in New Orleans*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, October 2005.
http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/200510_backtowork.pdf

This paper focuses on the causes of joblessness among young black men across the United States and in New Orleans in particular. Policy interventions for increasing employment and decreasing crime are proposed, including training and apprenticeship programs. According to the 2000 Census, New Orleans had one of the highest labor force

nonparticipation rates (40 percent) among young black males. This is a special problem in light of poor school performance, disappearing blue collar jobs, spatial disconnection to employment, increased incarceration, and noncustodial fatherhood. The author proposes several remedies, including improving access to jobs through post-secondary training programs such as the Job Corps and Youth Services Corps, using the One Stop workforce development system and workforce boards to help place young men in jobs in the rebuilding effort, providing apprenticeships and certifications for young men, and reducing discrimination on the basis of criminal record.

Howell, Susan E., et al. *The 2006 Citizen Recovery Survey: New Orleans and Jefferson Parish*. New Orleans, LA: University of New Orleans Survey Research Center, June 1, 2006. http://www.survey.lsu.edu/downloads/TheCitizenRecoverySurvey1.pdf

This document summarizes the results of a baseline survey conducted between March 24 and April 30, 2006, of 266 respondents in Jefferson Parish and 204 respondents in New Orleans. The sample is drawn from individuals with telephones living in houses or apartments; no adjustments are made for racial composition, since the post-Katrina racial composition of zip codes is not known. The survey addresses problems of daily life and psychological experiences, with findings presented on loss of housing, possessions, employment, difficulty accessing services, health problems, worry and sleep difficulties, depression and mood, and losses by race.

Hurlbert, Jeanne S., John J. Beggs, and Valerie A. Haines. "Bridges Over Troubled Waters: What Are the Optimal Networks for Katrina's Victims?" In *Understanding Katrina: Perspectives from the Social Sciences*. New York: Social Science Research Council, October 12, 2005. http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Hurlbert_Beggs_Haines/

Drawing on social network theory and baseline data on social networks and anticipated evacuation behavior collected in New Orleans prior to Hurricane Katrina, the authors examine what kinds of social networks will help New Orleans residents recover from the storm. Research from Hurricane Andrew shows that individuals receiving social support in the short-term experience better physical health and lower depression. Kinship ties, although particularly important for providing social support, may not be sufficient to meet Katrina victims' needs, such as for employment assistance. Optimal networks will incorporate kinship ties and ties to broader networks, which may be weaker. Reestablishing connections will be even more difficult, especially for those who have relocated to new communities, since there has been long-term displacement between family, friends, neighbors, and coworkers, and there is a lack of access to communication technologies. The extent to which victims are able to draw upon resources from their networks will affect the degree to which they will be able to relocate and return to New Orleans. Relocation behavior will also be affected by the availability of resources such as schools in new cities.

Hurricane Katrina Advisory Group. *Overview of Baseline Survey Results*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Medical School, Department of Healthcare Policy, August 29, 2006. http://www.hurricanekatrina.med.harvard.edu/pdf/baseline_report%208-25-06.pdf

This report of findings from a telephone survey conducted between January 19 and March 31, 2006, with 1,043 adult residents of the counties and parishes directly affected by the storm, is the first of a panel study of a sample of individuals affected by Hurricane Katrina. The researchers used multiple sampling frames to contact hard-to-reach individuals. Topics in the study include evacuation preparation, post-evacuation stress, practical problems of survivors, residential mobility plans, and measures of positive and negative emotions. The report summarizes the findings in a set of tables. In-depth qualitative, oral histories that describe the experiences of the survivors are available online (see related findings in Kessler, et al.).

Initiative for a Competitive Inner City. *Beyond Katrina: Initial Convening of Entertainment, Hospitality, and Tourism Clusters*. Boston, MA: Initiative for a Competitive Inner City, November 8, 2005.
http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20051108ICICpresentation.pdf
http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20051108ICICSynopsis.pdf

These two documents provide an overview of proceedings from a conference on rebuilding the tourism, entertainment and hospitality industries in Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina. Data on employment in tourism before Katrina show that the entertainment, hospitality, and tourism cluster had been a source of economic strength. Three strategies for economic revitalization are reviewed: a cluster-based strategy to identify potential bridging mechanisms to combine activity in entertainment, tourism, and hospitality; a workforce strategy focused on bringing people back to New Orleans, helping them find places to live, creating higher-paying jobs, and using local institutions to provide training; and a perception/brand strategy to counteract negative stereotypes about New Orleans as a tourism destination, while emphasizing Mardi Gras as a unique brand.

Jargowsky, Paul A. *Hurricane Katrina: A Window on the Concentration of Poverty*. Presented to National Association for Welfare Research and Statistics, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 21, 2006.

This is a PowerPoint presentation on the problem of concentrated poverty and its implications for urban planning in New Orleans and around the country. It is largely focused on spatial analysis, showing how poverty is distributed across metropolitan areas in major cities, and considers the policy implications of concentrated poverty on the provision of services and the prospects for improving living standards.

Jarmin, Ron, and Javier Miranda, *The Impacts of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma on Business Establishments: A GIS Approach*. Center for Economic Studies Working Paper Series CES-06-23. Suitland, MD: U.S. Census Bureau, August 2006.
http://www.ces.census.gov/index.php/ces/1.00/cespapers?detail_key=101763

The authors combine FEMA and GIS data on areas affected and severity of damage from the hurricanes with pre-storm data from the Census Bureau's Business Register, which provides information on the scale and type of business activity by establishment. The approach produces damage estimates by share of businesses, employees, and payroll, which are smaller than county-level estimates, and which assume that all businesses within a declared disaster area are damaged. For example, 13.2 percent of Louisiana employees worked in disaster-area parishes, but fewer than 0.2 percent worked in FEMA-designated GIS damage zones. Using data from the Economic Census the authors estimate the total loss of business revenue at $4.5 billion in the fourth quarter of 2005.

Jeter, Lynne. "Hurricane Katrina Places Workforce Training Funds in Peril." *Mississippi Business Journal* (Jackson, MS), October 10–16 2005. http://www.allbusiness.com/government/996142-1.html

This article discusses complications surrounding the use of Workforce Development funds in Mississippi as a result of increase in unemployment insurance claims caused by Hurricane Katrina. Earlier in 2005, the state legislature had authorized an annual $20 million for community college workforce training programs, but if the Unemployment Security Trust Fund fell below $500 million, these new workforce training funds would be cut off and the unemployment insurance tax on employers would rise. The state had a separate $3 million H1-B grant for workforce development in construction to address the rebuilding effort. Workforce training funds appeared to be relatively secure for 2005 but the funding stream was uncertain for 2006. The article contains several statistics relating to unemployment insurance in Mississippi.

Kates, R. W., et al. "Reconstruction of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina: A Research Perspective." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 103, no. 40 (September 26, 2006). http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/sed/docs/sdsem/kates_pnas_katrina_2006.pdf

The authors examine prospects for rebuilding in New Orleans from a historical perspective using four propositions drawn from research on natural hazards. The first proposition deals with how societies confront risk. The second suggests that disaster recovery and rebuilding take place in a sequence of four overlapping periods: emergency, restoration, reconstruction to predisaster levels, and betterment reconstruction, which may entail improving infrastructure and civic spaces. The third is that disaster relief often causes conflicts between different groups with different visions about how best to allocate resources; the reconstruction of New Orleans has been dominated by conflicting stakeholders at the federal, state, and local levels. The fourth shows that disasters can continue or accelerate development trends taking place in cities before the disaster; in New Orleans, this may mean reinforcing population decline.

Katz, Bruce, and Alan Berube. *Katrina's Window: Confronting Concentrated Poverty Across America*. Brookings Institution, October 2005. http://www3.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20051012_concentratedpoverty.pdf

The paper describes concentrated poverty in New Orleans prior to Hurricane Katrina and suggests some policy interventions. Nearly 50,000 New Orleanians lived in neighborhoods where the poverty rate exceeded 40 percent. New Orleans ranked second among the 50 largest cities on the degree to which poor families, mostly African American, were clustered in extremely poor neighborhoods. Other cities, such as Cleveland, New York, Atlanta, and Los Angeles confront similar poverty concentration. Government housing policies have entrenched segregation in inner-city neighborhoods while encouraging suburban sprawl. Policies such as redlining and the development of transportation away from inner cities further exacerbated poverty. Housing segregation reduces private sector activity, raising prices for basic goods, limiting job networks, perpetuating negative social norms, and inhibiting educational opportunity. The authors propose a framework for future development in New Orleans around mixed-income neighborhoods and suggest restoration of funding for HOPE VI, increasing access to housing vouchers, providing a home ownership tax credit, expanding the EITC, and targeting affordable housing funding to low-poverty neighborhoods.

Katz, Bruce, and Mia Mabanta. *Katrina Index: Tracking Variables of Post-Katrina Reconstruction*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, March 2007. http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/200512_katrinaindex.htm

Reporting 18 months after Katrina (including data from FEMA, the Mortgage Bankers Association, the Louisiana Department of Labor, the Louisiana Hospital Association, the New Orleans Transportation Authority, and the Census Bureau), the Katrina Index finds continued closure of schools, lack of repair to police and fire stations, red tape preventing release of federal funds for infrastructure development, and charitable giving up to $3.5 billion (though total rebuilding needs were estimated at $135 billion). Housing sales continued to rise slightly, demolitions of homes had slowed down, and unemployment in New Orleans was 4.6 percent.

Katz, Bruce, and Mark Muro. *To Shelter Katrina's Victims, Learn from the Northridge Quake Zone*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, September, 2005. http://www.brook.edu/views/op-ed/katz/20050912.htm

This two-page policy brief draws on the experience of finding emergency housing for victims of the 1994 Northridge earthquake as a model for an effective FEMA response to the victims of Hurricane Katrina. After the Northridge quake 20,000 people were left homeless and 55,000 residential structures were damaged. HUD immediately distributed $200 million in Section 8 housing vouchers for use everywhere in California. Within a week, displaced families were moving into new apartments rather than temporary housing. The authors recommend expanding HUD's Section 8 program to a rapid-response program that could be used in disaster situations. The authors also anticipate that this would help address issues related to structural poverty and housing.

Katz, Bruce, et al. "Housing Families Displaced by Katrina: A Review of the Federal Response to Date." In *Katrina Index: Tracking Variables of Post-Katrina Reconstruction*.

Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, November 2005. http://www3.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20051114_CostofHousing.pdf

This policy brief, written two months after Katrina made landfall, reviews the housing conditions of evacuees and provides several policy recommendations. At the time, 500,000 families were living in rental housing subsidized by the federal government and an additional 50,000 to 100,000 remained in temporary housing, including cruise ships, hotels, shelters, and trailers. Three programs discussed in the greatest detail are FEMA's Individual and Households Program, FEMA's Federally Owned Housing (including apartments and houses leased or owned by FEMA), and vouchers awarded through the Katrina Disaster Housing Assistance Program (KDHAP). The authors suggest replacing KDHAP with a true Section 8 voucher program and drastically scaling back the trailer program.

Kessler, Ronald C., et al. "Mental Illness and Suicidality after Hurricane Katrina." *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 84, no. 12 (December 2006): 930–39. http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=1852424&blobtype=pdf

This article compares the prevalence of mental illness and suicidality as well as dimensions of personal growth, such as closeness to a loved one and increased religiosity. The analysis compares the National Comorbidity Survey–Replication (NCS-R), conducted between February 2001 and February 2003, which interviewed 826 adults in the Census Division later affected by Hurricane Katrina, and a new sample of 1,043 adults who lived in the same area before the hurricane. The authors find that the proportion of respondents estimated to have serious mental illness is significantly higher among those in the post-Katrina sample than in the NCS-R (11.3 percent compared to 6.1 percent) and for mild to moderate illness there is also significant difference (19.9 percent after Katrina compared to 9.7 percent before). The difference with respect to suicidality is not significant.

Krisberg, Kim. "Health Workers Struggling to Meet Needs a Year after Katrina." *The Nation's Health* (Washington, DC), October 2006. http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/544648

This article discusses issues related to the reconstruction of the public health system along the Gulf Coast one year after the storm. Prior to Katrina, New Orleans had an uninsured rate of 21 percent, one of the highest in the country, placing a burden on public health hospitals, such as Charity Hospital, to care for the uninsured. In a survey of medical professionals conducted by the American College of Emergency Physicians, 82 percent of respondents said that the emergency systems in the Gulf Coast were not ready for another storm and more than half reported "no progress." There were reported long waits for emergency care, insufficient numbers of providers, and a need for the mobile clinics set up in the months following the storm but subsequently discontinued. In considering how to rebuild, it is argued that planners will need to take into account changing demographics, understand the scale and scope of health care need, and provide those returning home with information about potential health hazards. The article also

notes the prevalence of mental health disorders, including anecdotal evidence that there has been a rise in suicidality along the Mississippi coast.

Kurth, Michael M., and Daryl V. Burckel. *The Rita Report: A Summary of the Social and Economic Impact and Recovery of Southwest Louisiana One Year after Hurricane Rita*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana Recovery Authority, 2006. http://www.lra.louisiana.gov/assets/RitaReportFinal091806.pdf

This report, prepared for the Louisiana Recovery Authority, provides estimates of damage to the local environment and economy, including detailed analysis of damage to infrastructure in each Rita-affected parish, and discusses the scale of the relief effort. Data sources include the U.S. Department of Energy, the Department of the Interior, the Office of Gulf Coast Rebuilding, the Louisiana State University Agricultural Center, and the United Way of Southwest Louisiana.

LaFon, Rodney. *Katrina's Displaced School Children*. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Education and Early Childhood Development, Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. Washington, DC: U.S. Senate, September 22, 2005. http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2005_09_22/LaFonR.pdf.

This testimony by the Superintendent of St. Charles Parish Public School District describes challenges facing St. Charles Parish, both in recovering from storm devastation and in assimilating hurricane evacuees. The school district sustained $5 million in damage and lost 12 instructional days. The storm brought an additional 1,300 requests to enroll students in addition to its 10,000 students, and caused massive displacement of students, and new emotional crises among students. The school district will need an additional $7 million to cover new expenses as well as relief from federal regulations, including No Child Left Behind, and asks for additional federal relief and an amendment to the McKinney-Vento Act, which supports federal shelter programs.

Lewis, Nicole. "Beyond Relief and Recovery." *Chronicle of Philanthropy* 18, no. 21 (August 17 2006). http://philanthropy.com/premium/articles/v18/i21/21001801.htm

This article describes trends and characteristics of foundation awards for reconstruction post-Katrina. According to a study by the Foundation Center in New York, as of late summer 2006, grantmakers including private, corporate, and community foundations had spent at least $577 million on hurricane relief efforts. This is far short of the $1.1 billion spent after the September 11 attacks in 2001. Most of the funding was to provide immediate relief; about one-fifth helped longer-term recovery while four-fifths of the foundations reported completing their Gulf Coast grantmaking by January. During the crisis, some foundations relaxed their funding rules to allow for funds to be diverted to recovery relief. Other small foundations worked quickly to distribute donations in a short period of time. The article also describes recovery-related grants of several major foundations as well as smaller funders.

Litan, Robert. "Preparing for Future Katrinas." Policy Brief #150. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, March 2006. http://www.brookings.edu/printme.wbs?page=/comm/policybriefs/pb150.htm

This brief presents a proposal for a formal reinsurance system to handle mega-catastrophes. Such a system would largely supplement the private insurance market, which will pay out $50 billion in claims as a result of Hurricane Katrina. By definition, a mega-catastrophe such as Hurricane Katrina could not be covered by the existing private insurance industry. To manage the risk associated with these events, the federal government could create an independent office, much like the Comptroller of the Currency's catastrophe reinsurance program, to assist as insurer of last resort in mega-catastrophes, while smoothing out risk and uncertainty and correcting for market failure.

Logan, John R. "The Impacts of Katrina: Race and Class in Storm-Damaged Neighborhoods." Providence, RI: Brown University, 2006. http://www.s4.brown.edu/Katrina/report.pdf

The author uses FEMA damage assessments (mapped by Dartmouth Flood Observatory), 2000 Census tract-level data, and a web-based map system linked to aerial photographs of storm-affected areas to assess damage, in a spatial analysis of the impact of Katrina on different neighborhoods by socioeconomic status and racial group. He finds that the storm disproportionately impacted African Americans, renters, and the poor and unemployed. The report contains detailed neighborhood level analyses of estimated damage in Orleans Parish. Disparities in damage to low-income and African American groups were mainly due to living in areas vulnerable to flooding, and stems from historical decisions to build higher-income housing in areas of higher elevation ground or with better pumping and drainage. The author argues that recovery will be easier in Mississippi because most of the victims are homeowners who can more easily document their losses, there was less damage from flooding than from wind and rain, and property tracts are larger so that victims can more easily establish trailers on their properties during rebuilding.

Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals. *2006 Louisiana Health and Population Survey: Survey Report—Jefferson Parish*. New Orleans, LA: Louisiana Public Health Institute, November 27, 2006. http://popest.org/popestla2006/files/PopEst_Jefferson_SurveyReport.pdf

This survey is part of a series, conducted after Katrina by the Louisiana Public Health Institute for the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals and the Louisiana Recovery Authority, to provide population estimates and health and economic information of residents in 17 parishes. The survey used a methodology that involved two-stage cluster sampling by Census blocks and then households, and complex follow-up procedures to increase estimate reliability reflecting true nonresponse rates and the count of demolished or abandoned dwellings. The mailed responses or follow-up interviews for Jefferson Parish were received between June and October 2006. The population of Jefferson Parish was estimated to be 434,666, including 61 percent white,

26 percent black, 8 percent Latino, 3.5 percent Asian, and 8 percent others. Median household size was 2. Approximately two-thirds of respondents were homeowners, 72 percent were living in the same house before the hurricane, and 18 percent were uninsured. Forty-three percent of respondents were employed, and 10 percent of households were below poverty level. Seventy-four percent of children age 3 and older had not attended school in the past six months. Eighteen percent reported no medical insurance.

———. *2006 Louisiana Health and Population Survey: Survey Report—Orleans Parish*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, November 27, 2006. http://popest.org/popestla2006/files/PopEst_Orleans_SurveyReport.pdf

The report is part of the survey series of 17 parishes conducted between June and October 2006. The population of Orleans Parish was estimated to be 191,139, including 42.7 percent white, 47 percent black, and 3.5 percent Asian residents. Median household size was 2, two-thirds of respondents were homeowners, and 64.2 percent were living in the same house as before the hurricane. Forty-seven percent were employed and 11 percent of households were below the poverty level. Seventy-three percent of children age 3 and older had not attended school in the past six months. Twenty percent reported no medical insurance.

———. *2006 Louisiana Health and Population Survey: Survey Report—Plaquemines Parish.* Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, January 11, 2007. http://popest.org/popestla2006/files/PopEst_Plaquemines_SurveyReport.pdf

The report is part of the survey series of 17 parishes conducted between June and October 2006. The population of Plaquemines was estimated to be 17,860, with 74.3 percent white residents, 18.0 percent black, 0.8 percent Asian, 1.1 percent American Indian, and 1.3 percent multiracial. Median household size was 2, approximately 73 percent of respondents were homeowners, 61.7 percent were living in the same house as before the hurricane and 34.6 percent were in a different house, 38.5 percent were employed, and 14 percent of households were below the poverty level. Seventy-two percent of children age 3 and older had not attended school in the past six months. Sixteen percent reported no medical insurance.

———. *2006 Louisiana Health and Population Survey: Survey Report—St. Bernard Parish*. New Orleans, LA: Louisiana Public Health Institute, December 1, 2006. http://popest.org/popestla2006/files/PopEst_St.Bernard_SurveyReport.pdf

The report is part of the survey series of 17 parishes conducted between June and October 2006. The population of St. Bernard Parish was estimated to be 25,296, with 87.6 percent white, 7.3 percent black, 0.6 percent American Indian, and 0.9 percent multiracial residents. Median household size was 2, 80.4 percent of respondents were homeowners, 57.8 percent were living in the same house as before the hurricane, and 38.9 percent were in a different house. Nearly 42 percent were employed, and 13 percent of households were below the poverty level. Seventy-six percent of children age 3 and older had not

attended school in the past six months. Twenty-three percent reported no medical insurance.

———. *2006 Louisiana Health and Population Survey: Survey Report—St. Tammany Parish*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, January 10, 2007. http://popest.org/popestla2006/files/PopEst_St.Tammany_SurveyReport.pdf

The report is part of the survey series of 17 parishes conducted between July and December 2006. The population of St. Tammany Parish was estimated to be 220,656, with 85.4 percent white, 9.7 percent black, 0.6 percent Asian, and 0.5 percent multiracial residents. Median household size was 2, 79.3 percent of respondents were homeowners, 74.9 percent were living in the same house as before the hurricane and 22.2 percent were in a different house. Fifty-one percent were employed, and 6 percent of households were below the poverty level. Seventy percent of children age 3 and older had not attended school in the past six months. Fourteen percent reported no medical insurance.

Louisiana Family Recovery Corps. *Monthly Reports on TANF Subcontracts*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana Family Recovery Corps, September 2006.

This fact sheet from the Louisiana Family Recovery Corps, a TANF subcontractor, reports the number of TANF clients served between October 1, 2005, and September 30, 2006, as well as their education, employment, and housing status prior to Hurricane Katrina, and transportation, income, education, child care, emotional, mental health, physical health, and other needs.

Louisiana Geographic Information Center. *2005 Louisiana Hurricane Impact Atlas: Volume 1*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University, May 2006. http://lagic.lsu.edu/lgisc/publications/2005/LGISC-PUB-20051116-00_2005_HURRICANE_ATLAS.pdf

This document contains maps and graphics that depict the impact of hurricanes Katrina and Rita. One table provides side-by-side comparisons of the storms in terms of the strength of the storm; casualties; numbers of jobs, homes, and businesses impacted; and financial cost. Maps show the extent of rain, wind, and storm surge. Other maps provide damage estimates and show the diaspora of evacuees to other states.

Louisiana Recovery and Rebuilding Conference. *Starting Point: Report from the Louisiana Recovery and Rebuilding Conference*. New Orleans, LA: Louisiana Recovery and Rebuilding Conference, December 2005. http://lrrc.aia.org/SiteObjects/files/lrrc_startingpoint_crf.pdf

This report summarizes the product of the 2005 Recovery and Rebuilding Conference, which focused on developing mechanisms for collaboration between different rebuilding organizations and government, especially in the areas of housing and urban planning.

Specific recommendations are made for both the parishes in the New Orleans metropolitan area and other areas along the Gulf Coast.

Louisiana Recovery Authority. *Addressing the Challenges of Recovery and Rebuilding from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana Recovery Authority, December 19, 2005. http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/offices/miscdocs/docs-88/feb%209%20fed%20fund/972,2,Overview of LRA Board Decision Making Process

This PowerPoint presentation provides data from the U.S. Census, the National Association of Home Builders, the National Red Cross, the Insurance Information Institute, and FEMA on the comparative damage to infrastructure and the workforce compared to other disasters, and argues for federal funds for reconstruction in Louisiana.

———. *Louisiana's Case for Additional $4.2 Billion in CDBG Funds*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana Recovery Authority, March 9, 2006. http://www.lra.louisiana.gov/assets/922,1,Slide 1

This is a PowerPoint presentation on Louisiana's request for $12.1 billion additional Community Development Block Grant funds. It provides charts and graphs illustrating current unmet need, including housing, repairs to homes and infrastructure, safety, and employment gaps.

———. *Presentation to the Joint Steering & Executive Committees on Disaster Planning, Crisis Management, Recovery & Revitalization*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana Recovery Authority, October 23, 2006. http://www.lra.louisiana.gov/assets/SelectCmtePresentation102306.pdf

This is a PowerPoint presentation describing the Louisiana Recovery Authority's vision for rebuilding infrastructure that is both safe and inclusive. The presentation describes the progress of the Recovery School District and an initiative to secure modular housing for teachers, the Price Waterhouse Coopers report on health care reform in Louisiana, benefits and feasibility of the Road Home Program, and other housing proposals for small unit rentals.

———. *Technical Report 3: Analyses of Affordable Housing Costs and Development Options*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana Recovery Authority, 2006. http://www.livingcities.org/pdf/3_Analyses_of_Affordable_Housing_Costs_and_Development_Options_FINAL.pdf

This is a technical report drawn from a larger Living Cities report that focuses on the housing needs of current and potential residents in East Biloxi, Mississippi. The analysis assesses costs of development and repair to housing after Katrina, options for current landowners, and approaches the city could apply to residential rebuilding to promote low to moderate density, mixed-income development and restore a sense of community for residents.

Louisiana State University Media Relations. *LSU Releases Preliminary Findings of LSU-UH Hurricane Katrina Study*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University, February 17, 2006. http://appl003.lsu.edu/UNV002.nsf/(NoteID)/A1C16F6E471FA252862571180051B8D5?OpenDocument

This press release announces the findings from a 2–3 hour online survey of over 1,000 students at Louisiana State University and the University of Houston, assessing symptoms of depression, anxiety, trauma, stress, and coping. Displaced students showed significantly more symptoms of depression than nondisplaced students, but no differences in reported symptoms of anxiety or stress. The study also looks at experiences of being disconnected from loved ones, needing food or shelter, and losing personal possessions. (The full study was not available at the time this bibliography was prepared.)

Markle Foundation, American Medical Foundation, Gold Standard, RxHub, and SureScripts. *Lessons from Katrina Health.* New York: Markle Foundation, June 13, 2006. http://katrinahealth.org/katrinahealth.final.pdf

This paper summarizes key issues and lessons learned from Katrina Health, an online system established after the storm to help individuals gain access to electronic prescriptions and medical records. The system authorized pharmacists and doctors to obtain records of evacuees' medications and dosages. Katrina Health ultimately drew upon 150 public and private organizations, including medical software companies, pharmacy benefit managers, and chain drug stores. The paper describes the development of Katrina Health, the hurdles that the initiative faced, the larger disaster-response context, and recommendations for future disaster response.

McCarthy, Kevin, et al. *The Repopulation of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.* Santa Monica, CA: RAND Gulf States Policy Institute, 2006. http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR369.pdf

This study uses a consensus approach to estimate repopulation rates, and a cost-benefit analysis to study factors affecting migration, with a focus on factors driving mobility, including social networks, availability of housing, and the cost of repairing existing housing. The authors calculate that 25 percent of the pre-Katrina population of New Orleans was not exposed to flooding, while about 55 percent of the population experienced more than four feet (severe) of flooding, and estimate the likelihood of return based on variable levels of housing damage. Using data on dwellings and population by block from the 2000 Census, they estimate that the population in New Orleans would increase from 91,000 in December 2005 to 155,000 by March 2006, and to 272,000, or about 56 percent of the pre-Katrina population, within three years after the storm. The authors conclude that policymakers can affect the repopulation rate by helping to accelerate rebuilding of housing in New Orleans.

McCarty, Maggie, Libby Perl, and Bruce E. Foote, Domestic Social Policy Division. *HUD's Response to Hurricane Katrina.* Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 5, 2006.
http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/RS22358_20060105.pdf

This report describes the role of HUD in providing housing assistance to Katrina victims, including the authority granted it under existing legislation and under proposed legislation.

Meitrodt, Jeffrey. "Millions Earmarked to Create Housing." *Times Picayune* (New Orleans), December 14 2006.
http://www.nola.com/newslogs/topnews/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nola_topnews/archives/2006_12_14.html

This article reports on the Louisiana Housing Finance Agency's approval of $80 million in tax credits to developers, aimed at creating nearly 7,000 apartments in Louisiana, 79 percent of which is for New Orleans. This is the first time that Orleans Parish has been awarded over half of the funds for reconstruction, a recognition of the greater need for rebuilding there. $170 million of low-income tax credits is being made available through the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act and is expected to generate 15,000 rental units, below the 35,000 hoped for due to construction costs. The article describes tension among both advocates and opponents of low-income housing and the challenges individual developers are facing in their redevelopment bids.

Mercer, Charmaine, et al. *Issues Raised by Hurricane Katrina: a Focus on Education and Training.* Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, September 2005.
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/53690.pdf

This report analyzes the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the more than 400,000 elementary and secondary school students and 100,000 postsecondary students displaced by the storm; current policies governing education assistance to individuals and institutions, including the Stafford Act; policy options for funding education while complying with program requirements, such as maintenance of effort, in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act; and training programs funded by the Department of Labor under the Workforce Investment Act.

Meyer, Bruce D., and James X. Sullivan. *Differences in Poverty Rates: Based on Income and Consumption*. Slides presented at National Association for Welfare Research and Statistics. Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 21, 2006.

The authors describe the conceptual and methodological debates around poverty measurement, including income-based and consumption-based approaches to poverty. Using data from the Current Population Survey and from the Consumer Expenditures Survey, they show that different measures yield very different assessments of the level of poverty in the United States and discuss how changes in well-being for Katrina victims should be measured.

Mulcahy, Matthew. “Hurricanes, Poverty, and Vulnerability: An Historical Perspective.” In *Understanding Katrina: Perspectives from the Social Sciences*. New York: Social Science Research Council, September 12, 2005. http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Mulcahy/

The author argues that the relationship between poverty and vulnerability to disaster, as witnessed with Hurricane Katrina, is not unique in history. He relates the early history of encounters with hurricanes experienced by Spanish settlers in the Americas and pays special attention to the disproportionate burden of suffering experienced by slaves in the wake of hurricanes. He discusses the history of hurricane relief from 1600 to the 1900s, again arguing that the most generous relief has historically benefited the most well off.

National Center for Charitable Statistics at the Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy. *The Aftermath of Katrina: State of the Nonprofit Sector in Louisiana*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, September 21, 2005. http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=900879

This fact sheet presents statistics on the composition and funding of nonprofit health and human service organizations in Louisiana (excluding religious organizations) prior to Hurricane Katrina, based on annual filings of IRS Form 990 and 990-EZ. As of 2003, almost 2,300 charities were based in Louisiana and 900 were based in New Orleans, which represented half of the $8.7 billion in annual expenditures of these organizations. Three hundred and eighty-five organizations with $389 million in annual expenditures provided human services and community improvement programs to New Orleans residents, and 83 provided direct health and mental health services. Per capita nonprofit expenditures in health and human services amounted to $291 per person compared to $256 statewide. The authors also compare spending to other similarly sized cities.

National Center for Family Philanthropy. "*Emergency Giving: The Role of Family Donors in Relief, Recovery, and Rebuilding*. Washington, DC: The National Center for Family Philanthropy, 2005. http://www.ncfp.org/FGN-Nov_2005/Disaster_Relief.pdf

This is a newsletter offering practical guidance to philanthropic organizations responding to Hurricane Katrina. Guidance includes giving unrestricted funds to emergency aid organizations, giving to organizations already within the philanthropic mission of the donor organization, making funds available to grantees in the area sooner (even if it requires dipping into the foundation’s investment fund or principal), using already established relationships with current charities to forge new ones with groups on the ground, considering community-based advocacy groups, and thinking long term.

Nigg, Joanne, John Barnshaw, and Manuel Torres. “Hurricane Katrina and the Flooding of New Orleans: Emergent Issues in Sheltering and Temporary Housing.” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 604 (March 2006): 113–28. http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/604/1/113.pdf

This article examines government efforts to provide shelter and housing for Katrina evacuees based on interviews with evacuees in shelters and with housing officials, conducted in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas September 15–30, 2005. The authors examine policy documents from FEMA and other emergency management agencies, and contrast the procedures on paper with realities on the ground. The authors review different options for housing for evacuees, and analyze the current framework for intergovernmental relations between federal, state, and local entities.

Nossiter, Adam. "After the Storm, Students Left Alone and Angry." *New York Times*, October 31 2006. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/01/education/01orleans.html?ex=1320037200&en=34edc4ba98444a6c&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss

This article discusses the experiences of high school students disconnected from their parents and forced to fend for themselves in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, which has caused widespread and serious behavior problems among this group of adolescents. Various reasons for the problem are cited, including deteriorating family structures and economic necessities created as a result of the storm.

———. "New Orleans of Future May Stay Half Its Old Size." *New York Times*, January 21 2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/21/us/nationalspecial/21orleans.html?ex=1327035600&en=f7a40848f6afe402&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&pagewanted=print

This article explores the tension between political claims that New Orleans will reach or surpass its pre-storm population, with projections from demographers and economists that the city may reach only half of its pre-storm population of 444,000. Pre-storm issues, such as a stagnant economy, poverty, and unemployment had been causing decline in the city prior to Hurricane Katrina. The article also discusses the problem of low workforce participation, poverty concentration, racial division, and barriers to repopulation and consequent threats to the city's culture.

———. "Outlines Emerge for a Shaken New Orleans." *New York Times*, August 26 2006. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/27/us/nationalspecial/27orleans.html?ex=1314331200&en=9e9d63b91f2b74a7&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss

This article discusses possible demographic and social issues that will emerge in a post-Katrina New Orleans. Development has been strong in areas along the Mississippi River, but remains stagnant in East New Orleans and near Lake Ponchartrain. The article reports on the rebuilding of the school system and the growth of citizen activism as potential sources of strength. It relates the slow growth in repopulation to changing racial composition, and cites the lack of central planning in the redevelopment process and delays in the disbursement of clean-up funds.

———. "Steering New Orleans's Recovery With a Clinical Eye." *New York Times*, April 10 2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/10/us/10orleans.html?ex=1333944000&en=0f89968fa36af428&ei=5124&partner=permalink&exprod=permalinkspeaks

This article profiles Edward J. Blakely, the newly appointed Hurricane Katrina recovery chief in New Orleans, his approach to hotly contested local politics, his assessment of local needs and strengths, his vision for rebuilding the city (which is a compromise between idealistic proposals from activists and other visions that exclude low-income populations), and his perspective on the unique urban planning challenges posed by New Orleans.

Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding. *Continuing Progress: A 1-Year Update on Hurricane Recovery and Rebuilding*. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2006. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/GulfCoast_Katrina1yearFactSheet.pdf

This is a status report on progress in rebuilding government services, including infrastructure, housing, and the environment, one year after Hurricane Katrina. It reviews the immediate disaster relief and long-term recovery-related activities, funding allocations from HUD and HHS, and economic and workforce development efforts of the Department of Labor and the Minority Business Development Agency. The report highlights the relief work performed by organizations such as the Bush-Clinton Katrina Fund, the American Red Cross, Catholic Charities USA, the Salvation Army, and Habitat for Humanity.

Office of Governor Haley Barbour. *One Year after Katrina: Progress Report on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal*. Mississippi: Office of the Governor, August 29, 2006. http://www.mississippibeyondkatrina.com/images/oneyearafterkatrina.pdf

This report details Mississippi's response to the effects of Hurricane Katrina, including assistance related to transitional housing, education, economic stability, and human services. It includes statistics on damage and destruction, an assessment of the status of progress, and financial commitments for recovery from the federal and state governments.

Oliver-Smith, Anthony. "Disasters and Forced Migration in the 21st Century," in *Understanding Katrina: Perspectives from the Social Sciences*. New York: Social Science Research Council, June 11, 2006. http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Oliver-Smith/

This paper offers a theoretical framework for assessing vulnerability to disasters in the context of changes in technology, society, and the environment. The framework is useful for understanding different forms and motives for migration after disaster. Global environmental changes, such as desertification, deforestation, and soil erosion, and their impact on migration are also examined. The author predicts that while evolving market

structures and regional integration have created resilience for many populations, disruptions of local ways of life have compounded growing ecological and technological vulnerability.

Olshansky, Robert B. "Planning after Hurricane Katrina." *Journal of the American Planning Association* 72 (Spring 2006): 147–53. http://www.planning.org/katrina/reader/pdf/japaafterkatrina.pdf

This essay reflects on urban planning issues relevant to the rebuilding of New Orleans. It examines the background of other domestic and international disasters, including the 1995 Kobe earthquake, and explores different options for rebuilding New Orleans, including ecological restoration, elevation of homes, and provision of low-income housing.

Opportunity Agenda. *Housing: Welcoming Katrina's Victims Back Home.* Washington, DC: Opportunity Agenda, 2006. http://www.opportunityagenda.org/atf/cf/%7B2ACB2581-1559-47D6-8973-70CD23C286CB%7D/Katrina%20Housing%20Final.pdf

This is a five-page fact sheet that reviews barriers to rebuilding affordable housing in the Gulf Coast region. Using data from research reports and policy briefs, the fact sheet reviews problems of low homeownership, residential segregation, and lack of affordable housing in New Orleans prior to Hurricane Katrina. According to U.S. Census data, New Orleans was the 11th most segregated city among large metropolitan areas in 2000. The brief discusses problems of scarce public housing, discrimination, unaffordable rents, and resegregation after Katrina, and offers conclusions and recommendations for desegregation and expanding access to housing.

———. *Jobs and Business: The State of Opportunity for Workers Restoring the Gulf*. New York: Opportunity Agenda, 2006. http://www.opportunityagenda.org/atf/cf/%7B2ACB2581-1559-47D6-8973-70CD23C286CB%7D/Katrina%20Jobs%20PDF.pdf

This is a descriptive overview of labor market and income trends in New Orleans, with particular emphasis on labor market prospects for disadvantaged groups such as African Americans, immigrants, women, and working families. It includes findings from interviews with 700 workers in New Orleans conducted by the Advancement Project and data from the Economic Policy Institute. The paper emphasizes the need for housing, child care, job training, and other services to help address disparities in income and employment prior to the storm. Noting the high rate of poverty along the Gulf Coast and concentrated poverty in New Orleans, the report connects these trends to national trends in African American poverty related to job discrimination, stagnating wages for low-wage workers, and persistent gender gaps in earnings. The report recommends strict enforcement of labor laws, enactment of living wage provisions, legal protections regardless of immigrant status, and community-focused rebuilding projects.

———. *Rebuilding the Gulf Coast Region: Expanding Opportunity for All*. Washington, DC: Opportunity Agenda, 2006. http://www.opportunityagenda.org/atf/cf/%7B2ACB2581-1559-47D6-8973-70CD23C286CB%7D/Cross%20Issue%20Final.pdf

This fact sheet focuses on continuing efforts and obstacles to alleviating poverty in the Gulf Coast region. Drawing on a number of issue briefs and Katrina studies, it presents challenges in homeownership, residential segregation, declining health insurance coverage, and job creation. The authors argue that the rebuilding effort is in some cases replicating or worsening inequality in the Gulf Coast region, and they call for broad reform in housing, health care, and civil rights.

Oxfam America. *Recovering States? The Gulf Coast Six Months after the Storms*. Boston, MA: Oxfam America, February 2006. http://www.oxfamamerica.org/newsandpublications/publications/briefing_papers/recovering_states/oa_briefingpaper-04_FINAL.pdf

This is an analysis of housing alternatives that would directly affect low-income populations in Mississippi and Louisiana, based on secondary analysis of Census data, statistics released by the Brookings Institution, and anecdotal evidence on the economic impact of the loss of homes on disadvantaged individuals. The report concludes that the government's current approach to housing will not meet the needs of low-income populations, noting that although 45 percent of the houses destroyed by the hurricane were renter-occupied, renters are not eligible for housing assistance with community development block grant funds and will face inflated rents, and uninsured homeowners will be penalized on the value of their homes. The authors recommend a state tax credit for low-income housing to help renters obtain affordable housing, and expanded eligibility criteria for homeowner assistance grants.

Pane, John F., et al. *Student Displacement in Louisiana after the Hurricanes of 2005: Experiences of Public Schools and Their Students*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation Gulf States Policy Institute, 2006. http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR430.pdf

This report documents the short-term effects of the movement of students because of hurricane-related displacement, and the impact on state education systems. The authors use 2005–2006 data from the Louisiana Student Information System, and survey principals from a stratified sample of schools serving displaced students statewide, addressing questions about the behavior and needs of displaced students, and the effect of the influx on school resources.

Penner, Rudolph G. *Insuring Against Catastrophes: The Lessons from Katrina*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, May 2006. http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=311337

This policy brief in the Urban Institute series *After Katrina* looks at the potential role of the federal government as a provider of catastrophic insurance for events such as

Hurricane Katrina. The author argues that a federal insurance scheme is an effective way to correct for market failure of the private insurance industry. He considers the current system for flood insurance as well as insurance against terrorism and earthquakes, summarizing the weaknesses of current federal insurance programs and urging that the federal government develop a more extensive intervention.

Pipa, Tony. *Weathering the Storm: The Role of Local Nonprofits in the Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts*. Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute, 2006. http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/%7BDEB6F227-659B-4EC8-8F84-8DF23CA704F5%7D/NSPPNonprofits%20and%20Katrina.pdf

This paper focuses on the role of local charities in providing support to victims of Hurricane Katrina. Based on several case studies, the author finds that local nonprofits and religious congregations played a major role in disaster relief and the provision of shelters despite a lack of coordination with FEMA and some disagreement about the role of charities in disaster response. At different points, these organizations sheltered as many evacuees as the American Red Cross. Local foundations and intermediaries adapted to the situation as it developed and were important in helping to fund local agencies. Local agencies were not able to make use of funds outside of the Gulf Coast region, and such assistance could have helped to develop the capacity of these organizations. The author recommends the creation of a higher-level organizational body that can more effectively cooperate with government agencies in the future.

PolicyLink. *An Analysis of Development Trends.* Oakland, CA: PolicyLink. http://www.policylink.org/Communities/Louisiana/NewOrleans.html#Analysis

This is a web-based analysis of housing development trends prior to and since Hurricane Katrina. Before Katrina, approximately 11,000 affordable housing units were occupied in New Orleans and 9,000 vouchers were in use, compared to only 2,300 and 1,800, respectively, one year after the hurricane, leaving 16,000 families who previously had affordable housing without such housing. Affordable housing comprised 20 percent of the housing stock prior to the storm. As a result of the storm, 30 percent of rental housing was destroyed or severely damaged, and 81 percent of public housing and 76 percent of Low Income Housing Tax Credit housing was severely damaged. Only 8 percent of housing permits have been issued for multifamily housing. Using spatial mapping, the report's authors conclude that affordable housing and subsidized units were clustered in high-poverty areas. Spatial mapping also shows that post-Katrina funding for construction of low-income housing in the new Go Zone is in areas that were predominantly low-income African American prior to the storm.

———. *Ten Points to Guide Rebuilding in the Gulf Coast Region*. Oakland, CA: PolicyLink. http://www.policylink.org/EquitableRenewal.html. 2006.

This policy sheet presents key objectives for rebuilding the Gulf Coast. Ten objectives are presented: (1) ensure that all residents who want to return can return, (2) equitably distribute amenities and infrastructure, (3) give priority to health and safety, (4) ensure

responsible resettlement or relocation, (5) restore and build the capacity of community-based organizations, (6) create wealth-building opportunities, (7) strengthen the political voice of dispersed residents, (8) create a system for meaningful resident oversight of the $200 billion investment from private development corporations, (9) leverage rebuilding expenditures to create jobs, and (10) develop a communications and technology infrastructure.

Popkin, Susan, Margery Austin Turner, and Martha Burt. "Rebuilding Affordable Housing in New Orleans: The Challenge of Creating Inclusive Communities," in *After Katrina: Rebuilding Opportunity and Equity in the* New *New Orleans*, edited by Margery Austin Turner and Sheila R. Zedlewski. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, April 2006. http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=311406

This paper provides a framework for rebuilding affordable housing in New Orleans in a way that reduces concentrated poverty and improves the housing stock. Using 2004 American Community Survey data on housing tracts and a historical analysis of spatial development in New Orleans, the authors discuss the homeownership rate, redevelopment under the HOPE VI program, housing circumstances, and FEMA aid to people affected by the storm. The authors recommend developing clear criteria for neighborhood restoration to achieve diversity, equity, and cooperation in rebuilding, and establishing a regional approach with respect to levees, transportation, and economic development. They suggest that the model for rebuilding could be HOPE VI, which has demonstrated the benefits of mixed-income housing, and also suggest expanding the Low Income Housing Tax Credit and HOME block grants.

Porter, Michael E. *New Orleans Cluster Briefing*. Boston, MA: Initiative for a Competitive Inner City, November 2005. http://www.brookings.edu/metro/katrina.htm

This is a PowerPoint presentation summarizing demographic and economic indicators for New Orleans using data from, among other sources, the 2000 Census and the Cluster Mapping Project of the Harvard Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness. It contains charts and cluster maps that show employment by sector in New Orleans and surroundings from 1990–2002, detailed information on wage rates, and organizations involved in workforce and capital development, land use, small business development, and other key development sectors. The presentation outlines an approach for strategic economic development in clusters, such as tourism and entertainment.

Price Waterhouse Coopers. *Report on Louisiana Healthcare Delivery and Financing System*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana Recovery Authority, 2006. http://www.lra.louisiana.gov/assets/PwChealthcarereport42706l.pdf

This report for the Louisiana Recovery Authority presents recommendations for the long-term rebuilding of health care, medical education, emergency preparedness, and disaster planning in Louisiana. Based on secondary data sources and interviews with experts, the report gathers emerging themes pertaining to quality improvement and systemic change

in health care, including moving away from the financially unsustainable and low-quality two-tiered structure—one tier for the insured and another, of lower quality, for the uninsured—which was in effect prior to Katrina. The report addresses changing health care provision in specific localities and related workforce development and information technology reforms.

Rice, Douglas, and Barbara Sard. *FEMA Action Raises More Doubts About Federal Commitment to Aid Katrina Victims*. Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, November 18, 2005.
http://www.cbpp.org/11-18-05hous.pdf

This brief was written in response to FEMA's planned termination of reimbursements for hotel and motel stays on December 1, 2005, which would have transitioned families into more permanent housing under the Individuals and Households Program. The authors note the limitations of that program, outline conditions in the rental market and challenges to state and local governments, and assess the existing FEMA transitional housing plan.

———. *FEMA Misses Congressional Deadline to Issue Guidance on Continued Housing Assistance for Hurricane Victims.* Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, January 31, 2006.
http://www.cbpp.org/1-31-06hous.pdf

This brief focuses on FEMA's failure to deliver guidance about the future provision of assistance for families who will exhaust their 18-month benefits. The unique circumstances posed by Hurricane Katrina have prevented many families from regaining stability within the timeline of their benefits. The authors examine the policy statements issued by FEMA and the guidelines in place to govern the distribution of benefits.

Richardson, James A. "Katrina/Rita: The Ultimate Test for Tax Policy?" *National Tax Journal* LIX, no. 3 (September 2006).
http://ntj.tax.org/

This paper focuses on economic conditions in the distressed areas and the provisions of the tax relief and tax incentives imposed after Hurricane Katrina, as well as the provisions of the Go Zone Act, which allows Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi to provide tax-exempt bonds to businesses to replace damaged facilities. The first section explores employment and housing damage using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The second section describes the Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 and the Go Zone provisions. The third section deals specifically with the Go Zone Tax Exempt Bonds, including data on the approval and use of these bonds from the state departments of Finance and Economic Development.

Ritea, Steve. "Public Schools' Makeup Similar: Student Demographics Change Little Post-K." *Times Picayune* (New Orleans), November 27, 2006.

http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?/base/news-7/1164609235293240.xml&coll=1

This article summarizes data on the prevalence of poverty and racial characteristics in the New Orleans Schools before and after Katrina. The school district is 90 percent African American post-Katrina, compared to 93 percent African American pre-Katrina. The proportion of students enrolled for free and reduced-price meals has increased from 74 to 75 percent. The article examines how the Recovery District has restructured placement and opening of new schools in New Orleans.

Roberts, Deon. "No One Truly Knows How Many Back in N.O." *New Orleans City Business*, November 6, 2006. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4200/is_20061106/ai_n16823329

This article reports that the New Orleans Permits Department is not able to count the number of people who have reoccupied their homes because not all homeowners notify the city when they complete their repairs, and not all permit-holders ultimately return to repair their homes. Furthermore, the city has insufficient numbers of building inspectors. Suggested methods for counting the number of returnees include counting electrical permits. The department issued 32,296 permits as of November 2006. This figure may overcount returns because utilities can be activated for workers even when not activated for homeowners. The New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board has its own tracking methods.

Rose, Kalima. *Restoring Housing in Louisiana: New Actors Emerge to Ensure More Equitable Redevelopment*. New York: PolicyLink, September 14, 2006. http://www.policylink.org/documents/LDRF_KRose.pdf

This paper, commissioned for the Louisiana Disaster Recovery Foundation's Commemorative Event, outlines a strategy for low-income housing redevelopment. The author reviews different obstacles facing displaced people in their efforts to return and rebuild, including lack of funds, uncertainty about Army Corps of Engineers assessments, and lack of insurance. She emphasizes challenges faced by renters, who are not covered under the Road Home plan, examines possible interventions including the use of Low Income Housing Tax Credits for developers, and discusses efforts by housing advocates to protect the ability of low-income people to relocate and rebuild.

Rosenbaum, Sara. "U.S. Health Policy in the Aftermath of Katrina." *Journal of the American Medical Association* 295, no. 4 (January 25, 2006): 437–40. http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/295/4/437.pdf

This article examines national health policy in the context of Hurricane Katrina, and the general state of health care in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama prior to the storm. It includes an assessment of the health needs of the displaced survivors and the capability of programs like Medicaid to serve the needs of survivors and reviews the Grassley-Baucus proposal to extend Medicaid benefits to Katrina victims. The author concludes that the

health care system in the United States is not prepared to deal with a disaster of Katrina's magnitude and reemphasizes the need for universal health coverage.

Ross, Donna Cohen, and Victoria Wachino. *Medicaid Categorical Eligibility Rules Are Proving a Major Obstacle to Getting Health Coverage to Impoverished Katrina Victims in Louisiana: Pending Legislation Would Address Coverage Gaps in Louisiana and Other States*. Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, September 26, 2005. http://www.cbpp.org/9-26-05health.pdf

This four-page policy brief advocates support of the Grassley-Baucus Bill, which would provide temporary medical coverage to low-income victims of Hurricane Katrina. It draws on data from the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals to show that many indigent survivors are not categorically eligible for Medicaid. While many of these people would have been covered by the uncompensated care system in Louisiana, the system has been greatly depleted by Hurricane Katrina.

Rowley, Karen. *GulfGov Reports: A Year and a Half after Katrina and Rita, an Uneven Recovery*. Baton Rouge, LA: Public Affairs Research Council, April 19, 2007.

This is the second GulfGov Report, with partial findings from a three-year longitudinal study of a representative sample of state and local governments damaged by the Katrina and Rita hurricanes of 2005. As with the previous GulfGov Report, it focuses on the response of local government, economic and housing conditions, and assessments of rebuilding at the state level. However, this report employs new categories to describe conditions: areas where severe problems remain; areas where recovery is well underway, and areas where expansion is occurring. The report identifies housing as the single largest remaining recovery issue and finds that demand for labor continues to outstrip supply.

———. *GulfGov Reports: One Year Later*. Albany, NY: Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, August 22, 2006. http://kerrn.org/pdf/gulf_govreport.pdf

This report contains partial findings from a three-year longitudinal study of a representative sample of state and local governments damaged by the Katrina and Rita hurricanes of 2005. It covers 22 sites in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, including locations directly affected by the hurricanes and those dealing with substantial populations of evacuees. The report focuses on local government response to Katrina and evolving local conditions. Communities are divided into three categories: areas that are struggling; areas that are rebounding; and areas that are growing. Businesses and residents fleeing affected coastal areas have moved inland, creating new opportunities for areas such as Baton Rouge. In these areas, tax revenue is increasing and construction is underway. In the rebounding communities, sufficient infrastructure has remained to make rebuilding a viable possibility, but uncertainty about future migration and revenue remains. As of the summer of 2006, there was a shortage of workers to assist with rebuilding. Nongovernmental organizations played an important role in recovery and relief, although they were hampered by poor coordination with government and a lack of

capacity. Rebuilding plans in Mississippi and Alabama are much further along than in New Orleans.

Rubin, Victor. *Economic Development for the State and Its Regions in the Wake of the Storms*. Oakland, CA: PolicyLink, 2006. http://www.policylink.org/documents/LDRF_VRubin.pdf

The article, prepared for the Louisiana Disaster Recovery Foundation, examines economic development in Louisiana, especially New Orleans, after Hurricane Katrina. It discusses challenges to small businesses, 19,000 of which were incapacitated by damage and 81,000 affected overall. The author describes the economic climate prior to the storm, assesses progress after the storm, and concludes with a section on long-term growth, articulating key goals and strategies. The assessment is based on data from the Louisiana Recovery Authority and a variety of secondary sources.

Rudowitz, Robin, Diane Rowland, and Adele Shartzer. "Health Care in New Orleans before and after Hurricane Katrina." *Health Affairs* 25, no. 5 (August 29 2006): 393–406. http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/5/w393

This article reviews the status of health care for underserved and low-income residents of New Orleans prior to and after the storm, and discusses options for rebuilding the local health care system as well as ensuring access to care for evacuees. Louisiana's health system was divided into two tiers, with a tier of higher quality care available to insured people and a charity system operated by Louisiana State University (LSU) for the uninsured. Much of the population that had been served by Charity Hospital is now using facilities in the LSU system in other parts of the state. There has also been a large displacement of physicians, some of whom have been assimilated into nearby hospitals. Outpatient clinics for specific populations, such as Latinos and recipients of mental health services, were destroyed by Hurricane Katrina and have not yet been restored. Interviews with survivors reveal disruptions in basic services, such as prenatal and mental health care, even among insured patients. The authors suggest a shift away from the two-tiered approach toward a broader, more inclusive health care model. Short-term needs include restoring ambulatory, inpatient, and behavioral health care. Long-term goals include redesigning and rebuilding health care infrastructure and safety net programs, rebuilding stability and financing mechanisms, and expanding access to affordable coverage.

Saenz, Rogelio. *Beyond New Orleans: The Social and Economic Isolation of Urban African Americans*. Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau, 2006. http://www.prb.org/Articles/2005/TheSocialandEconomicIsolationofUrbanAfricanAmericans.aspx

The author examines the social and economic isolation of urban blacks in the United States using data from the 2000 Census. In 2000, New Orleans had the highest rate of African American poverty among cities with the largest absolute numbers of African Americans. Nationwide, about 75 percent of African Americans aged 25 or older did not

have a college diploma and in many major cities whites were more than twice as likely to be college graduates. In the 15 largest cities, one-third to one-half of African American males aged 16 or older were unemployed and in cities such as New Orleans and St. Louis, blacks were three-quarters as likely as whites to have a job. Rates of car ownership and telephone access were also low among African Americans in these cities, especially relative to whites. In large U.S. cities, African American females greatly outnumbered African American males (sex ratios of 85 percent or lower in many cities), due to factors such as incarceration and high mortality among males, which also contribute to extreme isolation. Blacks were 1.5 times more likely to be poor in all but 2 of 15 cities. The author recommends that measures be taken to reduce isolation among African Americans, including skills development programs, funding and access to education, workforce development through businesses in urban neighborhoods, and better planning to address the vulnerability of African American families.

Sard, Barbara, and Douglas Rice. *Changes Needed in Katrina Transition Housing Plan to Meet Families' Needs.* Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, October 2005. http://www.cbpp.org/10-13-05hous.pdf

This report analyzes federal support options for transitional and long-term housing assistance to Katrina evacuees. It discusses FEMA's Individual and Household Program and HUD's Katrina Disaster Housing Assistance Program. The authors argue that neither of these programs will help low-income families cover expenses such as utilities and will continue to create instability for households who are unsure whether they will be eligible for extensions. Families receiving assistance will also need help with relocation and housing searches. They recommend extending the term of the assistance for up to 18 months and using rental housing vouchers.

Schwartz, John. "A Scarred Region Mends, With Help From Friends." *New York Times*, November 13, 2006. http://travel.nytimes.com/2006/11/13/us/13orleans.html

The article describes the involvement of community and faith-based organizations in rebuilding efforts after Hurricane Katrina. Much of the disaster response has come from loosely organized community and faith-based organizations. According to the Corporation for National and Community Service, 219,000 college students have volunteered in the Gulf region—many for Habitat for Humanity. More than 35,000 national service participants have given more than 1.6 million hours of hands-on help to survivors and evacuees. The volunteer organizations reportedly operate with less overhead and fewer requirements, allowing them to be more resourceful and flexible. Many of the volunteers have helped gut and clean houses as well as run clinics and provide legal advice.

Shapiro, Alan, et al. "Providing Primary Care to Underserved Children after a Disaster: A National Organization Response." *Pediatrics* 117, no. 5 (May 2006): S412–15. http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/117/5/S2/S412

Written by a team of pediatricians from hospitals in New York, California, and Arizona, this document is a case study of how medical organizations responded based on field team narratives of medical teams deployed to the Gulf Coast. The authors concentrate on efforts by the Children's Health Fund to establish mobile medical units to serve evacuees. They provide anecdotes about the experiences of victims they served, their efforts to provide clinical care in hazardous and chaotic surroundings, and the process of conducting intake and needs assessments, and they reflect on the mental health needs of storm victims.

Sherman, Arloc, and Isaac Shapiro. *Essential Facts about the Victims of Hurricane Katrina*. Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, September 19, 2005. http://www.cbpp.org/9-19-05pov.pdf

This is a three-page fact sheet presenting data from the 2004 American Community Survey on the poverty and racial composition of people living in areas affected by Hurricane Katrina. The data show that poverty rates in Alabama (16 percent), Louisiana (19 percent), and Mississippi (22 percent) are, respectively, the eighth, second, and worst among all states. The data also show that storm victims were disproportionately African American, and less likely to have a car (54 percent of poor households in New Orleans in the 2000 census lacked a car).

Shores, Elizabeth, et al. *Orleans Parish, Louisiana, Child Care Assessment; Executive Summary*. Mississippi State: Mississippi State University Early Childhood Institute, August 2006. http://earlychildhood.msstate.edu/orleans-summary/orleans-exec-summ.pdf

This is a needs assessment for child care in Orleans Parish, based in part on the location of existing pre-kindergarten and kindergarten facilities. The study incorporates a survey of child care centers, schools, and housing stock, and the prevalence of day care closures after Katrina, to assess gaps in coverage. The paper considers frameworks for restoring child care, allocating resources, providing assistance to families, providing technical assistance to service provides, and creating partnerships.

Smart Growth America. *The Hurricanes' Legacy: Redevelopment in the Gulf Coast and the Nation*. Washington, DC: Smart Growth America, 2005. http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/SGARecommendations.pdf

This document compiles a set of principles and recommendations to guide the rebuilding of New Orleans. The overarching principles are providing affordable, accessible housing; preserving the unique cultural heritage of the region; protecting health, safety, energy security, and the environment; making transportation accessible, equitable, and efficient; expanding job opportunities; planning carefully to spend money wisely; and creating a regional coordinating redevelopment agency. The paper closes by discussing how the challenges in the Gulf Coast region connect to broader issues in urban planning in the United States.

Stanton, Thomas H. *Delivery of Benefits in an Emergency: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina*. Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University Institute of Government, 2007. http://www.businessofgovernment.org/pdfs/StantonKatrinaReport.pdf

This report focuses on the delivery of emergency and financial benefits to survivors of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, in an effort to draw lessons and recommendations for more effective emergency delivery systems. It reviews benefits including TANF, pensions, Social Security, emergency food stamps, unemployment insurance, and emergency cash assistance. The authors conclude that public systems need to develop emergency benefits systems for special circumstances, of which the basic components already exist. However, adequate organizational structures across federal, state, and local government agencies, and other private avenues of assistance are lacking. Because of its capabilities and resources, the federal government should provide the leadership and networking necessary for more effective service delivery, but this will also require participation of all levels of government and other public and private actors.

Strolovitch, Dara Z., Dorian T. Warren, and Paul Frymer. "Katrina's Political Roots and Divisions: Race, Class, and Federalism in American Politics." In *Understanding Katrina: Perspectives from the Social Sciences*. New York: Social Science Research Council, September 28, 2005. http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/FrymerStrolovitchWarren/

This paper takes a broad, structural view in examining the socioeconomic inequalities revealed by Hurricane Katrina. The authors discuss how racial and class inequality were depicted in the news media and by politicians. They examine the long legacy of federal-state conflicts over the role of blacks in southern states, argue that antifederal politics have been strategically deployed by political elites in southern states, and that this political legacy has structured the differences in how blacks and whites perceive the federal response to Katrina.

Testa, Bridget Mintz. "One Year after Katrina: New Orleans Employers See Operations in New Light." *Workforce Management* 85, no. 16 (August 28 2006). http://www.workforce.com/tools/newsletters/wfw/workforce_week_060829upload.htm

This article describes private sector workforce management issues after Katrina. The Hurricane permanently shifted business and workforce operations along the Gulf Coast. Large employers such as Sodexho, State Farm, Entergy, and Tulane University have struggled with labor issues related to financial assistance, health insurance, and personnel management. Employers have struggled to locate and assist their workers. These experiences have led to some permanent changes in business practices. The article profiles the experiences of several employers.

Townsend, Shane, and Nathalie Dajko. *Rapid Assessments of Temporary Housing Camps for Hurricane-Displaced Children and Families*. New York: Save the Children, July 2006. http://www.savethechildren.org/publications/reports/katrina-assessment_final-0706.pdf

The report is based on a rapid assessment conducted in February and March 2006 of the circumstances of children in 20 housing camps in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Site visit teams conducted an appraisal of the built environment followed by one-on-one and group interviews and discussions with camp residents and others. Camps varied in size from 12 to 600 trailers and were located in both urban and rural settings. The report raises concerns about the safety of children living in transitional housing, especially mass-displacement camps. The field teams found that housing density created tensions and family stress. Families reported an inability to access public transportation in many sites, lack of recreation and communal space, lack of lighting, and other hazards. Parents reported child behavioral and emotional problems. Teams identified child protection issues stemming from high levels of parent-child separation, vulnerability to crime and sexual violence, and nonattendance in school. Several recommendations are offered to improve the safety and living circumstances in the temporary camps and to plan for future disasters.

Turetsky, Vicki. *Child Support-Related Provisions in New Katrina Relief Legislation*. Washington, DC: Center for Law and Social Policy, October 25, 2005. http://www.clasp.org/publications/child_support_and_katrina_relief_legislation.pdf

This policy brief examines the child support provisions of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Emergency Response and Recovery Act of 2005, intended to provide supplementary benefits to states affected by the 2005 hurricanes. The author outlines the terms of the legislation, especially the provision that Katrina emergency TANF benefits are not considered assistance, which exempts states from fulfilling many of the TANF program requirements related to child support cooperation and payments. The brief also discusses waivers from penalties that HHS may grant. The author also examines the implications of child support provisions in the proposed Emergency Health Care Relief Act of 2005 and makes recommendations to help states provide effective child support services.

Turner, Margery Austin. *HUD Disappoints in Housing Crisis*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, June 2006. http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=900966

The author faults HUD for its inadequate response to Katrina and contrasts this with its more proactive response to the Northridge Earthquake. She lists several priorities for HUD post-Katrina, including restoring New Orleans' dilapidated public housing, and more creative solutions such as the use of modular housing.

Turner, Margery Austin, and Sheila R. Zedlewski. *After Katrina: Rebuilding Opportunity and Equity into the* New *New Orleans*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, April 2006. http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=311406

This essay synthesizes a collection of proposals to guide the city's social reconstruction, with a focus on connecting New Orleans' low-income residents to mainstream social and economic opportunities. It is based on a collection of Urban Institute papers that address

employment, affordable housing, public schools, young children's needs, health care, arts and culture, and vulnerable populations. It argues for parallel investments in affordable housing, quality public schools, effective job training, health care, and other social infrastructure alongside planned investments in physical infrastructure. The suggestions highlight innovation and experience of other U.S. cities in reducing the risks of poverty and opening opportunities for economic security.

United Methodist Committee on Relief. *40% of the Katrina Aid Today Goal: Reporting on Progress, Indicators and Outcomes for the First 40,000 Cases Entered Into CAN*. New York: United Methodist Committee on Relief, March 2, 2007. http://katrinaaidtoday.org/downloads/report20070302.pdf

This article summarizes the characteristics of 40,000 Katrina-affected families who are clients of Katrina Aid Today's Coordinated Assistance Network (CAN), a network of case managers in a national multiorganizational partnership. The data are from an online database, including eligibility and outreach, demographics, case management capacity, referrals, client needs, services provided, and evaluations of closed cases. The article also discusses limitations in the current reporting system.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services. *Emergency Housing Needs in the Aftermath of Katrina: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity.* 109th Cong., 1st sess., September 15, 2005. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:25950.pdf

This is a 223-page transcript of testimony from a broad array of community housing advocates, government officials, and housing developers. Some topics covered include the status of temporary housing, the relationship between housing and physical health, the costs associated with rebuilding permanent housing, community redevelopment strategies, and the capacity of nonprofits to respond to the development challenge.

U.S. Congress, House. *A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina*. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., February 15, 2006. http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/15feb20061230/www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/mainreport.pdf

This is a major document produced by a bipartisan select committee in the House of Representatives to assess the response of federal agencies to Hurricane Katrina. One chapter describes the process of convening the committee and holding hearings. The report is critical of failures at all levels of government and complementary of the roles played by nonprofits and first responders. The report examines information gaps, when failures of communication prevented decisive action, sources of inflexibility within government, and the inadequacy of the National Response Plan. Other chapters address housing, health services, charitable organizations, and other elements of the disaster response and relief effort.

U.S. Department of Commerce. *The Gulf Coast: Economic Impact and Recovery One Year after the Hurricanes*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, 2006.

This report from the Economics and Statistics Administration on the economic impacts of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita is an extensive compilation of facts and tables on the national economy, the economies of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, and the New Orleans, Louisiana, and the Gulfport-Biloxi, Mississippi, metropolitan statistical areas.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. *Fact Sheet for Transportation of Evacuees with Medical Needs*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2005. http://www.hospitalreliefefforts.org/hospitalreliefefforts/content/hhsfactsheet.pdf

This fact sheet provides guidance on evacuation procedures for patients with ongoing medical needs who were transported to different parts of Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. It mentions the work of the HHS Medical Travel Center, which arranges for the transportation of evacuees who require en route medical care. It also provides guidance on procedures for placing and discharging patients with ongoing medical needs. Separate sections of the fact sheet deal with insurance, reimbursement, and logistical questions.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Child Welfare Resource Center for Organizational Support. "Coping with Disasters: Tips for Child Welfare Agencies." *Child Welfare Matters.* Portland: University of Southern Maine, Spring 2006. http://muskie.usm.maine.edu/helpkids/rcpdfs/cwmatters3.pdf

This article includes tips, recommended practices, and lessons learned in disaster planning for welfare agencies. It advocates that welfare agencies recognize the reality of possible crises and plan effectively for them. The article offers lessons learned from welfare agency administrators who have been through disasters and makes recommendations on how to prepare for future disasters, including, importantly, communicating with larger emergency management efforts and ensuring the availability of support staff in times of disaster. The article describes how a natural disaster adds extra stress to welfare agency workers dealing with the trauma experienced by clients as well as that experienced by their own families, increasing staff turnover, which is detrimental to emergency management.

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. *Current Housing Unit Damage Estimates: Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, February 12, 2006. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/GulfCoast_HousingDamageEstimates_021206.pdf

This is an estimate of housing unit damage along the Gulf Coast, using data from FEMA and the Small Business Administration. Damage estimates are provided for 136 counties and parishes in five states. Tables provide breakdowns of affected housing by extent of damage, type of dwelling, and insurance coverage, if any, of the inhabitants.

———. "Funding for Recovery in the Hurricane's Wake, Part I." *Research Works* 3, no. 9 (October 2006). U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/ResearchWorks/oct_06/RW_vol3num9t1.html#t1

This is the first of two articles that discuss HUD's response to the 2005 hurricanes and focuses on HUD's $11.5 billion in emergency supplemental appropriations. The article reports that as of January 2006, HUD funds had been allocated to affected states as follows: Louisiana, $6.2 billion; Mississippi, $5.1 billion; Texas, $75 million; and Alabama, $74 million, including the $11.5 billion and other HUD funds. The article draws on the HUD report *Current Housing Unit Damage Estimates: Hurricanes, Katrina, Rita, and Wilma,* which combined FEMA and Small Business Administration data sources, and describes the estimation methods used.

———. "Funding for Recovery in the Hurricanes' Wake, Part II." *Research Works* 3, no. 10 (November 2006). U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/ResearchWorks/nov_06/RW_vol3num10t1.html#t1

This is the second of two articles that discuss HUD's response to the 2005 hurricanes, and focuses on HUD's allocation of $5.2 billion in supplemental Community Development Block Grant recovery funds. HUD allocated the statutory maximum, $4.2 billion, to Louisiana. The article describes HUD's disbursement process, including conducting a needs assessment, inviting state input, and meeting with the states.

———. *HUD Katrina Accomplishments - One Year Later*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2006. http://www.hud.gov/news/katrina05response.cfm

This is a brief on HUD's accomplishments, initiatives, programs, and outcomes related to affordable housing after Hurricane Katrina. It uses data from FEMA and the Small Business Administration to assess housing damage in the Gulf region. Most data are county level; neighborhood-level data are collected in some cases. It describes the Defense Appropriation Act of December 2005, which provides $11.5 billion in Community Development Block Grant disaster supplemental funding for areas affected by hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. The brief describes how each state used its HUD funds for housing projects. By August 2006, HUD will have built 100 new units in New Orleans. Additional funding was issued to Native American tribes affected by the hurricanes. The HUD Center for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives designed information services about federal and local resources for victims of the hurricanes. The HUD Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity educated those affected by the hurricanes on their rights and options for fair housing, and Field Policy and Management staff offered counseling sessions to those families attempting to repurchase and rebuild homes, targeted to those now living in HUD-assisted housing.

U.S. Government Accountability Office. *Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Continued Findings of Fraud, Waste and Abuse*. Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2007. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07300.pdf

This study finds that FEMA lost tens of millions of dollars in improper or fraudulent payments associated with both hurricanes Katrina and Rita because of ineffective preventive controls. Erroneous payments include improper rental assistance, duplicate payments, and improper payments to nonqualified immigrants, foreign students, and other non-U.S. residents.

———. *Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Federal Actions Could Enhance Preparedness of Certain State-Administered Federal Support Programs*. Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, February 2007. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07219.pdf

This report focuses on how federal programs that provide supports (including Social Security, Supplemental Security Income, Food Stamps, Unemployment Insurance, and TANF) to low-income populations responded to the challenges created by Hurricane Katrina, and how their efforts can be improved in future crisis situations. GAO reviewed policies, reports, and plans, and interviewed program officials at the federal level and in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. GAO found that the hurricanes created huge new demand for UI benefits, TANF, and food stamps. While some state programs had in place emergency plans, which enabled them to respond to new logistical challenges and increases in applications, others were unprepared. GAO found that using 800 numbers, issuing debit cards, and implementing Internet applications increased flexibility and expedited services. It also examines the problem of improper payments and mentions various efforts underway to improve program integrity during disasters. The report mentions HHS efforts underway to improve links with state program administrators, but cautions that some gaps remain in federal officials helping states plan systematically for the needs of the TANF program and its population.

———. *Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Provision of Charitable Assistance*. Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2005. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06297t.pdf

The report, based on fieldwork conducted by GAO and analysis of data provided by Indiana University's Center on Philanthropy, focuses on the charitable sector's response to Hurricane Katrina. Charities raised more than $2.5 billion after the hurricanes to assist in hurricane relief and recovery. Efforts for coordination included information sharing through daily conference calls and a shared electronic database. Conference calls were reportedly of limited informational value involving too many organizations. Lack of capacity to use the electronic database, insufficient development of the electronic case management system, and the lack of electricity and Internet access hindered the utilization of this system. There were also concerns about the scope of the relief effort, since the Red Cross did not provide services in certain areas that were deemed too dangerous. Smaller charities, including local Salvation Army chapters and local churches, provided relief services in these areas.

———. *Lessons Learned for Protecting and Educating Children after the Gulf Coast Hurricanes*. Washington, DC: GAO, 2006. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06680r.pdf

Using federal, state, and local data and elements of disaster plans, interviews with officials, and a site visit to Louisiana, GAO examined education and foster care services for children affected by Hurricane Katrina, the plight of foster children, children reported missing, and displaced students. The report also reviews the challenges and response of the foster care system, including staff dislocations and loss of case files. The report concludes that state and local disaster plans could improve protections for children by integrating the child welfare and education systems into their disaster planning, improving data-sharing practices, maintaining better contact information for staff and foster parents, developing evacuation instructions, and implementing more flexibility in federal reporting requirements. State officials expressed the need for waivers and shared concerns about the long-term availability of federal funding, which is linked to performance goals.

Urban Land Institute. *A Strategy for Rebuilding New Orleans, Louisiana.* Washington, DC: Urban Land Institute. November 2005. http://www.uli.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTFILEID=10080&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm

This report draws on the recommendations of a panel of urban planning professionals advising Mayor C. Ray Nagin on proposals to redevelop New Orleans after Katrina. The panel addressed five key areas: government effectiveness, economic development and culture, urban and city planning, infrastructure, and housing. The report is also informed by 300 interviews with various stakeholders. Key goals for rebuilding include restoration of New Orleans culture, diversity and equity, job training, and safety. The report includes specific policy recommendations embedded in a larger development framework.

Vigdor, Jacob L. "The Katrina Effect: Was There a Bright Side to the Evacuation of Greater New Orleans?" *Working Paper* 13022. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2007. http://www.nber.org/papers/w13022.pdf

Using 2004–2006 data from both the monthly Current Population Survey and the CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement, this working paper estimates the net impact of the Hurricane Katrina–related evacuation on indicators of well-being. The author is particularly interested in the hypothesis that residing in an economically depressed region has deleterious effects on individuals' socioeconomic outcomes, and that Katrina evacuees may be more well-off in the cities to which they evacuate. The author examines the historical economic and social forces prevailing in New Orleans. Using a differences-in-differences methodology, the author compares the outcomes of the evacuees with those of nonevacuees, controlling for various characteristics that affect employment and earnings. The author finds no evidence that pre-Katrina residents of New Orleans had been disadvantaged by their location, as nonreturning evacuees worked and earned less

than they had before the storm. Labor market conditions in the metropolitan areas to which evacuees relocated did not have significant impacts on their earnings and employment either. Evacuee income from public assistance and self-employment did increase, offsetting some of the loss in earnings. Evacuees who returned to the New Orleans area had better outcomes than those who remained elsewhere.

Webster, Richard A. "Health Care in N.O. Scarce for Returning AIDS Patients." *New Orleans City Business*, July 24, 2006.
http://www.neworleanscitybusiness.com/viewStory.cfm?recID=16225

The article discusses experts' recommendations that AIDS patients wait to return to New Orleans until their health care systems and services are further rehabilitated. Though there have been improvements, other cities are more likely to offer better services, especially for those who do not have Medicaid or Medicare. Sixty percent of the 7,420 AIDS patients from New Orleans have already returned despite diminished resources; only three out of eight HIV clinics have reopened. There are now few specialists in the area, and many patients must travel long distances for complicated health problems. The HIV Outpatient Program lost almost three-quarters of its staff, increasing staff to patient ratios from 1:23 to 1:41. Scientists are attempting to map new infections in the area post-Katrina, and expect to find a rise in Latino infection rates. Stress is expected to increase substance abuse and complicate health problems for AIDS patients. Stress from lost housing and jobs may divert patients from their drug regimens, leading to detrimental health effects since HIV medication is complex and requires rigorous and precise intake.

Weil, Frederick, and Edward Shihadeh. *The Burdens of Social Capital: How Socially-Involved People Dealt with Stress after Hurricane Katrina*. Presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Sociological Society. Montreal, Canada, January 17, 2006.
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p103858_index.html

This conference paper, written by sociologists from LSU, draws upon pre-Katrina survey data and three waves of post-Katrina surveys in Baton Rouge to examine how community involvement, connections, and trust affect a range of outcomes including attitudes toward authorities and public policy, fears about crime, feelings of stress and optimism, race relations, and attitudes toward the evacuees. Measures from the study are taken from Robert Putnam's Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey. The authors found that people who were more socially connected experienced higher stress during the crisis than people who were less socially connected, on whom fewer demands were placed. After the immediate crisis subsided, those with higher levels of social engagement were able to recover more quickly than those who were socially isolated.

Williams, Erica, et al. *The Women of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast: Multiple Disadvantages and Key Assets for Recovery II*. The Institute for Women's Policy Research, Washington, DC, August 2006.
http://www.iwpr.org/pdf/D465.pdf

This report analyzes the association of gender and poverty with labor market effects before and after Hurricane Katrina. The analysis uses decennial Census data, the Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS), and Bureau of Labor Statistics data. The authors examine women's income and labor market participation in three metropolitan areas: New Orleans, Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula, and Beaumont–Port Arthur. The areas experienced an 83 percent drop in the number of single mothers after the storm and the workforce shifted from being predominantly female (50.5 percent) to predominantly male (52.7 percent). Using the PUMS microdata from the 2000 Census, the authors find little overlap between the highest and lowest paying jobs for women and men in New Orleans and where there is overlap, men out-earn women in each occupation. The highest paid occupations were predominantly held by Caucasians, with some exceptions in nursing, education, and finance-related occupations. Differences in educational attainment were important contributors to the earnings differential for blacks and women, and were important entryways to managerial and other professional jobs. The authors recommend specific attention to ensuring women access to better paying jobs, and other recommendations from the first "Women of New Orleans" report by Barbara Gault et al.

Winston, Pamela, et al. *Federalism After Hurricane Katrina: How Can Social Programs Respond to a Major Disaster?* Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, June 2006. http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=311344

This analysis focuses on the balance of responsibilities between federal, state, and local governments in four key programs providing human services to low-income people, and examines how these programs adapted to the emergency circumstances after Hurricane Katrina. The programs are (1) housing assistance provided by HUD and FEMA, (2) income replacement through the unemployment insurance program, (3) health care through the Medicaid program, and (4) TANF cash assistance. The authors argue that several factors prevented a coherent response, including complex jurisdictional rules governing the disbursement of funding, the strained fiscal capacity of some of the affected states, the lack of clarity about the federal response, and the lack of speed and consistency in the federal response. The authors outline several recommendations, including an explicit definition of how assistance should be provided in emergencies, clarification of responsibilities at different levels of government, consideration of different funding mechanisms, and consideration of what executive branch and congressional actions would be required to activate the emergency response.

Zedlewski, Sheila R. *Building a Better Safety Net for the* New *New Orleans*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, February 2006. http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=900922

This article discusses government safety net programs that will need to be put into place in New Orleans to assist vulnerable groups such as the elderly, people with disabilities, and single mothers. Using 2004 American Community Survey data, the author reviews some of the challenges these groups faced prior to Katrina. For example, in 2004, the share of elderly in New Orleans was similar to the national average, but one in five elderly were poor (about twice the national average). More than one in ten New Orleans adults aged 16 to 64 had disabilities, and 27 percent were impoverished and experienced

high unemployment. Louisiana's ability to improve social safety net programs was hampered by its low fiscal capacity (ranked 48th in the country). The author examines how federal welfare programs might shore up gaps in the safety net. Early responses to Katrina have relied upon existing government safety net programs such as food stamps, TANF, WIC, and school meals programs. For example, the food stamp program provided over $400 million in benefits to hurricane victims, but there will be barriers to the use of food stamps in the future because of the burdensome reapplication process. There is a need to increase TANF benefits beyond the $200 per month currently provided in Louisiana. Longer-term interventions for vulnerable populations will need to include comprehensive employment and training programs as well as asset building and supportive housing. The author suggests expanding skills training through the community college system, increasing teen pregnancy prevention programs, and helping individuals gain access to Individual Development Accounts.